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ABSTRACT 
The degree to which European Union (EU) policy-making is representative 
of citizens’ preferences is a central contested issue in the debate over the EU’s 
‘democratic deficit’. Previous studies have demonstrated that in many cases 
political representatives share their voters’ attitudes to the EU. However, this 
research has rarely considered the substance of actual legislative policy-making 
in the EU institutions. Scrutinising the popular image that EU policy-making is 
unresponsive to public demands, the thesis investigates EU-level representation 
along the ‘domestic route’, on which citizens’ preferences intrude policy-
making through their national governments in the Council of the EU. Using a 
range of original and existing datasets, the four papers investigate three classic 
assessment criteria of representation (mandate fulfilment, responsiveness, con-
gruence) with methods ranging from mixed effects regressions to quantitative 
text analysis. 
Three central findings emerge: first, national governments are responsive to 
their domestic public opinion when negotiating and voting on legislative acts in 
the EU. Regarding legislative conflicts over left-right issues, responsiveness is 
stronger with majoritarian than proportional electoral systems and peaks when 
national elections are imminent. When it comes to pro-anti integration conflicts, 
responsiveness is conditional on the salience of EU issues in national political 
arenas. Second, executive coordination and parliamentary oversight in EU af-
fairs limit the discretion of national ministers in EU negotiations and help gov-
ernments to deliver their electoral mandates. Third, final EU policy output is 
most responsive to and congruent with the views of those national publics that 
have clear-cut opinions on a policy issue and care intensely about it.  
These findings are evidence of surprising patterns of citizen representation in 
EU policy-making. They suggest that politicisation of the EU and the diffusion 
of executive coordination and parliamentary oversight in EU affairs could 
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strengthen representation. Yet, evidence remains scarce that better representa-
tion will end the EU’s legitimacy crisis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Assessing Citizen Representation in the European Union 
 
 
 
O WHAT EXTENT, UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS, AND IN WHAT WAY DO PUBLIC 
preferences influence policy-making in the European Union (EU)? This 
is the broad research question this thesis aims to answer. While this question is 
empirical in nature, its relevance – in particular for a wider public audience and 
for policy circles – derives from the idea that a close correspondence between 
citizens’ preferences and policy-making is a central characteristic of democracy. 
As Andrew Rehfeld (2009: 214) has put it, the relationship between ‘citizen 
preferences and the laws that govern them’ is the ‘central normative problem’ of 
democracy. And while most democratic theorists would argue that ‘perfect’ 
translation of citizens’ preferences into policy, without constitutional con-
straints, without time for deliberation, and with zero-lag and zero-gap, may not 
be desirable, most also agree that some form of translation is an important value 
of democracy (Sabl 2015).  
Not surprisingly, the question of whether some form of citizen representa-
tion exists in EU policy-making is also a central contested issue in one of the 
most vibrant academic and public debates on the EU: namely the debate about 
the EU’s alleged ‘democratic deficit’ (e.g. Crombez 2003; Føllesdal and Hix 
2006; Hix 2008; Lord 2001; Majone 1998; Moravcsik 2002). Since the beginning of 
the 1990s, scores of newspapers, television shows, and academic journals have 
T 
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been filled with mostly theoretical based judgements of EU democracy.1 In a 
nutshell, two different lines of argument have been presented: On the one hand, 
some argue that the EU suffers from a democratic deficit due to unchecked ex-
ecutive dominance, an institutionally weak European Parliament (EP) elected in 
‘second-order’ elections, and a ‘felt’ distance between the voters and the EU that 
all contribute to stark policy drift away from voters’ ideal policies (see Føllesdal 
and Hix 2006; Weiler, Haltern, and Mayer 1995). On the other hand, some 
scholars reject this ‘standard version’ of the democratic deficit thesis by stress-
ing existing chains of democratic delegation, checks and balances, a comparison 
of the EU to national non-majoritarian institutions (such as central banks), and 
the potential Pareto-efficiency of EU policy-making (Crombez 2003; Majone 
1998; Moravcsik 2002). 
Claims about citizen representation are a central element of both lines of ar-
gument. On the one hand, liberal intergovernmentalists, who are sceptical 
about the democratic deficit, stress that ‘EU policy-making is, in nearly all cases, 
(…) responsive to the demands of European citizens (…) in a way quite similar 
to national polities’ (Moravcsik 2002: 605, 618). On the other hand, the advo-
cates of the democratic deficit thesis counter that even if EU policy-making 
might match people’s preferences such a relationship is unlikely to represent 
stable, reliable, and causal public control. Instead, considering the severe lack of 
electoral accountability of EU politics, any correlation between people’s views 
and EU policy-making is unlikely to be more than a ‘happy coincidence’ 
(Føllesdal and Hix 2006: 556). 
But despite the centrality of these claims for the debate, our actual empirical 
knowledge about the relationship between citizens’ preferences and EU policy-
																													
1 See Rittberger (2007: 28-29) on the rise of the democratic deficit debate in academic and jour-
nalistic articles. 
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making has remained very limited, in particular at the stage of actual legislative 
negotiations: do public preferences intrude into the EU policy-making process? 
How close are policy outputs to public preferences? Do such outputs serve eve-
ryone, a European median voter, citizens in certain countries, or more narrow 
interests?2 And, is an association between policy outputs and public preferences 
consistent, stable, reliable, and causal – or just a result of ‘benevolent authoritar-
ianism’?3 The four papers of this thesis speak directly to these questions, pro-
vide some important answers, and point to key areas of potential societal and 
political change that could improve citizen representation in the future. 
 
CITIZEN REPRESENTATION IN EU STUDIES 
The study of the influence of public preferences (or opinion4) on policy-
making has a long tradition in the US context (e.g. Erikson, MacKuen, and 
Stimson 2002; Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993; Gilens 2005, 2012; Lax and 
Phillips 2012; Page and Shapiro 1983; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995). 
More recently, the field has also produced significant cross-national, compara-
tive work on the topic (e.g. Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Soroka and Wlezien 
2010; Wlezien and Soroka 2012) as well as a number of further country studies 
(e.g. Brooks 1990; Hakhverdian 2010, 2012; Jennings and John 2009). However, 																													
2 There is disagreement between Majone and Moravcsik vs. Hix and Follesdal on the extent to 
which EU policy output is Pareto-efficient. 
3 Føllesdal and Hix (2006: 545) have stressed that any association between public preferences 
and EU policy output may be more a result of benevolent policy-makers than of a causal rela-
tionship representing real public control over EU policy-making.  
4 Throughout the text I use ‘public preferences’ and ‘public opinion’ interchangeably. In line 
with the existing literature, this thesis assumes that public opinion is the major signal of public 
preferences which policy-makers receive (in particular, see Geer 1996). 
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with regard to the EU the linkage between opinion and policy (Wlezien and 
Soroka 2007) has been neglected by academic scholarship for decades, especial-
ly throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, when scholarship on US policy-
making blossomed.  
Historically, empirical and analytical reasons justified this neglect. In terms 
of empirical relevance, scholars observed that national publics took an uninter-
ested but generally favourable view of European integration in virtually all 
opinion survey data from the 1950s up to the 1970s. This observation came to be 
known as the ‘permissive consensus’ and suggested that the integration project 
had a very low electoral relevance, and hence that the public was unlikely to 
have a noticeable influence (Haas 1958: 16-19; Inglehart 1970; Lindberg and 
Scheingold 1970). In addition, from an analytical perspective the EU was mostly 
viewed as an international organisation for which appropriate standards of 
democratic legitimacy were not obvious and might not necessarily include di-
rect links between citizen preferences and political negotiations (see Dahl 1999; 
Majone 1998; Moravcsik 2002; Wimmel 2009).  
Yet, by the mid-1990s empirical findings and analytical lenses changed: at 
least since the Maastricht Treaty, European integration was increasingly politi-
cised in domestic arenas (Hooghe and Marks 2006, 2009), including a series of 
highly contentious referendums on integration (Hobolt 2009). Public opinion on 
Europe became more polarised (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007) and the media 
attributed more attention to it (Boomgaarden et al. 2010; Vliegenthart et al. 
2008). In addition, particularly the strengthening of the EP (Rittberger 2007) 
turned the EU into a structure resembling many core elements of national de-
mocracies – from the separation of powers to a bicameral legislative system. 
This suggested that the EU could be viewed as a political system to be analysed 
with the toolkit of comparative politics (Hix 1994, 1999; Hix and Høyland 2011) 
and that the democratic quality of its policy-making could be measured against 
the standards applied to national systems (Crombez 2003; Dahl 1999; Zweifel 
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2002). While these developments did not provide an answer to the normative 
question of what democratic standards the EU should be measured against, they 
made it analytically viable to apply nation-state standards focusing on citizen 
representation. As most democratic theorists would probably agree that such 
standards are either adequate or too high – but not too low – for supranational 
political systems, criteria of representation provide ‘hard’ tests of the EU’s 
democratic quality.  
Recent studies have provided key evidence that justifies an extended re-
search agenda on representation in the EU context. Importantly, scholars have 
demonstrated that the fulfilment of the most fundamental necessary condition 
for any impact of citizens’ preferences on EU politics is being fulfilled: Europe’s 
citizens (increasingly) use politically meaningful channels like national or Eu-
ropean elections to express their preferences on the EU by choosing parties and 
candidates on their EU-related positions (e.g. Hobolt and Spoon 2012; Schoen 
2008; Tillman 2004; De Vries, Edwards, and Tillman 2010; de Vries 2007, 2009). 
This suggests that EU politics in general, and questions of the scope and level of 
integration in particular, have become electorally salient, providing incentives 
to policy-makers to respond to citizens’ preferences. Indeed, scholars have 
demonstrated that these expressions translate into attitudinal mass-elite linkag-
es. Citizens and their political representatives share similar positions on the EU, 
even though it remains a matter of discussion whether elites mainly follow the 
public or rather cue it (e.g. Carrubba 2001; Costello, Thomassen, and Rosema 
2012; Hellström 2008; Hooghe 2003; Ray 2003; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 
2007; Schmitt and Thomassen 2000; Steenbergen, Edwards, and de Vries 2007; 
Williams and Spoon 2015). 
Regrettably, existing research has largely stopped at elite positions and only 
recently entered the world of legislative behaviour. It thus remains unclear 
whether political elites merely share or even only pretend to share public posi-
tions in EU politics or whether they actually adjust their legislative behaviour. 
	 18	
Even if political actors share public positions in manifestos, elite surveys, or the 
media portrayal, this does not necessarily imply that they actually behave as 
‘agents of the public’ in concrete legislative negotiations, when taking positions or 
voting on legislative acts. A few studies on the voting behaviour of members of 
the EP (MEPs) have found at least some evidence that MEPs are responsive to 
public opinion (Arnold and Sapir 2013; Lo 2013). Yet, work on national gov-
ernments in the Council of the European Union (henceforth, the Council), as the 
EU’s primary legislative body, is entirely lacking to date. 
Going one step further from legislative behaviour to actual policy output, the 
very limited existing research on the impact of public preferences has almost 
exclusively focused on ‘systemic responsiveness’. This small but emerging liter-
ature ascertains whether the amount of EU legislative acts reacts to changes in 
public Euroscepticism, and whether in turn the public ‘thermostatically’ adjusts 
its Euroscepticism in response to EU-level policy activity (Arnold and de Vries 
2009; Bølstad 2015; Franklin and Wlezien 1997; Toshkov 2011; de Vries and 
Arnold 2011). 
 The existing evidence is inconclusive. Toshkov's (2011) important contribu-
tion using vector auto-regression models of opinion and legislative output re-
ports some troubling evidence that the amount of EU directives negatively re-
acted to popular Euroscepticism before the mid-1990s but not afterwards. This 
is surprising, since increasing politicisation in the 1990s and 2000s should theo-
retically suggest a strengthening and not a weakening of policy-makers’ incen-
tives to react to public opinion. In contrast, Bølstad's (2015) work employs an 
error-correction model that can capture long- vs. short-run relationships be-
tween opinion and policy. He finds that public opinion in the ‘core’ (founding 
members) as well as the ‘periphery’ (Denmark, Ireland, UK) generally has a 
substantial impact on the EU’s legislative output. Unfortunately, it remains un-
clear whether these seemingly different results are a product of the different 
models employed (vector auto-regression vs. error-correction) or rather of the 
	 19	
territorial decomposition of the opinion series in Bølstad (2015). Most im-
portantly, a core limitation of the literature on systemic responsiveness is that it 
tests a relationship between opinion and the sheer quantity of acts. So far, there 
has been a complete lack of research regarding the influence of citizens’ prefer-
ences on the substantive content of EU policies. 
This thesis addresses important gaps in the existing literature. It studies the 
relationship between EU policy-making and public opinion by focusing on the 
legislative behaviour of national ministers in the Council and assessing the cor-
respondence between the very substance of positions, votes, final policy output 
and domestic public opinion. 
 
CONCEPTS AND ASSESSMENT CRITERIA OF CITIZEN REPRESEN-
TATION 
Throughout the thesis I assume that citizens’ views on policy-making in the 
EU can be conceptualised along two dimensions: first, ‘left-right’ preferences refer 
to questions of redistribution; interventionism vs. economic freedom; libertari-
an vs. authoritarian and materialist vs. post-materialist values. This corre-
sponds to a broad, potentially multidimensional, understanding of the left-right 
semantic that incorporates newer, non-economic aspects that are often referred 
to under the labels ‘new politics’, ‘authoritarian-libertarian’ or ‘GAL-TAN’ 
(Flanagan and Lee 2003; Inglehart 1971; Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990). Second, 
‘pro-anti integration’ preferences refer to questions of the EU system’s scope of 
authority (breadth of EU activity, number of policy areas) as well as its level of 
authority (decision-making power of EU institutions) and its geographical in-
clusiveness (membership, affected constituencies) (Börzel 2005; Schmitter 1970; 
de Wilde and Zürn 2012). These two theoretical dimensions have been the clas-
sic model for understanding the EU’s political space (Hix 1999; Marks and 
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Steenbergen 2002). However, their empirical relevance and relatedness in citi-
zens’ attitudes remains a matter of discussion (e.g. Gabel and Anderson 2002). 
The thesis is based on a theoretical model of policy representation that maps 
out the main linkages between citizens’ preferences and policy and the corre-
sponding causal mechanisms which lead to citizens having an impact. Scholars 
widely agree that policy representation is almost entirely based on mechanisms 
flowing from ‘elections as instruments of democracy’ (Barro 1973; Ferejohn 
1986; Powell 2000). According to the empirical literature, two mechanisms are 
central; these have been formulated in different terminologies by several au-
thors (Mansbridge 2009; Stimson 1999; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995): 
first, citizens use their vote in elections to (re-)shape the composition of parlia-
ment and government so that elected policy-makers best share their respective 
policy preferences and are likely to implement corresponding policies. This 
mechanism of ‘electoral turnover’ is accompanied by a second that is based on 
the idea that policy-makers may engage in ‘rational anticipation’ of this very 
turnover. In order to forestall any electoral sanctions at the end of the legislative 
term policy-makers may change their behaviour and align policy-making to 
changes in citizens’ preferences during the term. This is achieved through close 
tracking of and reaction to public opinion (e.g. expressed in opinion polls, the 
media, or on the street) as the primary signal of citizens’ preferences.  
From a game theoretical perspective, electoral turnover highlights the role of 
elections as ‘adverse selection’ games, in which citizens attempt to select policy-
makers that are ‘good types’ sharing their preferences (Fearon 1999; 
Mansbridge 2009). In turn, rational anticipation captures the role of elections as 
sanctioning games, in which policy-makers calculate how much they can devi-
ate from the principal’s preferences without being punished at the ballot box 
(Barro 1973; Ferejohn 1986).  
From the perspective of political theory, electoral turnover loosely relates to 
Jane Mansbridge's (2003) models of ‘gyroscopic representation’ as well as ‘promis-
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sory representation’. When the elected representatives follow citizens’ prefer-
ences, they may do so because they have similar preferences or political core 
values themselves and are honest and principled in pursuing them (gyro-
scopes). Or, because as agents to a principal they succeed in keeping the politi-
cal promises on which they have been elected – irrespective of their own prefer-
ences (promissory representatives) (Mansbridge 2003). While gyroscopes act in 
citizens’ interests out of intrinsic motivation, the core meaning of promissory 
representation assumes that representatives are externally motivated to keep 
their promises in order to avoid electoral sanctions (Rehfeld 2009: 220-221). In 
turn, rational anticipation closely relates to ‘anticipatory representation’ in the 
theoretical literature. As in promissory representation, representatives are sen-
sitive to electoral sanctions under anticipatory representation. But they are will-
ing to compromise their promises if they expect future voters to have changed 
their preferences in other directions, as voters are expected to audit representa-
tives not only on keeping promises but also on keeping in touch with voters’ 
changing preferences. Anticipatory representation might also create incentives 
for representatives to manipulate voters’ preferences to make them more ap-
proving of their actions (Mansbridge 2003: 517).5  
Pinning down and operationalising the relationship between citizens’ prefer-
ences and policy-making in empirical data is far from trivial. The papers of this 
thesis thus focus on three assessment criteria of citizen representation for which 
																													
5 In a stylised understanding of the popular ‘delegate/trustee’ distinction, gyroscopes come 
closest to the trustee end of the spectrum. They rely on their own judgement instead of instruc-
tions, pursue the long-term interests of their constituents (whereas classic trustees may focus on 
the interests of the nation), and are not very sensitive to electoral sanctions. In turn, the repre-
sentative under anticipatory representation is a delegate, who relies on the judgement of his 
constituents, also pursues short-lived preferences, and is highly sensitive to electoral sanctions 
(for a fuller discussion see Mansbridge 2003; Rehfeld 2009). 
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satisfactory empirical models have been built. First, mandate fulfilment refers to 
the idea that political representatives (or parties) keep the promises they made 
in election campaigns when legislating during the term (e.g. Budge and 
Hofferbert 1990; Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994; Thomson 2001). Liv-
ing up to electoral promises does not directly imply that citizens’ preferences 
are realised, as promises could substantially diverge from citizens’ preferences. 
But to the extent that citizens select representatives whose promised policy 
goals match their own, keeping these promises realises citizens’ preferences as 
long as their preferences are fairly stable over a legislative term. In fact, in a 
model of promissory representation mandate fulfilment is an empirical assess-
ment criterion for citizen representation. Moreover, if electoral promises reflect 
representatives’ genuine preferences, principles, and beliefs, some degree of 
mandate fulfilment will also be observed in a model of gyroscopic representa-
tion. Much depends on the level of measurement of promises: at the level of 
very specific policy goals (i.e. clearly-defined programmes) gyroscopes may not 
always fulfil their mandates, as they are expected to act with considerable dis-
cretion providing leeway for creative policy solutions (Mansbridge 2003: 522). 
But if the measured promises accurately reflect representatives’ broad political 
convictions – beyond specific programmes – gyroscopes’ behaviour should cor-
respond to their promises. 
The second and third criteria more directly assess the linkage between citi-
zens’ preferences and representatives’ legislative behaviour. Responsiveness re-
fers to the idea that due to different levels of public opinion, representatives 
behave differently and the substantive difference in their behaviour corre-
sponds to the substantive difference in opinion (Lax and Phillips 2012: 148). 
Roughly speaking, if opinion is different, representatives’ behaviour should be 
different in the ‘same direction’. For instance, if public opinion is more ‘leftist’ 
in one situation and less so in a second, responsiveness demands that repre-
sentatives push more ‘leftist’ policies (e.g. regulation, educational expansion) in 
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the first than in the second situation. If responsiveness occurs within a legisla-
tive term, it is an empirical assessment criterion of citizen representation in a 
model of anticipatory representation. Sanction-sensitive representatives react to 
different levels of public opinion in their behaviour because they believe cur-
rent opinion is a signal of citizens’ preferences at the time of the next elections 
(Geer 1996; Mansbridge 2003: 517; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995: 545). 
Note that neither promissory nor gyroscopic representation expects significant 
within-term responsiveness from representatives, as gyroscopes follow their 
intrinsic principles and promissory representatives keep promises made before 
the last election. 
Third, congruence refers to an absolute concordance between majority opin-
ion and representatives’ behaviour (Lax and Phillips 2012: 148). If the majority 
of citizens favour a certain policy, congruence is indicated if representatives 
push (e.g. with their legislative votes) this policy. In turn, if the majority of citi-
zens oppose a policy, congruence is indicated if representatives abstain from 
pushing or realising it. All other cases indicate incongruence. According to 
Mansbridge (2003: 526), congruence relates to all three models of representa-
tion: In gyroscopic representation we would expect congruence ‘to the extent 
that the representative was elected descriptively to duplicate the median voter 
but less to the extent that the representative was elected to behave as a princi-
pled notable’ (Mansbridge 2003: 526). In promissory representation congruence 
will occur as representatives may make very specific policy promises concord-
ant with citizens’ preferences and keep these very promises when in office. 
And, in anticipatory representation congruence is the constant goal of the rep-
resentative to secure re-election, and it should peak before elections. Some level 
of congruence can then be seen as a ‘global’ assessment criterion of citizen rep-
resentation.  
Importantly, while responsiveness and congruence are related, they are in no 
way identical. For instance, it is true that a representative under anticipatory 
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representation aims to be equally responsive to and congruent with public pref-
erences. But conceptually, very strong responsiveness can even impede congru-
ence: if 10% vs. 40% of people favour a policy, empirical tests of responsiveness 
would expect different behaviours from representatives in these situations, 
whereas congruence demands that this policy should not be implemented in 
either situation, as a majority is against it. Here, ‘overshooting’ responsiveness 
would lead to incongruence. In fact, empirically responsiveness has not only 
been found to be too weak but sometimes also too strong to congruently realise 
majority opinion (see e.g. Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993: 92-95; Lax and 
Phillips 2012). Moreover, responsiveness is not a necessary condition for con-
gruence and relatively high levels of congruence can emerge without substan-
tial responsiveness, i.e. tracking and anticipation of public preferences by the 
representative. This is particularly the case if representatives are selected to de-
scriptively resemble the preferences of the median voter and these preferences 
change little. The representatives can then act independently of public prefer-
ences, but will still mostly act congruently with them. 
Table 1.1 summarises the relationship between the models of representation 
and the three assessment criteria. This demonstrates that each of the assessment 
criteria employed in this thesis relates to at least one vision of representation, 
and congruence is the most universally valued criterion. The three assessment 
criteria can each be applied to either the individual or the collective behaviour of 
legislators. On the level of individual representatives, their policy positions in 
negotiations and their votes on legislation can fulfil their mandates, be respon-
sive or congruent with citizens’ preferences. On the level of the collective of all 
legislators, the policy output agreed on can likewise be assessed with all three 
criteria. Certainly, the constituency of citizens whose preferences we view as 
relevant for representation may be different on the individual and collective 
level. In the case of EU policy-making we might be able to link individual legis-
lators (such as national ministers in the Council or MEPs) to their constituency, 
	 25	
but whether EU-level policy output should represent an ‘average’ EU citizen 
(e.g. a fictive EU median voter) can be contested from a normative perspective. 
The thesis takes a clear stance (in Paper 4) on who is best represented by the 
EU’s policy output, and the conclusion highlights the normative questions 
posed by these findings. 
 
TABLE 1.1: POLITICAL THEORY MODELS OF REPRESENTATION AND 
ASSESSMENT CRITERIA 
  Models of representation 
  Gyroscopic rep-
resentation 
Promissory 
representation 
Anticipatory 
representation 
Assessment 
criteria 
Mandate fulfilment: 
correspondence be-
tween electoral prom-
ises and behav-
iour/policy 
v Strong for 
broad policy 
goals 
v Weak for 
specific policy 
goals 
v Strong v Weak (only 
coincidentally if 
preferences are 
stable) 
Responsiveness: 
directionally aligned 
impact of preferences 
on behaviour/policy 
v Weak (only 
coincidentally) 
v Weak 
within term 
v Strong 
between terms 
v Strong with-
in and between 
terms 
Congruence:  
concordance between 
preferences and behav-
iour/policy 
v Medium for 
‘principled’ rep-
resentative 
v Strong for 
‘descriptively 
elected’ repre-
sentative 
v Strong v Medium to 
strong 
 
 
THE CHAIN OF POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE EU 
Having conceptualised the assessment criteria of citizen representation, I in-
troduce the ‘chain of policy representation’ in EU policy-making as a broad 
theoretical model of the central linkages connecting citizens’ preferences with 
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legislative behaviour and policy outputs at the European level.6 Figure 1.1 
shows how citizens’ preferences can – in theory – shape EU policy output 
through three essential linkages.  
First, citizens’ pro-anti integration and left-right preferences must affect their 
voting behaviour in national and European elections. The strength of this link-
age is influenced by the quality of the respective electoral arenas. Most funda-
mentally, elections can only function as transmission belts of citizens’ prefer-
ences if citizens are able to cast votes among a set of clearly identifiable and real 
political alternatives (Bartolini 1999: 545; Powell 2004: 97-98). If parties or can-
didates essentially offer the same positions on issues or do not clearly com-
municate them, voters will not be able to identify an alternative that comes 
close to their own preferences (i.e. elections do not serve their selection pur-
pose). While electoral competition in this sense is a fairly universal feature on 
the left-right dimension (Bakker, Jolly, and Polk 2012; Huber and Inglehart 
1995), European mainstream parties have largely shied away from competing 
on and emphasising pro-anti integration issues due to latent internal divisions 
and coalition considerations (van der Eijk and Franklin 2007; Green-Pedersen 
2012; Parsons and Weber 2011; Steenbergen and Scott 2004; van de Wardt 2014). 
 Another important feature of the quality of electoral arenas is mass media as 
the primary source of citizens’ information about political issues and parties’ 
positions. Adequate information provision through media has been found to be 
an important prerequisite for representation of various sorts (Besley and 
Burgess 2002; Snyder and Strömberg 2008). This is again especially relevant for 
citizens’ pro-anti integration preferences, since media coverage on integration 
and EU issues is still very limited, despite a general upward trend over time 
																													
6 The model was developed by adapting Bingham Powell’s (2004: 92) ‘chain of democratic respon-
siveness’ to the EU context. 
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(Boomgaarden et al. 2010, 2013). Hence, different electoral arenas may provide 
for better or worse transmission of citizens’ preferences, and their varying qual-
ity may especially make a difference to the transmission of citizens’ pro-anti 
integration preferences. 
 
FIGURE 1.1: CHAIN OF POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE EU 
At the second linkage, voting behaviour must influence policy-makers’ pref-
erences (e.g. policy positions) by shaping the composition of and majorities in 
the EU’s three policy-making bodies: the European Commission (henceforth, 
the Commission), the Council, and the EP. Institutional mediation refers to a wide 
range of institutional features of national political systems and the EU system 
that intervene at this point in the chain. At the stage of national elections and 
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government formation, electoral systems are of prime concern, as they define 
how citizens’ votes are transformed into parliamentary majorities that usually 
determine who will get into government. Their effect on representation is con-
tested and arguably varies across assessment criteria: with regard to respon-
siveness, some authors have suggested that responsiveness should be higher in 
majoritarian electoral systems than in proportional electoral systems (Chang, 
Kayser, and Rogowski 2008; Kayser and Lindstädt 2015; Rogowski and Kayser 
2002). The argument is that changes in vote share typically produce larger 
changes in seat shares under single-member district (SMD) systems, which 
should incentivise governments to be highly reactive to public demands during 
the legislative term in order to secure their majority. However, scholars have at 
the same time argued that proportional (PR) electoral systems produce more 
congruence than majoritarian (McDonald, Mendes, and Budge 2004; Powell 
2000). The idea is that coalition bargaining under PR is likely to moderate gov-
ernment policy towards median opinion, while single-party governments un-
der SMD can deliver ideologically distorted mandates. In essence, SMD could 
‘suffer’ from overshooting responsiveness that hinders actual congruence (see 
Lax and Phillips 2012). However, some recent work has questioned these con-
clusions about the effects of electoral systems on representation.7  
At the stage of national governments’ policy formulation, executive and leg-
islative institutions may influence citizen representation. Different forms of co-
ordination of EU affairs in the national executive potentially advantage certain 
citizens at the expense of others. Importantly, some national executives rely on 
executive coordination of EU policy-making, which entails inter-departmental 
																													
7 For instance, Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2004) and Rickard (2009, 2010, 2012) stress that SMD 
creates incentives to respond to geographically concentrated interests that are often much nar-
rower than median preferences. Blais and Bodet (2006), Golder and Lloyd (2014), and Golder 
and Stramski (2010) question the PR advantage on congruence. 
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information exchange on EU-level policy formulation and centralised reconcili-
ation of conflicts (e.g. in the prime minister’s office). In other countries, EU af-
fairs are generally not coordinated within the executive, with potentially strong 
discretion for and weak oversight of ministers and civil servants (Gärtner, 
Hörner, and Obholzer 2011; Kassim 2013; Kassim, Peters, and Wright 2000). 
Depending on the issue, this may, for instance, influence which parties can fulfil 
their mandate because they hold certain ministerial portfolios. In a similar vein, 
legislative institutions, in the form of parliamentary oversight of EU affairs, 
vary starkly between member states (Winzen 2012, 2013). This may likewise 
empower particular political forces (e.g. opposition parties, small coalition 
partners) in shaping governments’ policy positions, and therefore influence cit-
izen representation. 
At the European level, new institutional innovations affect citizen represen-
tation at the stage of institutional mediation. For instance, the strengthening 
link between political majorities in the EP and the appointment of the president 
of the Commission, at least since the 2014 EP elections, may incentivise the 
Commission to propose different policies (Hix 2008).  
At the third linkage, policy-makers preferences must turn into actual public 
policies during the legislative negotiations at the EU level (e.g. output, votes on 
output). This is conditioned by features of the legislative decision-making process 
and procedures. Bargaining power is a decisive factor here. For instance, if 
some member states are generally more successful in influencing policy-making 
in the Council, their citizens should ceteris paribus also be better represented by 
EU policies. Research on Council bargaining success is inconclusive but it 
seems to have rejected the naïve intergovernmentalist proposition (Moravcsik 
1998) that a subset of populous and economically powerful states simply ‘get 
what they want’ (Thomson 2011: 212-226). Some research has even found that 
small states do surprisingly well in Council bargaining (Golub 2012b). Certain-
ly, the distribution of bargaining power may also vary from issue area to issue 
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area or depending on the legislative procedure (e.g. involvement of the EP, de-
cision rule). Hence, different legislative decision-making setups may substan-
tially influence citizen representation. 
Feedback loops are an important caveat of this model of policy representation 
in the EU. Not only may public preferences causally influence EU policy-
making, but the policy-making processes and policy output itself may in turn 
shape citizens’ preferences: EU policy-makers may engage in priming, framing 
and persuasion activities in order to influence public opinion (Druckman 2004; 
Zaller 1992) and the public may react to EU policy-making by adjusting their 
preferences (Wlezien 1995). I will turn to such issues of endogenous citizens’ 
preferences in the research design section of this introduction. 
 
STUDYING THE CHAIN OF POLICY REPRESENTATION 
The chain of policy representation (Figure 1.1) maps out two major pathways 
connecting citizens with EU-level policy-making: a ‘European route’ running 
through EP elections, Commission formation and EP majorities; and a ‘domestic 
route’ through national elections, national government formation, and bargain-
ing in the Council. Both routes are worth studying. However, the papers of this 
thesis focus on the domestic route as the more likely route of public influence. 
First, the Council is the most powerful actor in legislative politics compared to 
the Commission or the EP (Costello and Thomson 2013; Franchino and Mariotto 
2012; Thomson 2011d). Second, national elections compared to European elec-
tions function much better as transmission belts for citizens’ preferences (Hix 
and Marsh 2008). The domestic route is therefore likely to be the more fruitful 
starting point for understanding policy representation in the EU. Hence, three 
of the four papers of this thesis focus on politics in the Council, and the fourth 
is based on a theoretical model, in which bargaining in the Council plays a key 
role. 
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The papers study different relationships in the chain of policy representation. 
They vary with regard to dependent variable, independent variable, assessment 
criteria of representation tested, and their main contribution. Paper 1 is devoted 
to the relationship between public opinion and national governments’ policy 
positions on controversial legislative acts negotiated in the Council. Its main 
focus is on how patterns of government responsiveness vary between legisla-
tive conflicts over left-right and pro-anti integration issues. It starts from the 
observation that the two kinds of issues play very different roles in domestic 
electoral competition. Whereas left-right is a ‘super-dimension’ that is highly 
and reliably salient for vote choice in national elections (e.g. van der Brug, 
Franklin, and Tóka 2008), EU integration is an evolving issue whose electoral 
salience varies greatly over time (e.g. Stevens 2013; De Vries 2010). This influ-
ences the relative importance of the first (electoral arenas) and second (institu-
tional mediation) linkage on the chain of policy representation, leading to two 
stylised modes of responsiveness. As governments know that left-right issues are 
reliably salient in electoral arenas, they can systematically plan their respon-
siveness efforts and focus on adjusting them to factors of institutional media-
tion, such as electoral systems (‘systematic mode’). Meanwhile, as governments 
face substantial uncertainty about whether pro-anti integration will be salient in 
the next election, they will only sporadically respond to public opinion, when 
EU integration becomes salient in the electoral arena (‘sporadic mode’). 
In line with this argument, the paper finds that the responsiveness of nation-
al governments’ policy positions in the Council is moderated by the public sali-
ence of integration on pro-anti integration issues, but by electoral systems and 
cycles on left-right issues. The paper does not only contribute to our under-
standing of government responsiveness in the Council specifically, but also 
suggests that variability in the electoral salience of an issue dimension may af-
fect what factors influence responsiveness in other contexts (electoral arenas vs. 
institutional mediation). 
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Paper 2 also focuses on responsiveness to public opinion but instead of look-
ing at governments’ policy positions, it investigates their voting behaviour in 
the Council. It starts from the important observation that virtually all legal acts 
put to a vote in the Council have eventually passed with a clear majority in fa-
vour. This poses the question of what the purpose of opposition votes is, as they 
never have a realistic chance to stop or amend legislation. The argument is that, 
among possible other motives, governments use opposition votes to send sig-
nals about their political positions to their domestic public (Lupia and 
McCubbins 1998). This suggests that voting behaviour in the Council must be 
understood with a view to the national electoral arena. If opposition votes are 
signals about issue positions, they should be especially important if the related 
issues become salient in domestic party competition. 
The paper finds that on legal acts extending the level and scope of EU au-
thority the probability of opposition votes significantly increases with public 
Euroscepticism, i.e. negative opinion on integration. Moreover, this effect is 
stronger when domestic opposition parties increase their emphasis on the EU in 
their manifestos. These findings support the interpretation of opposition votes 
as signals about governments’ positions on pro-anti integration. The paper also 
demonstrates that these signals resonate in domestic media coverage, which is 
higher on acts with opposition votes. In sum, the paper demonstrates the strong 
relevance of electoral arenas for voting behaviour in the Council, at least on 
pro-anti integration legislation. It thereby also confirms findings from Paper 1 
using a different dependent variable. 
Paper 3 focuses on mandate fulfilment and the ways in which is affected by 
institutional mediation. Starting from the widespread belief that unchecked ex-
ecutive dominance at the EU level allows individual ministers to drift away 
from their government’s electoral mandate (e.g. Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008; 
Ladrech 2010), the paper asks whether political institutions can limit their dis-
cretion. It develops a novel model of policy-making by multiparty coalitions 
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that is a synthesis of Martin and Vanberg's (2011) ‘compromise model’ and the 
‘ministerial discretion’ models (Laver and Shepsle 1990, 1996). The key argu-
ment is that executive and legislative institutions provide information and deci-
sion rights to the party machineries of coalition partners that enable them to 
control ministers, and enforce policy compromises reflecting central govern-
ment ideology. Thereby, these institutions limit ministerial drift and orient min-
isters’ EU-level policies towards the key electoral promises of their domestic 
support coalition of parties. 
The findings show that governments’ policy positions in the Council more 
reliably reflect the supporting parties’ central economic left-right ideology if 
policy-making in EU affairs is strongly coordinated within the national execu-
tive (Kassim 2013), and in the case of minority governments, if parliamentary 
oversight is strong (Winzen 2012). In addition, compromises limiting ministeri-
al drift are facilitated if the government is a majority government (as opposed 
to minority) and if ideological divisiveness in the support coalition increases the 
incentive to control ministers. Normatively, policy compromises are valuable 
not only because they circumscribe ministerial discretion, but also because they 
enforce more inclusive, joint decision-making that has intrinsic value from the 
perspective of deliberative political theory (Mansbridge and Warren 2013). The 
paper also contributes to the broader literature on multiparty policy-making by 
refining and questioning key results of Martin and Vanberg (2011), in particu-
lar, regarding the role of legislative institutions for coalition compromises.  
Paper 4 is the thesis component that focuses on actual EU-level policy output 
at the third linkage of legislative decision-making. It investigates the relation-
ship between citizens’ support for policy change on important political issues 
	 34	
and the EU’s record of implementing the desired changes.8 The focus is on the 
relative representation of citizens across the different member states: whose 
nationals are represented best by EU policy-making? The argument is that na-
tional governments will push policy change on issues with strong domestic 
public support, particularly if the issue is highly salient to their citizens. In con-
trast, they will be willing to give in to other governments on issues their citizens 
are split about, and particularly if the public cares little about the issue. This 
opens up opportunities for logrolling and vote-trading (Achen 2006a; Aksoy 
2012) between national governments when opinion about and salience of issues 
varies across countries. Assuming a largely equal distribution of bargaining 
power between national governments (Thomson 2011e), EU policy should re-
spond to and be congruent with the opinions of citizens in those countries that 
care the most about an issue.  
The findings demonstrate that EU policy output is most responsive to opin-
ion in the five to ten countries where the issue is most salient to citizens. In turn, 
congruence between EU-level policies and country-level opinion increases 
when national citizens have clear-cut and salient views on an issue. The results 
highlight the fact that the EU’s political system is unlikely to represent an EU-
wide median voter or average citizen. Instead, its decision-making processes 
and procedures follow strong logics of territorial representation – with national 
governments as key legislators that respond to their geographically defined 
constituencies (i.e. their citizens). The geographical distribution of salience and 
opinion is crucial under such arrangements. Thereby, the paper also contributes 
to the broader literature on citizen representation in other political systems with 
‘territorial’ or ‘upper’ chambers of parliament (e.g. federal states, US) that has 																													
8 While all the other papers exclusively look at legislative politics, some of the policy issues in 
Paper 4 are constitutional (e.g. issues concerning the Lisbon Treaty). Hence, here the thesis goes 
beyond secondary legislation and also considers institutional change in the treaties. 
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so far neglected the relevance of the sub-national distribution of opinion and 
salience. 
 
TABLE 1.2: OVERVIEW OF THE FOUR PAPERS 
 Paper 1 Paper 2 Paper 3 Paper 4 
 ‘Systematic or 
Sporadic? 
Modes of Gov-
ernment Re-
sponsiveness’ 
‘Government 
Responsiveness 
in the EU: Evi-
dence from 
Council Voting’ 
‘Enforcing the 
Compromise’ 
‘Territorial Rep-
resentation and 
the Opinion-
Policy Linkage’ 
Dependent  
variable 
Governments’ 
initial policy 
positions in the 
Council (left-
right, pro-anti 
integration) 
Governments’ 
opposition votes 
in the Council 
(pro-anti inte-
gration) 
Governments’ 
initial policy 
positions in the 
Council (eco-
nomic left-right) 
Implementation 
of policy change 
(policy issues) 
Main independ-
ent variable 
Public opinion 
(left-right, pro-
anti integration) 
Public opinion 
(pro-anti inte-
gration) 
Election mani-
festos (left-right) 
Public opinion 
(policy issues) 
Assessment  
criteria 
Responsiveness Responsiveness Mandate fulfil-
ment 
Responsiveness, 
congruence 
Representational 
linkage 
Electoral arenas, 
institutional 
mediation 
Electoral arenas Institutional 
mediation 
Legislative deci-
sion-making 
Main  
contribution 
Modes of re-
sponsiveness 
vary between 
left-right & pro-
anti integration 
Opposition votes 
act as position 
signals to do-
mestic publics 
Executive and 
legislative insti-
tutions facilitate 
compromises & 
limit ministerial 
drift 
Geographical/ 
territorial distri-
bution of opin-
ion & salience 
matters 
 
 
In sum, the four papers provide significant evidence for patterns of citizen 
representation in EU policy-making. They demonstrate that representation goes 
beyond attitudinal mass-elite linkages and systemic responsiveness of the EU’s 
legislative output. Public opinion and party programmes influence substantive 
policy positions and votes in the Council, the salience of EU integration and 
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strong political institutions strengthen representation, and final policy output 
reflects cross-national differences in public support. Certainly, the papers are 
just a first step and only represent a small share of possible research projects on 
the chain of policy representation in the EU. Nevertheless, together they pro-
vide a first picture of citizen representation in EU policy-making by covering 
each linkage of the chain, all three assessment criteria, different dimensions of 
citizens’ preferences, and the individual as well as collective behaviour of legis-
lators. Table 1.2 provides an overview of the four papers. 
 
DATA, MEASUREMENT, AND METHODS 
In this section, I discuss key issues concerning data, measurement, and 
methods that reappear across the four papers.  
 
Independent variables: citizens’ preferences and parties’ electoral promises 
Throughout the thesis I exclusively use public opinion data as a proxy for cit-
izens’ preferences. While this is the common choice in the representation litera-
ture, it is by no means uncontroversial. Many studies have concluded that citi-
zens’ surveyed political opinions display little structure, are highly malleable in 
response to additional information, and are sensitive to question-wording and 
framing, calling into question whether they can be signals of well-ordered pref-
erences (for a critique, see e.g. Althaus 2003). This could lead to the conclusion 
that citizens lack meaningful political preferences all together, or at least that 
their preferences cannot be measured by surveys.  
But several studies have argued that this picture is too pessimistic. First, 
while most citizens may lack informed opinions on most issues, for each salient 
issue there is an ‘issue public’ made up of few citizens holding informed opin-
ions on the issue. These issue experts can provide cues to the wider public on 
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what opinion it should adopt on the issue (e.g. Lupia and McCubbins 1998; 
Zaller 1992). Second, while surveys are no perfect measurement instrument of 
citizens’ preferences, random measurement error on the level of the individu-
als’ survey responses tends to cancel out when aggregating opinion across re-
spondents (e.g. a country or group estimate) (e.g. Page and Shapiro 1992). 
Third, while framing effects do exist and may also affect differently worded 
questions, they shrink in competitive elite environments that are typical for 
Western democracies (Druckman 2004).  
Moreover, if we set aside for a moment the question of how well public opin-
ion data reflects any well-ordered preferences, Geer (1996) has persuasively 
argued that, no matter their quality, for policy-makers opinion polls are simply 
the best available signal of citizens’ preferences. What other more reliable and 
representative source could politicians rely on to retrieve information about 
citizens’ preferences? Relying on opinion data in representation research is 
therefore no perfect solution, but there is a clear line of justification that collec-
tive opinion in surveys reflects meaningful preferences and that surveys are the 
best available measurement tool for these preferences.  
The public opinion data in all papers is taken from the Eurobarometer (EB), a 
survey series of frequent samples of the populations in all EU countries fi-
nanced by the Commission and conducted by TNS Opinion. The weaknesses of 
the EB surveys are well-known: in terms of implementation, EB data suffers 
from slightly smaller sample sizes per country (typically, 1000), multi-stage 
sampling, and relatively low survey completion rates compared to other social 
science surveys like the European Social Survey (Schmitt 2003: 248). Fortunate-
ly, sample sizes are not a problem for this thesis, since it only uses country-level 
aggregates of opinion for which standard errors are small. From the point of 
view of design, it has been claimed that the Commission uses the EB as a ‘gov-
ernance tool’ (Signorelli 2012) and tries to design the questionnaire so as to re-
ceive the ‘desired answers’ (Höpner and Jurczyk 2012, 2015). This does not af-
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fect Papers 1, 2, and 3, as they rely on only two very widely used items (left-
right self-placement and support for EU membership, see below) for which this 
problem is not pressing. In Paper 4 I discuss in detail the consequences of ques-
tionnaire design by the Commission and argue that they should not result in 
systematic biases relevant to the paper. The minor weaknesses of the EB are 
counterbalanced by its strong qualities for cross-temporal and cross-national 
comparisons: the series covers all EU countries and provides half-yearly 
measures of a large range of standard items. This quality is unprecedented con-
sidering that, for instance, the European Social Survey is only conducted every 
two years and not in all countries for all waves. 
The major opinion measures I use pertain to citizens’ left-right and pro-anti 
integration preferences. To capture public preferences on left-right conflicts I 
use the country-level average of the Eurobarometer’s left-right self-placement 
item for which respondents are asked to place their own political ideological 
position on a scale ranging from 1 (left) to 10 (right). Scholars have demonstrat-
ed that these self-placements are systematically related to attitudes on econom-
ic, cultural, and materialist vs. post-materialist conflicts (Huber 1989; Knutsen 
1997), including specific issues such as immigration (de Vries, Hakhverdian, 
and Lancee 2013), civil liberties and human rights (Cohrs et al. 2005, 2007), and 
a variety of environmental issues (Kvaloy, Finseraas, and Listhaug 2012; 
Neumayer 2004; Skrentny 1993; Thalmann 2004). Therefore, these placements 
are a substantive measure of citizens’ left-right preferences. 
Citizens’ preferences on pro-anti integration are measured as the country’s 
average support for EU membership (‘Generally speaking, do you think (your 
country’s) membership in the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, or 
neither good nor bad?’). While we have some evidence that attitudes towards 
pro-anti integration are arguably multidimensional (Boomgaarden et al. 2011), 
there is little work on which measure best captures common variation in these 
attitudes. The choice of the Eurobarometer’s membership item is therefore 
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mainly justified by common practice in the field (in particular, Bølstad 2015; 
Toshkov 2011) and by the limited availability of alternatives.  
The second independent variable used throughout this thesis is govern-
ments’ electoral promises. I use the Comparative Manifesto Project’s (CMP) data-
base of parties’ hand-coded election manifestos to measure this variable 
(Lehmann et al. 2015). The CMP is the largest time-series cross-section collec-
tion of election manifestos in political science. Except for Malta it covers all EU 
countries (with some gaps, especially regarding Latvia). Human coders divide 
the manifestos into quasi-sentences, content analyse them, and allocate them 
according to their substantive meaning into one of 57 categories/codes. The 
counts for the categories can be used to construct scales as measurements of 
parties’ electoral promises. 
For some readers expert surveys on party positions (such as the Chapel Hill 
Expert Survey on Parties) may seem to be a natural alternative to the CMP. 
However, for the purpose of studying citizen representation using the CMP is 
preferable for several reasons: first and foremost, whereas the CMP’s main pur-
pose is to capture electoral promises (as statements in election manifestos), ex-
perts will – willingly or unwillingly – be influenced by parties’ actual behaviour 
in assessing their position (Budge 2000; Volkens 2007). Using expert survey da-
ta to judge mandate fulfilment would then become circular as the expert as-
sessments are no pure measurement of parties’ promises, but already entail 
their actual behaviour – that we would like to check against their promises. This 
point applies more generally as all the papers of this thesis attempt to explain 
the behaviour of governments and the EU system. Manifesto-based data is 
much more exogenous to this behaviour than expert data.  
Second, the CMP is most likely to provide measurements that are compara-
ble across all EU countries and time (McDonald, Mendes, and Kim 2007). This is 
due to its universal coding categories and criteria, whereas expert surveys may 
suffer from ‘differential item functioning’ (Bakker et al. 2014; King et al. 2004) – 
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the different perception of terms like ‘left’ or ‘right’ by experts in different coun-
tries – as well as from limited time-variation as experts use parties’ ‘ideological 
reputation’ as a cue. Third, a further advantage of the CMP for studying repre-
sentation is that the CMP measures party positions at the time of elections. 
Thereby, it allows us to discern the relative contribution of the two electoral 
mechanisms (electoral turnover and rational anticipation, see below), whereas 
expert surveys conducted at arbitrary times in the electoral cycle would not al-
low this. 
In line with the public opinion measures, the CMP measures I use in the pa-
pers pertain to electoral promises on left-right and pro-anti integration. For left-
right I use the CMP’s summative RILE score, which is calculated by subtracting 
the category counts for 13 ‘leftist’ categories from those for 13 ‘rightist’ catego-
ries and dividing by the sum of counts for all categories (i.e. the sum of all cod-
ed quasi-sentences). RILE reflects parties’ promises on key left-right contrasts 
such as ‘Market Regulation’ vs. ‘Free Enterprise’, ‘Protectionism: Nega-
tive/Positive’, or ‘Controlled Economy’ vs. ‘Economic Orthodoxy’ (for a recent 
evaluation of RILE, see Budge and McDonald 2012). According to Budge (2013), 
RILE is a deductive measure, as it was not constructed from regularities in the 
data (e.g. by factor analysis or other multivariate techniques), but categories 
were identified a priori so as to reflect theoretical writings about the left-right 
division at the beginning of the 20th century.  
Unsurprisingly, there is disagreement on the extent to which RILE adequate-
ly reflects ‘cultural’ left-right issues such as immigration or civil rights (e.g. 
Alonso and da Fonseca 2011; Protsyk and Garaz 2011) which play no prominent 
role in a classic understanding of the left-right semantic, but have been inte-
grated into a multidimensional understanding of left-right in recent years (e.g. 
Flanagan and Lee 2003; Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990; De Vries, Hakhverdian, 
and Lancee 2013). Paper 3 on mandate fulfilment adjusts for this caveat by ex-
cluding observations that relate to cultural left-right issues. Similarly, some 
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studies are sceptical about the use of RILE for post-communist party systems 
(of which we have 11 in the EU-28). For instance, Tavits and Letki (2009) 
demonstrate for Poland and Hungary that parties that were right-wing accord-
ing to RILE increased government spending and left-wing parties decreased it 
during the period of market and democracy transition. Certainly, our intuition 
tells us that the opposite should be the case. However, these findings actually 
do not demonstrate that RILE lacks any construct validity in post-communist 
countries, but may simply indicate that parties in these systems have not kept 
their promises on the RILE dimension, perhaps precisely because they may 
have ambiguous stances on it. Nevertheless, in Papers 1, 2, and 3 I demonstrate 
the robustness of results when excluding post-communist countries. 
For pro-anti integration, I use a simple EU scale from the CMP that is the 
count of positive quasi-sentences on EU integration minus the count of negative 
quasi-sentences divided by the count of all coded quasi-sentences. While to my 
knowledge this scale has not been validated, it appears to be an obvious choice 
as only two categories of the CMP codebook clearly relate to EU integration. 
 
Dependent variables: policy preferences, behaviour, and output 
With regard to the dependent variables in this thesis, I attempt to improve 
inferences by data triangulation: in particular, Papers 1 and 2 have common the-
oretical roots but test their hypotheses on different kinds of data. Paper 1 relies 
on the Decision-making in the European Union (DEU) dataset (Thomson et al. 
2006, 2012), which provides spatial information on governments’ initial negotia-
tion positions in the Council from expert interviews with bureaucrats and dip-
lomats in Brussels. The weaknesses of expert data on the Council are well-
known: first, the question of post-rationalisation (or post-diction) bias (Bueno 
de Mesquita 2004) potentially impairs validity, as experts could wrongly recon-
struct actors’ positions in order to best fit their personal beliefs about positions 
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or a negotiation outcome they already knew. Second, selection bias limits the 
generalisability of findings, as existing datasets only cover ‘salient’ legislative 
files, i.e. legislation that received public attention in the media, and are not a 
random draw from the population of Council acts (for a comprehensive 
discussion of the DEU approach, see also Mattila 2012). The prime advantage of 
expert data is relatively high levels of variation, since experts normally report 
several different positions that were taken by different member states’ delega-
tions during negotiations. 
In turn, Paper 2 relies on a dataset of governments’ voting behaviour in the 
Council (Hagemann 2015), which also forms the basis for the reporting of 
Votewatch Europe (www.votewatch.eu), a transparency organisation based in 
Brussels (see also Hagemann 2007). In contrast to expert data, voting data nei-
ther suffers from post-rationalisation nor from selection bias. Votes are officially 
recorded and public voting (at least since the Lisbon Treaty) is fairly compre-
hensive covering all votes on legislative files (while excluding many non-
legislative votes). However, voting data also has a key drawback: variation in 
voting data is very limited; that is, a strong consensus norm still seems to pre-
vail at this public stage of Council politics (Heisenberg 2005), which is epito-
mised by just 1.46% opposition votes in the Council in the 1999-2011 time peri-
od examined in Paper 2. As acts are only put to vote when a majority has been 
secured beforehand, and as experts report much higher levels of controversy 
than voting data suggests, this poses questions about the extent to which voting 
data reflects member states’ actual preferences and/or behaviour regarding a 
specific act. Paper 2 argues that voting in the Council, in fact, is probably pri-
marily a tool used by governments to signal broad and general positions to the 
public rather than to reveal policy-specific and policy-relevant preferences or 
behaviour.  
Therefore, the two data sources complement each other: whilst expert data 
lacks generalisability but excels in variation, the reverse is true of voting data. 
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Whereas expert data is strong in providing information on governments’ poli-
cy-specific positions, voting data records governments’ actual behaviour, which 
is potentially motivated by broader considerations. The substantial overlap in 
findings between Papers 1 and 2 should therefore indicate a high reliability of 
results. While Paper 3 also relies on DEU expert data, Paper 4 provides an en-
tirely novel dataset on the EU’s implementation record and policy output with 
regard to 167 policy issues that appeared on the EU’s agenda after Eastern en-
largement in 2004. This dataset is a central contribution of the thesis and is de-
scribed and evaluated in detail in Paper 4.  
 
Methods: electoral mechanisms and causal inference 
The four papers of this thesis all rely on mixed or fixed effects regression 
analyses as their prime toolkit for statistical inference. Furthermore, single pa-
pers also employ methods from quantitative text analysis (Paper 2) (see 
Grimmer and Stewart 2013) as well as factor analysis (Paper 4).  
A key methodological issue common to Papers 1, 2, and 3 is the disentan-
glement of the two electoral mechanisms of citizen representation – electoral 
turnover and rational anticipation. If citizen representation originates from the 
electoral replacement of political representatives (that are of different types or 
make different electoral promises) and from the representatives’ response to 
citizens’ (changing) preferences, we have to estimate both mechanisms jointly 
so as not to misattribute effects to one or the other. The thesis follows Stimson 
(1999) (see also Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995), who suggests a quite 
straightforward procedure for estimating both mechanisms: this is based on the 
joint inclusion of a measure of citizens’ preferences (in this thesis: public opin-
ion) and a measure of government type/promises (in this thesis: government 
positions from election manifestos) in each regression model. The coefficient on 
citizens’ preferences is then controlled for government type/promises and 
	 44	
should solely reflect the rational anticipation mechanism, i.e. governments’ ef-
forts at adjusting their behaviour to citizens’ preferences. In turn, the coefficient 
on government type/promises is controlled for fluctuations in citizens’ prefer-
ences and should solely reflect the impact of government type/promises (for 
instance, mandate fulfilment). 
A key challenge and often a limitation of empirical representation studies is 
causal inference. As I have outlined in the previous section, citizens’ prefer-
ences may not only influence policy-making, but there may also be important 
feedback loops, i.e. citizens’ preferences react to politicians’ cues and policy 
output. In methodological terms, this raises the question of endogeneity in the 
form of reversed causality or simultaneity bias. While in the case of mass-elite 
linkages, citizens’ attitudes may be shaped by elites’ attitudes, in this thesis, the 
main concern is that citizens’ attitudes could be shaped by the individual or 
aggregate legislative behaviour of representatives (e.g. their policy positions, 
votes, policy outputs).  
In the literature on attitudinal mass-elite linkages on European integration 
the issue of endogeneity has most frequently been addressed through instru-
mental variable (IV) estimations (e.g. Carrubba 2001; Steenbergen, Edwards, 
and de Vries 2007). Citizens’ attitudes are instrumented with exogenous predic-
tors on the individual level or the group level of party supporters (such as age, 
gender, occupation, education, and income). The key condition that has to hold 
for the IV approach to be valid is the ‘exclusion restriction’, i.e. the exogenous 
predictors must not influence the dependent variable through any other route 
(including mediating variables) than through their impact on citizens’ attitudes. 
While this is credible at the individual level (e.g. the age of a particular re-
spondent does not influence a political representative’s attitude in any other 
way than through influencing the respondent’s attitude that in turn influences 
the representative’s attitude), it becomes more questionable at aggregated lev-
els. For instance, the national average income may not only influence citizens’ 
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aggregated Euroscepticism but it may also influence elites’ Euroscepticism di-
rectly (e.g. because elites care about the welfare effects of integration). As this 
thesis operates with country-level aggregates of citizens’ preferences, an IV ap-
proach would have little credibility.  
A second solution to the endogeneity issue is the use of VAR and related 
time-series models with Granger causality tests. This solution is prominent in 
much of the literature on the opinion-policy linkage, and some of the literature 
on mass-elite linkages (e.g. Bølstad 2015; Hakhverdian 2010, 2012; Hellström 
2008; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995; Toshkov 2011; Williams and Spoon 
2015). Granger tests infer causality from the temporal ordering of movements in 
policy and opinion over time using distributed lag structures of both. A central 
identifying assumption of these models is that opinion and policy influence 
each other with a delay of at least one time lag, i.e. that effects are not contem-
poraneous. While this is a strong assumption in itself (especially if time periods 
are years or even electoral cycles), the main problem for this thesis is that we 
entirely lack time-series data on governments’ positions, behaviour, or policy 
output at the EU level. The variation in all of the available datasets (including 
expert data and the novel data presented in Paper 4) is not sufficient to obtain 
comparable and reliable time-series estimates for any of the dependent varia-
bles.  
Like key parts of the policy representation literature (e.g. Gilens 2012; Lax 
and Phillips 2012), Papers 1, 2, and 49 of this thesis therefore have to rely on less 
sophisticated causal identification. As the popular empirical methods of causal 
identification outlined above are not available, the focus is on ‘plausibility 
probes’ which suggest a dominant direction of causality but cannot ultimately 
																													
9 Note that Paper 3 only focuses on mandate fulfilment for which the direction of causality is of 
little concern. 
	 46	
prove it. Essentially, I consider which cross-sectional pieces of evidence in the 
papers point towards bottom-up (from citizens to elites) or top-down (from 
elites to citizens) dynamics in the relationship between public opinion and poli-
cy-making.  
For instance, in Paper 1 I argue that the available evidence speaks for bot-
tom-up causality, since the correlation between public opinion and govern-
ments’ policy positions is strongest in situations of high electoral pressure. Im-
portantly, it is stronger before elections, for electorally more vulnerable incum-
bents in majoritarian electoral systems, when opposition parties politicise Eu-
ropean integration, and when integration is an important national political is-
sue. This is relevant as Jacobs and Shapiro (2000: 43) have argued that active 
cueing and manipulation of opinion by political elites is the strategic choice in 
times of low electoral pressure but not if electoral incentives are imminent, 
since then ‘it is less risky and faster to respond to public opinion than attempt 
to change it’.10 The stronger correlations between opinion and policy positions 
in situations of high rather than low electoral pressure therefore suggest a dom-
inance of bottom-up over top-down causality.11 Similarly, in Paper 4 I consider 
which cases are most likely to see manipulation of opinion by elites, and show 
that citizens’ demands and policy do not correlate more strongly in these cases, 
which they should if top-down causality were dominant.12 
																													
10 For a similar, specific formulation of this argument with regard to referendums on integration 
(that create electoral pressures) see Steenbergen, Edwards, and de Vries (2007: 19), who argue 
that referendums should strengthen bottom-up linkages (i.e. influence of citizens on elites). 
11 The same argument about electoral pressure also applies to Paper 2, although I do not present 
it in the text to avoid repetition. 
12 Besides national political elites’ influence on public opinion, negative or positive feedback 
from policy, i.e. the adjustment of citizens’ preferences in response to exposure to policies, rep-
resents a second sort of potential feedback loop that may result in endogeneity. Negative feed-
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This thesis offers one of the very first assessments of citizen representation in 
EU policy-making. It goes beyond the existing studies of attitudinal mass-elite 
linkages and investigates the relationship between citizens’ preferences and 
actual legislative behaviour of national governments and EU policy output with 
regard to three fundamental assessment criteria of citizen representation: man-
date fulfilment, responsiveness, and congruence. The overarching argument is 
that EU policy-making is subject to significant dynamics of citizen representa-
tion in various forms. Several key hypotheses about citizen representation de-
veloped for the domestic level also apply to citizen representation at the EU 
level (see particularly Papers 1, 2, 3). At the same time, new patterns of citizen 
representation emerge in EU policy-making that are a result of the peculiarities 
of the EU’s political system and may so far have been overlooked by scholar-
ship on political systems that resemble the EU in relevant respects (see particu-
larly Papers 1 and 4). While this thesis also raises a host of questions for further 
research and cannot provide answers regarding all aspects of citizen represen-
tation in the EU, it can clearly reject the claim that EU policy-making is taking 
place entirely independently of public influence. 
This introduction is followed by the four constitutive papers of the thesis, 
and a conclusion. The conclusion serves three main purposes. First, it provides 
an integrative perspective on the results of the four papers and discusses their 
contribution to the debate on the EU’s democratic deficit, highlighting 
																																																																																																																																																																		
back is well known in the literature on the ‘thermostatic model’ of spending (e.g. Wlezien 1995), 
where citizens’ preferences for spending increase (decrease) if spending decreases (increases). 
However, such forms of feedback are of little concern for the papers of this thesis, as they large-
ly parse out common variation in opinion across countries (that might be influenced by the 
common exposure to previously agreed EU-level policies) through policy issue fixed and ran-
dom effects. 
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measures that could strengthen representation in the EU. Second, it also consid-
ers whether a strengthening of the domestic route of policy representation 
could ameliorate the EU’s crisis of popular legitimacy. Third, it points to prom-
ising areas for future research along the chain of policy representation outlined 
in this introduction.  
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PAPER 1 
 
 
Systematic or Sporadic? Modes of Government Respon-
siveness in European Union Policy-Making 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Do national governments respond to citizens’ opinions when negotiating poli-
cies in the European Union? While policy-making in the EU is not only about left-
right but to a significant extent also about pro-anti integration issues, conflicts over 
integration are only occasionally salient in domestic electoral politics, where left-
right issues dominate. I argue that this should be reflected in national govern-
ments’ efforts to respond to public opinion. As governments can expect left-right 
issues to be reliably salient in domestic elections, their response to public opinion 
on such issues should be stronger and more systematic than on pro-anti integra-
tion issues, whose electoral relevance is highly variable. Statistical analyses of 3,700 
policy positions adopted by governments in the Council of the EU provide strong 
evidence for two ‘modes of responsiveness’: on left-right issues governments sys-
tematically organise their responsiveness according to the electoral cycle and sys-
tem (‘systematic mode’). In contrast, on EU integration issues they only respond to 
opinion occasionally (‘sporadic mode’). These findings challenge the notion of an 
entirely unresponsive policy-making system in the EU. They also enhance our un-
derstanding of how variability in electoral salience influences responsiveness.  
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EVERAL STUDIES HAVE INVESTIGATED ‘SYSTEMIC RESPONSIVENESS’ IN THE EU-
ropean Union (EU) by ascertaining the extent to which the volume of EU 
legislation reacts to public Euroscepticism (Arnold and de Vries 2009; Bølstad 
2015; Toshkov 2011; de Vries and Arnold 2011). While this work has produced 
important findings on policy representation in the EU, it has neither been able 
to assess the substantive content of policies nor to investigate responsiveness on 
the level of individual EU policy-makers (but see Hagemann, Hobolt, and 
Wratil 2016; Lo 2013). Are EU-level legislators responsive to citizens’ substan-
tive policy preferences, not only adjusting the sheer amount of legislation but 
also its content? Here, I address this question with regard to the behaviour of 
national governments in the Council of the EU (henceforth, the Council), the 
union’s main legislative body, in which national ministers meet and negotiate 
policy change. This means I focus on the ‘domestic route’ of policy representa-
tion in the EU, in which national governments are accountable to national vot-
ers in domestic general elections.  
To understand government responsiveness at the EU level, I start from the 
common observation that EU policy-making is characterised by two main issue 
dimensions, namely conflicts over ‘left-right’ and ‘pro-anti integration’ issues 
(Hix 1999; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2006; Marks and Steenbergen 2002). While 
both kinds of issues are similarly salient at the EU level, their role in electoral 
politics at the domestic level, where national governments are accountable, is 
strikingly different. Whereas conflicts over left-right ideology – for instance, pro 
vs. anti economic regulation – play a reliable and prominent part in electoral 
competition in the member states (van der Brug, Franklin, and Tóka 2008; 
Huber and Inglehart 1995; Whitefield 2002), the electoral salience of conflicts 
over ‘pro-anti integration’, such as the extension of EU authority, varies greatly 
over time (Stevens 2013; de Vries 2007; de Vries et al. 2011). More technically, 
the electoral salience of left-right issues is rather high and stable (i.e. not easily 
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changed or likely to change) from election to election, while the salience of pro-
anti integration is extremely variable over time. 
This has important consequences for responsiveness. In particular, it affects 
the central mechanism of ‘rational anticipation’, which refers to governments’ 
attempts to forestall electoral sanctions by responding to public opinion on is-
sues that they anticipate will be salient in future elections (see e.g. Erikson, 
MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Mansbridge 2003; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 
1995). Importantly, governments should face less uncertainty in anticipating the 
future electoral salience of left-right than of pro-anti integration issues. I argue 
that this leads to different stylised modes of government responsiveness in EU 
policy-making. As governments know that left-right has a certain, rather stable 
level of salience in domestic elections, they can engage in systematic, long-term 
planning and organisation of their responsiveness. They can decide on their 
exact effort of responsiveness, adjust it to national institutions, and distribute it 
over time to optimise their returns (‘systematic mode’). In contrast, as the elec-
toral salience of pro-anti integration fluctuates, it is not rational for govern-
ments to systematise their responsiveness efforts, as EU integration may be ir-
relevant at the time of the next electoral contest. The best governments can do is 
to take current salience shocks as a signal of potentially high salience at the next 
election, and respond sporadically when such shocks occur (‘sporadic mode’). 
Statistical analyses of over 3,700 policy positions adopted by governments 
from 26 member states in the Council between 1996 and 2008 reveal clear dif-
ferences in responsiveness between issue dimensions. On left-right issues gov-
ernments generally respond to public opinion, and their response is stronger if 
they face majoritarian electoral systems at home and when national elections 
approach. This indicates that governments systematically tailor and plan their 
responsiveness efforts with a view to national elections. In contrast, on pro-anti 
integration issues governments do not systematically or routinely respond to 
opinion. Instead, they only temporarily consider opinion at times when domes-
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tic opposition parties increase their emphasis on EU integration issues as well 
as when EU-related events increase the salience of integration in the public 
sphere.  
These findings challenge the widely held notion that the EU policy-making 
process is entirely unresponsive to public demands and a match between citi-
zens’ preferences and EU policy-making is mostly ‘happy coincidence’ (e.g. 
Føllesdal and Hix 2006: 556). In contrast, the results show that, at least, national 
governments in the EU are systematically responsive to their voters on left-right 
issues, and sporadically also on pro-anti integration issues. This responsiveness 
in Brussels appears as a result of their electoral accountability at home. Moreo-
ver, the discovery of a ‘systematic’ and a ‘sporadic’ mode of responsiveness 
could potentially be relevant beyond the EU context. Thereby, this study con-
tributes to our general understanding of how issue characteristics shape re-
sponsiveness and may facilitate the development of more comprehensive and 
nuanced models of policy representation in the future. 
 
THE EU’S POLICY-MAKING SPACE AND DOMESTIC ELECTORAL 
COMPETITION 
In contrast to many landmark studies of responsiveness in national systems 
that assume the policy-making space to be defined by a single liberal-
conservative (or left-right) conflict dimension (e.g. Erikson, MacKuen, and 
Stimson 2002; Hakhverdian 2010, 2012; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995), 
responsiveness in the EU has to be assessed on two issue dimensions. Scholars 
widely agree that, at least from a deductive, a priori perspective (see de Vries 
and Marks 2012), the EU’s policy-making space must be conceptualised as two-
dimensional 
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2002; Proksch and Slapin 2009).13 Many EU policy-making controversies will 
naturally connect to conflicts about ‘left-right’ ideological issues, encompassing 
classical economic and newly emerging left-libertarian vs. right-authoritarian 
elements. Examples range from the liberalisation of former state company sec-
tors (like postal services), over visa facilitations, to the treatment of laying hens 
in farms. But some pieces of legislation also touch upon ‘pro-anti integration’ 
conflicts, as they concern jurisdictional architecture and have direct implica-
tions for the scope and level of EU authority or for the EU’s geographical inclu-
siveness (for this definition of integration, see de Wilde and Zürn 2012). Exam-
ples range from the European Commission’s (henceforth, the Commission) au-
thority in enforcing budgetary discipline to the harmonisation of existing na-
tional safety regulations regarding the transport of dangerous goods. Some-
times both kinds of conflict intersect in the same issue. 
Yet, while left-right and pro-anti integration issues are of similar significance 
for the policy-making space at the EU level, they play very different roles in 
electoral competition at the domestic level. On the one hand, left-right is a ‘su-
per-dimension’ of political competition with a firm anchoring in classical politi-
cal cleavages as ‘persistent lines of salient social and ideological division’ (see 
Lipset and Rokkan 1967; de Vries and Marks 2012; Whitefield 2002: 181). Left-
right has strong social bases, since citizens’ preferences on the issue dimension 
derive in large part from socio-structural and social identity factors such as 
class, religion, or trade union membership (Freire 2006, 2008).14 For parties left-
right issues often make up their very identity, i.e. they are ‘party-defining’ 
(Hurley and Hill 2003). Parties themselves and experts assessing parties use the 
																													
13 This is despite continued disagreement about the empirical relatedness of the dimensions and 
the empirical relevance of a third dimension. 
14 For an examination of two Eastern European countries, see Jou (2010).  
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left-right semantic to summarise party positions, and left-right has been 
demonstrated to have a common core meaning across Europe from West to East 
(Bakker et al. 2012, 2014; Huber and Inglehart 1995). Due to its centrality for 
party identity, left-right also takes primacy in party strategic considerations, for 
instance, when parties adopt positions on new issues (Marks, Nelson, and 
Edwards 2006).  
In contrast, EU integration and questions of supranational authority have no 
obvious relation to major political cleavages in the Lipset-Rokkan (1967) sense, 
but are instead an often fragile, evolving issue of electoral competition 
(Carmines and Stimson 1986, 1989, 1993). Citizens’ pro-anti integration prefer-
ences do have some limited social bases (especially occupation, education, and 
income) (e.g Gabel 1998a, 1998b), but they remain highly malleable and subject 
to elite cueing (Gabel and Scheve 2007; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Steenbergen, 
Edwards, and de Vries 2007). For parties, pro-anti integration positions are 
usually merely a ‘programmatic addendum’ and not the core of their identity 
(e.g. the French Front National, though a few single-issue parties like UKIP in 
the UK exist). As an issue that cross-cuts lines of party cleavage (Edwards 2009), 
EU integration has caused major internal dissent in Europe’s mainstream par-
ties, whose leaderships have tried to contain the issue’s salience wherever pos-
sible (Edwards 2009; Parsons and Weber 2011; van de Wardt 2014). As a conse-
quence, EU integration is mainly mobilised by issue entrepreneurs, i.e. new or 
existing fringe parties which are losers on the left-right dimension (Hobolt and 
de Vries 2015; Rovny 2012; Taggart 1998).  
These differences between a central dimension of domestic electoral competi-
tion (left-right) and an evolving, fragile issue (pro-anti integration) are reflected 
in the issues’ salience for vote choice in national elections. Where longitudinal 
and cross-national data has been investigated, citizens’ left-right preferences 
prove universally salient for vote choice with not much variation between elec-
tions (van der Brug, Franklin, and Tóka 2008; van der Eijk, Schmitt, and Binder 
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2005). Some slight long-term decline in the electoral salience of left-right has 
been reported for some countries. However, this seems to be a result of gradual 
and predictable occupational change and globalisation (Hellwig 2008). In con-
trast, the EU issue voting literature has demonstrated that the electoral salience 
of attitudes on pro-anti integration is highly variable and often low. Important-
ly, it varies according to current levels of media information on European issues 
and is stronger after important events related to integration (e.g. referendums) 
(de Vries 2009; de Vries et al. 2011). Even for the UK, Daniel Stevens (2013) has 
demonstrated that the relevance of EU integration as an electoral factor has 
starkly fluctuated between the 1960s and today, following ebbs and flows and 
no long-term trend.15  
In sum, left-right issues are more salient and more reliably salient in national 
elections than pro-anti integration issues, whose salience is sometimes substan-
tial but low on average and fluctuates starkly over time. 
 
ELECTORAL SALIENCE AND MODES OF RESPONSIVENESS 
The level and variability of the electoral salience of issues should have para-
mount consequences for governments’ responsiveness, since national elections 
provide the fundamental incentives for governments to respond to public opin-
ion (Powell 2000). First, a plethora of studies show that a higher level of issue 
salience increases representatives’ responsiveness to public opinion, since voters 
monitor representatives more vigorously and sanction incumbents more 
strongly for deviating behaviour on the issue (e.g. Burstein 2006; Lax and 
Phillips 2009, 2012; Page and Shapiro 1983; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Wlezien 
																													
15 In Stevens’ view, the issue follows Carmines and Stimson's (1989) patterns of issue evolution.  
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2004).16 This provides incentives to representatives to respond more consistently 
to voters’ preferences on such issues. Given that left-right issues are, on aver-
age, more salient than pro-anti integration issues, governments’ responsiveness 
should be stronger on left-right issues than on pro-anti integration issues.  
Second, variability in issue salience should also impact on responsiveness. The 
prime reason for this is what scholars have called ‘rational anticipation’ 
(Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995) or ‘anticipatory representation’ 
(Mansbridge 2003) – the idea that politicians try to anticipate ‘future voters’ in 
future electoral contests. Chiefly, incumbents want to know whether left-right 
and pro-anti integration issues will be salient at the time of the next election in 
order to be able to forestall any potential electoral sanctions by responding to 
opinion beforehand. However, as the future is inherently uncertain, govern-
ments can only form (rational) beliefs about whether the issues will be im-
portant in the next election and these beliefs can be true or false to different de-
grees (Mansbridge 2003, 517; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995, 545). This is 
where the variability in salience matters. If governments know that left-right 
issues are reliably salient over time, they face little uncertainty about the extent 
of their relevance in the next electoral contest. In turn, if pro-anti integration 
issues are subject to stark fluctuations in salience, the uncertainty about their 
electoral relevance in the next election is substantial. I argue that this will affect 
the way in which governments organise their responsiveness efforts.  
In total, the differences in the level and variability of salience between the 
two kinds of issues should lead to different stylised modes of responsiveness.17 As 
governments know that left-right issues will be reliably salient in the next elec-
																													
16 For sanctioning models of representation, see Barro (1973); Ferejohn (1986). 
17 The notion of different modes is based on a simplified view. I use it for heuristic purposes 
and acknowledge that both stylised modes may simply be the ends of a continuum. 
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tion, they can adapt their responsiveness efforts to the domestic institutional 
framework, creating a long-term and highly structured plan (‘systematic mode’). 
In particular, with a view to the next election they can adapt their responsive-
ness to electoral institutions and cycles. This structuring effort is rational, as 
governments can expect a positive pay-off from their responsiveness at the next 
election with a high level of certainty. In turn, as the electoral salience of pro-
anti integration issues is uncertain, systematic responsiveness and long-term 
planning may not be efficient, since the issue may be entirely irrelevant at the 
time of elections. Instead, I argue that governments will handle responsiveness 
more immediately by only reacting to salience shocks that suggest that EU inte-
gration will be important at the next election, and disregarding opinion other-
wise (‘sporadic mode’). Responsiveness should then primarily be triggered by 
signals of salience such as exogenous events, the activities of the opposition, 
and media attention.  
To test whether governments’ modes of responsiveness differ between left-
right and pro-anti integration issues, I formulate two testable hypotheses for 
each issue dimension that should be specific to the systematic and sporadic 
mode respectively. I start with left-right and systematic responsiveness. First, if 
governments systematically plan their responsiveness efforts on left-right with 
an eye towards elections, their efforts should vary over the course of the elec-
toral cycle. Such structuring should not occur if governments only respond spo-
radically. Several studies have demonstrated that the responsiveness of repre-
sentatives on major issue dimensions increases with electoral proximity (Canes-
Wrone and Shotts 2004; Elling 1982; Kuklinski 1978; Lindstädt and Vander 
Wielen 2011). Organising responsiveness efforts according to the electoral cycle 
is effective, as voters’ gratitude for government action declines over time and 
good deeds before elections count more than those in the distant past (Bechtel 
and Hainmueller 2011). Moreover, voters may use the period leading up to the 
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elections as a heuristic for government performance overall and ‘substitute the 
end for the whole’ (Healy and Lenz 2014: 33). The first hypothesis is therefore: 
LR-H1: Governments will be more responsive to domestic public opinion on 
left-right issues the closer national elections are.  
Secondly, in the systematic mode electoral systems should be the major institu-
tion according to which governments can optimise their responsiveness efforts, 
which should not be possible if acting in an ‘ad hoc’ or sporadic manner. If the 
two major parties in a system are neck and neck, marginal changes in vote 
shares will typically transform into larger changes in seat shares in majoritarian 
electoral systems than in proportional systems. This means that the vote-seat 
elasticity, !! = !"#$%& !"#$%!"#$%&/!"#$% , is larger under majoritarian systems (Kayser and 
Lindstädt 2015; Rogowski and Kayser 2002). This should generally create 
stronger incentives for governments to respond to opinion in majoritarian as 
opposed to proportional electoral systems, as comparatively smaller electoral 
losses could dismantle government majorities.18 A second advantage of majori-
tarian electoral systems for responsiveness is that they more often produce sin-
gle party governments that are versatile in reacting to opinion, while multiparty 
governments under proportional representation (PR) have to engage in costly 
																													
18 However, there are two caveats concerning this general conclusion. Firstly, the idea that seat-
vote elasticities are strictly greater in single-member district (SMD) than in proportional (PR) 
systems only holds if the two major parties are neck and neck. If one party dominates by a wide 
vote margin, seat-vote elasticity can approach 0 under SMD, while it will always be very close 
to 1 under PR (see Chang, Kayser, and Rogowski 2008: 749-750; Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008: 
313-314). Second, SMD also creates incentives for governments to over-respond to the prefer-
ences and opinions of citizens in marginal districts that may often markedly differ from average 
opinion (see Persson and Tabellini 2003; Rickard 2012). Yet, Kayser and Lindstädt's (2015: 247) 
‘loss probability’ model accounts for these caveats and still estimates a higher average electoral 
risk for Western post-war SMD than PR systems. This underscores the plausibility of LR-H2. 
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intra-coalition coordination (Wlezien and Soroka 2012: 1413-1414). The second 
hypothesis can therefore be formulated as:19 
LR-H2: Governments will be more responsive to domestic public opinion on 
left-right issues in majoritarian as opposed to proportional electoral systems.  
Turning to pro-anti integration issues and sporadic responsiveness, two fun-
damental factors indicate salience shocks and should prompt governments’ oc-
casional response: opposition parties emphasising the issues, and events related 
to integration. First, as party elites play a crucial role in mobilising issues with 
fluctuating salience in the domestic media and public sphere, governments’ 
responsiveness efforts should be sensitive to opposition parties’ emphasis on in-
tegration (see Carmines and Stimson 1986; van der Eijk and Franklin 2007; 
Hooghe and Marks 2009). In contrast, this emphasis should not matter much if 
governments respond routinely. As pro-anti integration issues have little cleav-
age base and often relate to rather unobtrusive and abstract questions such as 
the competence allocation between national and EU institutions, they cause lit-
tle genuine interest in the media and the public sphere.20 Instead, studies 
demonstrate that party elites must often act as ‘vehicles’ for pro-anti integration 
issues to attain media coverage. If party leaders speak about the issues, reframe 
																													
19 Carey and Hix (2011) have argued that ideological congruence and other representational 
outcomes are maximised at medium district magnitudes (e.g. four to eight legislators) at which 
the accountability advantages of small districts are still strong but are topped up by gains in 
representativeness. While Carey and Hix (2012) show that medium district magnitudes may 
also be beneficial to legislators’ congruence with median voter opinion, it is not clear whether 
their argument also applies to responsiveness (as defined in this thesis). In any case, unreported 
analyses did not reveal any statistically significant advantage of medium district magnitudes. 
20 As left-right issues closely connect to social cleavages, people often experience them directly 
(e.g. unemployment, tax, immigration), which secures such issues a constant coverage in the 
media and on the public agenda (see also Soroka 2002). 
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their domestic relevance, and communicate their stances on them, their news 
value increases (Adam 2007; Boomgaarden et al. 2013; Van der Pas and 
Vliegenthart 2016). Therefore, when opposition parties place increased empha-
sis on integration issues, governments should interpret this as a signal of poten-
tial public and electoral salience, and increase their responsiveness:21 
EU-H1: Governments will be more responsive to domestic public opinion on 
pro-anti integration issues whenever opposition parties increase their emphasis 
on such issues.  
Second, events related to EU integration should add to the public salience of in-
tegration and therefore prompt governments’ responsiveness. Like party em-
phasis on integration, events can act as a vehicle for pro-anti integration con-
flicts to enter the public sphere. Research has demonstrated that events like ref-
erendums on EU integration, elections to the European Parliament (EP), or the 
introduction of the euro temporarily increase the coverage of integration issues 
in national media, as does the period in which a nation holds the EU presidency 
(Boomgaarden et al. 2010; Vetters, Jentges, and Trenz 2009). These events often 
trigger intense public debates about pro-anti integration, ranging from ques-
tions of adopting new EU treaties (e.g. in referendums) to stopping legislation 
that challenges national sovereignty (e.g. during a presidency). In the specific 
case of referendums, research has shown that such debates clarify actors’ posi-
tions to the public, affect public evaluations of leaders (de Vreese 2004), and 
increase the electoral salience of pro-anti integration in the next national elec-
tion (de Vries 2009). Therefore, I expect: 
EU-H2: Governments will be more responsive to domestic public opinion on 
pro-anti integration around major events related to EU integration. 
 																													
21 On the effects of media information on electoral salience, see e.g. de Vries et al. (2011). 
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DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
To test these hypotheses I investigate the responsiveness of national gov-
ernments from 26 EU countries on both issue dimensions in the Council. Specif-
ically, I measure responsiveness as the effect of domestic public opinion on na-
tional ministers’ policy positions regarding concrete pieces of legislation nego-
tiated in the Council.22 I take governments’ policy positions as the dependent 
variable from the Decision-making in the European Union (DEU) dataset 
(Thomson et al. 2006, 2012), which covers actor positions regarding 331 contro-
versial issues from two legislative terms, 1994-1999 and 2004-2009. DEU is 
based on 349 semi-structured interviews with experts from member states’ 
permanent representations and EU institutions, who were asked to report con-
troversial legislative issues and locate governments on corresponding spatial 
policy scales. It is the most widely used dataset on EU decision-making and has 
been employed in a diverse range of applications.23 Importantly, DEU is a selec-
tion of the most salient issues in EU policy-making as proposals had to be men-
tioned in European media and actors had to be divided on key aspects to be 
included in the data.24  
In order to identify those DEU issues that substantively relate to the two is-
sue dimensions of interest, I have developed an original coding scheme. The 
guiding principle has been to construct categories for both dimensions that cor-
respond to the DEU issues and at the same time closely reflect our best 																													
22 An overview of all data sources used, including descriptive statistics, is available in Appen-
dix 1. 
23 A full justification of the suitability of DEU in this context is provided in Appendix 1.  
24 Tracking governments’ behaviour in the Council with DEU is therefore broadly comparable 
to tracking American legislators on the basis of ADA (Americans for Democratic Action) or 
similar scores (see Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995). 
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knowledge from the public opinion literature about what citizens associate with 
‘left-right’ and ‘pro-anti integration’ conflicts (see below). This guarantees a 
high substantive relevance between the dependent and independent variable. 
The resulting scheme consists of eight categories representing the left-right di-
mension; they cover conflicts ranging from economic regulation, through con-
sumer and environmental protection, to human and civil rights.25 Four catego-
ries capture the integration dimension, covering aspects ranging from harmoni-
sation over EU-level authority to the delaying of EU legislative acts.  
The coding26 reveals that about 61% of the DEU issues fall into at least one 
left-right category and 31% into at least one pro-anti integration category (with 
12% relevant on both dimensions, i.e. both kinds of conflicts crossed in one is-
sue). 22% relate neither to any left-right nor to any pro-anti integration category 
(e.g. they are connected with geographical cleavages). Wherever necessary the 
DEU scales with a predefined range of 0-100 have been rescaled in a linear 
manner so as to ensure that the most ‘right’ and the most ‘integrationist’ op-
tions advocated by any government in the estimation sample are represented 
by 100 and the most left / least integrationist by 0.27 
 
																													
25 Hence, left-right is understood here as a macro-dimension that does not only capture eco-
nomic left-right but also the ‘new politics’ dimension or GAL/TAN. One could separate these 
components, but their underlying issues jointly influence voters’ left-right self-placement, 
which is the only available cross-country, cross-time measure of public opinion (see below). 
26 The full codebook and measures of inter-coder reliability are available in Appendix 1. 
27 Rescaling removes 15 (left-right) / 13 (pro-anti integration) policy issues on which all national 
governments in the sample took the same position. In addition, I exclude 14 / 4 further policy 
issues on which more than two-thirds of government positions were not reported by the ex-
perts, as such large gaps may indicate that experts wrongly identified the policy issue in the 
first place. 
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FIGURE 2.1: ILLUSTRATION OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 
 
Notes: AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; CY: Cyprus; CZ: The Czech Republic; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; FI: 
Finland; FR: France; DE: Germany; EL: Greece; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IT: Italy; LV: Latvia; LT: Lithua-
nia; LU: Luxembourg; MT: Malta; NL: The Netherlands; PL: Poland; PT: Portugal; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slo-
vakia; ES: Spain; SE: Sweden; UK: The United Kingdom 
 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the dependent variable with governments’ positions on 
two exemplary issues from the data. Left-right issues are illustrated with a pro-
posal concerning the inclusion of the aviation industry in the EU’s CO2 emis-
sion trading system (COD/2006/304). In this case, the extent of emission allow-
ances to be allocated to the industry was contested with some governments opt-
ing for smaller and others for larger allowances (left vs. right position). Pro-anti 
integration issues are exemplified by the Commission’s power to apply budget-
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some the Council 
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ceiling and decide how 
much and where to cut 
DE, NL 
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ary discipline in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (CNS/2004/164). Gov-
ernments were divided over the degree of authority they should delegate to the 
Commission in this respect.  
To measure public opinion as the primary independent variable I use survey 
data from the Standard Eurobarometer series by linearly interpolating opinion 
between the six-monthly surveys. In line with common practice in the respon-
siveness literature, I use lagged opinion (by six months) to reflect causal order-
ing, in which governments first observe opinion and subsequently react to it. 28 
Public opinion on left-right conflicts is operationalised as the country’s average 
of the ideological self-placement item that asks respondents to identify their 
own ideological position on a scale ranging from 1 (left) to 10 (right). Scholars 
have demonstrated that these self-placements are systematically related to atti-
tudes on economic, cultural, and materialist vs. post-materialist conflicts 
(Huber 1989; Knutsen 1997), including specific issues such as immigration (de 
Vries, Hakhverdian, and Lancee 2013), civil liberties and human rights (Cohrs 
et al. 2005, 2007) as well as a variety of environmental issues (Kvaloy, Finseraas, 
and Listhaug 2012; Neumayer 2004; Skrentny 1993; Thalmann 2004). Therefore, 
these placements are a substantive measure of the public’s left-right prefer-
ences.  
In line with the extant literature, public opinion on pro-anti integration is 
measured as support for EU membership (‘Generally speaking, do you think 
your country’s membership in the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, 
or neither good nor bad?’). Support is operationalised as the difference between 
respondents answering that the EU is a good thing minus those thinking the EU 
is a bad thing divided by all responses per country. This measure has been 
shown to correspond with more specific attitudes on integration as well as with 
																													
28 In Appendix 1, I provide results for different lag lengths (e.g. one year). 
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actual EU policy activity (e.g. Bølstad 2015; Boomgaarden et al. 2011; Toshkov 
2011). 
The moderating factors hypothesised are measured as follows. First, to test 
whether the electoral cycle influences government responsiveness I operational-
ise the distance to the next, scheduled national legislative election in 100 day 
units.29 Second, the impact of electoral systems is ascertained with a measure of 
logged district magnitude to map systems on a continuum from majoritarian to 
proportional.30 Third, whether an increase in opposition parties’ emphasis on 
EU integration is related to stronger responsiveness is measured with the help 
of the Comparative Manifesto Project’s (CMP) database of election manifestos 
(Lehmann et al. 2015). This is operationalised as the simple average percentage 
of quasi-sentences opposition parties devote to EU integration (positive as well 
as negative statements) in their manifestos. To capture times in which parties 
increase their emphasis, I linearly interpolate over time and measure the change 
in party emphasis over the last four years.31 Fourth, to determine the effects of 
major EU-related events I use a dummy variable that is ‘1’ six months before 
																													
29 Results do not change when coding the distance to the next election that really occurred, i.e. 
to account for early elections (see Appendix 1). 
30 I use the superior measure of district magnitude as the number of seats available in the dis-
trict faced by the average legislator instead of the number of seats available in the average dis-
trict. These measures can diverge considerably if the size of districts varies within a country (see 
Johnson and Wallack 2005). A log-transformation accounts for potential outliers. I substantively 
obtain the same results when using Arend Lijphart’s formula for the effective electoral thresh-
old or a three-level variable for SMD, mixed, and PR systems (see Appendix 1). 
31 This measure was developed by Hagemann, Hobolt, and Wratil (2016). The version I use 
accounts for changes in government and linearly interpolates between such occasions. Using 
the change over three or five years yields the same results, as does seat-weighting the emphasis 
across opposition parties instead of using the simple average (see Appendix 1). 
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and after the following events: national referendums on integration, final ratifi-
cation of EU treaties, accession to the EU, introduction of the euro currency, 
elections to the EP, holding the Council presidency. 
I also include measures of government parties’ left-right and pro-anti inte-
gration positions at the last election from the CMP. For left-right I use the 
CMP’s summative RILE measure, and for pro-anti integration I take the differ-
ence between the percentage of positive and negative quasi-sentences on the 
EU. Aggregated government positions are obtained by seat-weighting. This 
effectively controls for effects of the ‘electoral turnover’ mechanism.32 Not only 
do governments respond directly to public opinion, but voters also align gov-
ernments’ preferences with their views by influencing the composition of par-
liament and government through elections. Including measures of govern-
ments’ promised policy positions guarantees that the effects of public opinion 
are controlled for any effects of the ideological composition of the government 
and exclusively represent governments’ responsiveness efforts, i.e. rational an-
ticipation (Stimson 1999).  
In addition, I control for several factors that are known to influence the posi-
tioning of governments in EU policy-making and might at the same time have 
non-trivial relationships with public opinion. Most importantly, I account for a 
potentially relevant redistribution cleavage of rich versus poor countries with a 
measure of countries’ annual net receipts from the EU budget (% of GDP) 
(Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 2014; Zimmer, Schneider, and Dobbins 2005). 
Second, I include national unemployment and inflation rates to ensure that the 
relationship between parties’ and government’s policy positions is more than a 
reflection of macroeconomic fluctuations (see e.g. Ferguson, Kellstedt, and Linn 
																													
32 For a discussion of the two mechanisms of responsiveness, see e.g. Hakhverdian (2010) or  
Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson (1995). 
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2013). Third, I broadly capture the idea that member states may try to transfer 
their domestic policies to the European level (see e.g. Börzel 2002) with a meas-
ure of domestic economic freedom from the Fraser Institute’s Economic Free-
dom of the World dataset (Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall 2013).33 All data 
sources are linked on the date the Commission submitted the relevant proposal 
to the Council.34 
 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
To model the relationship between governments’ policy positions and opin-
ion, I use linear regressions with two-way fixed effects for the DEU policy is-
sues as well as for the countries. The fixed effect estimator is based on the with-
in-transformation, a demeaning of the data for each policy issue as well as each 
country,35 which is best suited to obtaining consistent estimates in face of the 
heterogeneous set of policy issues and potentially unobserved country-level 
confounders. Moreover, I employ the Huber-White sandwich estimator of vari-
ance to provide standard errors that are robust to clustering on the country lev-
el. Including interaction terms between public opinion and the respective mod-
																													
33 This measure has also been used by Thomson (2011a) to explain DEU positions. 
34 This reflects the fact that DEU measures ‘initial positions’, just after the introduction of the 
proposal. 
35 For technical reasons, I implement the model using a within-transformation for countries and 
dummy variables for policy issues, as a straightforward way of obtaining the correct degrees of 
freedom for the calculation of the country-cluster robust standard errors. Fixed effects (FE) 
nested within clusters (in my case, country FEs) should be treated as redundant for the finite 
sample degrees-of-freedom (DoF) correction of clustered SEs. In contrast, non-nested FEs (in 
my case, policy issue FEs) should reduce the DoF, which the dummy variables do.  
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erating variable allows us to test the hypotheses (see Berry, Golder, and Milton 
2012). Hence, all models take the following general form: 
 !!,! − !! − !!  =  !! !!,! − !! − !! + !! !!,! − !! − !!+ !! !!,! − !! − !! !!,! − !! − !! +⋯  + !!,! − !! − !!  
 
Where ! is a policy position of a national government, ! is public opinion in 
the member state, ! is one of the four moderating variables, ! is the index for 
policy issues, ! the index for countries, and ! denotes the position-specific error 
term.  
In a first step, I restrict the sample to all issues that relate to the left-right di-
mension. Table 2.1 shows the major results. Model A1 regresses governments’ 
policy positions (0 ‘most left’ to 100 ‘most right’ option) on left-right opinion 
and the control variables. The results show that opinion exerts a systematic and 
significant effect on governments’ positioning in the Council. For a unit change 
in opinion to the right, governments shift their policy positions by 15.2 points 
towards rightist policy positions on the DEU scale. This effect is significant at 
the 5% level. In addition, there is some weak evidence that governments who 
are net receivers from the EU budget take more rightist policy positions. The 
coefficients on all other control variables are not statistically significant. 
Model A2 investigates the evidence for the two hypotheses specific to the 
systematic mode. First, it tests whether governments increase their responsive-
ness on left-right issues as national elections approach (LR-H1). Indeed, there is 
a significant negative interaction effect between public opinion and the number 
of days to the next election. As elections approach, governments increasingly 
consider public opinion when taking policy positions in the Council. Second, 
the model also assesses the impact of electoral systems on responsiveness by 
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allowing the opinion effect to vary by logged district magnitude (LR-H2). It 
shows that governments in majoritarian electoral systems are indeed more re-
sponsive to left-right preferences than their counterparts in proportional elec-
toral systems, as the opinion effect diminishes with district magnitude. Both of 
these results are evidence that governments systematise and adjust their re-
sponsiveness with a view to national elections. The model also provides some 
limited evidence that governments with strong economic freedom at home take 
more rightist positions, which is in line with the ‘uploading’ hypothesis. 
 
TABLE 2.1: RESPONSIVENESS ON LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION 
 Model A1 Model A2 
Left-right opinion 15.213 47.938 
 (7.205)** (14.553)*** 
Days to election  5.584 
  (2.454)** 
Left-right opinion x Days to election  -1.026 
  (0.452)** 
District magnitude (ln)  43.910 
  (18.976)** 
Left-right opinion x District magnitude (ln)  -9.119 
  (3.653)** 
Government left-right position  0.080 0.124 
 (0.130) (0.139) 
Net receipts from EU budget 3.246 4.040 
 (1.789)* (1.869)** 
Unemployment -0.665 -0.895 
 (0.719) (0.679) 
Inflation -1.516 -1.657 
 (1.548) (1.493) 
Economic freedom 5.216 7.944 
 (3.630) (4.600)* 
Fixed effects Policy issues,  
countries 
Policy issues,  
countries 
Number of policy issues 172 172 
Number of countries 26 26 
N 2,965 2,965 
R2 0.28 0.28 
Notes: All are fixed effects regressions; No observations for Malta due to missing CMP measures;  
Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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To illustrate these results, Figure 2.2 plots the marginal effect of public opin-
ion depending on the days to the next election and separately for SMD and PR 
electoral systems (prediction for PR is at the average district magnitude of the 
sample, i.e. ~13). We can see that in the average electoral system public opinion 
does not have any significant influence on governments’ positioning when 
planned elections lie more than 1300 to 1400 days in the future. However, from 
around three and a half years before the elections governments clearly consider 
public opinion when taking policy positions in the Council. In turn, govern-
ments facing SMD systems at home are generally responsive, even five years 
ahead of elections, and when elections are imminent they change their policy 
positions by up to 48 points for a unit change in opinion. Considering the DEU 
scale from 0-100, this is a stark effect. 
 
FIGURE 2.2: MARGINAL EFFECT OF OPINION BY ELECTORAL CYCLE 
AND SYSTEM 
 
Notes: 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines; Histogram of observations as shaded areas. 
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In a second step, I restrict the sample to all issues relating to conflicts about 
pro-anti integration. The results are reported in Table 2.2.  
 
TABLE 2.2: RESPONSIVENESS ON PRO-ANTI INTEGRATION DIMENSION 
 Model B1 Model B2 
Pro-anti integration opinion 19.916 9.640 
 (19.087) (21.674) 
Party emphasis (EU)  -3.230 
  (1.468)** 
Pro-anti integration opinion x Party emphasis (EU)  10.398 
  (3.612)*** 
EU event  -16.059 
  (7.102)** 
Pro-anti integration opinion x EU event  27.097 
  (12.977)** 
Government pro-anti integration position  -0.210 -0.290 
 (0.608) (0.556) 
Net receipts from EU budget 7.285 3.570 
 (2.421)*** (2.934) 
Unemployment -1.034 -1.522 
 (0.550)* (0.541)*** 
Inflation -0.523 -0.015 
 (1.053) (1.056) 
Economic freedom -1.338 -0.087 
 (3.577) (3.624) 
Fixed effects Policy issues,  
countries 
Policy issues,  
countries 
Number of policy issues 82 82 
Number of countries 26 26 
N 1,448 1,448 
R2 0.30 0.31 
Notes: All are fixed effects regressions; No observations for Malta due to missing CMP measures; Country-
clustered robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Model B1 estimates the adopted policy position (0 ‘least integrationist’ to 100 
‘most integrationist’ option) as a function of pro-anti integration opinion and 
the control variables. In contrast to the findings on the left-right dimension, 
there is no unconditional effect of public opinion on governments’ positioning 
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on pro-anti integration issues. The coefficient on opinion is positive but statisti-
cally indistinguishable from zero. This supports the idea that governments do 
not systematically respond on pro-anti integration issues, as pro-anti integra-
tion is not reliably salient in domestic elections.  
Model B2 tests the two hypotheses specific to the sporadic mode, investigat-
ing whether governments respond on pro-anti integration in the face of salience 
shocks. First, it tests whether governments are responsive when opposition par-
ties increase their emphasis on pro-anti integration in their manifestos (EU-H1). 
The hypothesis is supported by a significant interaction term (at the 1% signifi-
cance level). Second, the model tests whether major events related to EU inte-
gration play a pivotal role in making governments wary of public opinion on 
pro-anti integration (EU-H2). The results entirely support this conjecture: before 
and after major events on EU integration governments shift positions by about 
7 points on the DEU scale when about 10% of citizens change their opinion on 
EU membership (e.g. from ‘bad thing’ to ‘good thing’, assuming ‘neither good 
nor bad’ answers are negligible). The results demonstrate that governments do 
not respond systematically on pro-anti integration but sporadically when trig-
gered by opposition parties’ emphasis on integration or EU events, both of 
which signal potential electoral salience. 
Figure 2.3 plots the marginal effect of public opinion depending on the 
change in parties’ emphasis on integration and separately for times with and 
without an event related to EU integration. In times with no event governments 
do not significantly respond to opinion, irrespective of opposition parties’ em-
phasis on integration. But around events related to integration opinion exerts a 
statistically significant effect on governments’ positions, if opposition parties 
have increased their quasi-sentences on integration. However, the opinion ef-
fect is indistinguishable from zero, if opposition parties have reduced their em-
phasis on integration during the last four years.  
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FIGURE 2.3: MARGINAL EFFECT OF OPINION BY PARTY SALIENCE AND 
EVENT CONTEXT 
 
Notes: 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines; Histogram of observations as shaded areas. 
 
In terms of the control variables, the negative and significant coefficient on 
unemployment in Models B1 and B2 suggests that governments facing unem-
ployed workers at home are more reluctant to extend integration.36 Also note 
that neither on left-right nor on pro-anti integration government parties’ posi-
																													
36 This ties in with Toshkov's (2011) findings that support for EU membership is dampened by 
unemployment with a four-year delay and at the same time influences the amount of integra-
tion implemented. Rationally anticipating governments may want to avoid more integration in 
the face of unemployment, as they know that it is a signal of reduced future support for the 
union.   
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tions in their election manifestos prove predictive of the positions they take in 
the Council.37 
What do these opinion effects mean in a real world context? First, they can be 
interpreted relative to average distances in policy positions between national 
delegations. For instance, the average distance on the left-right scale between 
the UK, which advocated more ‘rightist’ policy positions, and France, with 
more ‘leftist’ positions, is about 10 scale points (57 against 47 respectively). Giv-
en an opinion effect of about 28-48 points in SMD systems and long-run stand-
ard deviations of left-right opinion between 0.1-0.2, regular fluctuations in opin-
ion are sufficient to make the UK government adopt positions like its French 
counterpart. For an example for pro-anti integration, we can compare Ireland, 
which has largely adopted integrationist policy positions, and the Netherlands, 
which has been more reluctant. An average of 7 scale points separates them. 
Given an opinion effect of 15-55 points in most situations around EU-related 
events and long-run standard deviations of support for membership around 
0.1, changes of policy positions by 3-11 scale points are quite frequent. Hence, 
under Eurosceptic tides of public opinion the Irish government, which has had 
to face eight EU referendums so far, can be expected to agree with the Dutch 
delegation.  
Second, the substantive impact of opinion can be exemplified by predicting 
governments’ positions on specific policy issues from the data. As an example 
for left-right I use an issue from a directive on common standards for returning 
illegal immigrants (COD/2005/167). A key controversy on this directive was for 
how long member states should be allowed to detain illegal immigrants who 
																													
37 This is evidence of little overall mandate fulfilment by parties. However, Paper 3 demon-
strates mandate fulfilment on economic left-right issues in some contexts. 
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have received a deportation decision. As an example for pro-anti integration I 
draw on the member states’ decision to establish the EU’s Employment Com-
mittee (CNS/1999/192), an advisory committee to the Employment and Social 
Affairs (EPSCO) Council configuration. In this case, it was contested whether 
the committee should be located in the Council’s or the Commission’s sphere of 
influence.  
 
FIGURE 2.4: SUBSTANTIVE MEANING OF OPINION EFFECT WITH EX-
AMPLES 
 
Notes: Arrow connects predicted position at observed values with hypothetical prediction when increasing 
opinion by two long-run standard deviations (average across countries, 1990-2013). at: Austria; be: Belgium; 
cy: Cyprus; cz: The Czech Republic; dk: Denmark; ee: Estonia; fi: Finland; fr: France; de: Germany; el: Greece; hu: 
Hungary; ie: Ireland; it: Italy; lv: Latvia; lu: Luxembourg; nl: The Netherlands; pl: Poland; pt: Portugal; si: Slovenia; 
sk: Slovakia; es: Spain; se: Sweden; uk: The United Kingdom. 
 
Figure 2.4 plots the models’ (A2/B2) predicted positions at the observed val-
ues and connects them with an arrow to the prediction when shifting public 
opinion two long-run standard deviations towards rightist or pro integration 
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opinion. This reveals the substantial leverage of opinion. For instance, the 
French position on detention periods for illegal immigrants would have been 
predicted 14 scale points towards longer periods, which would have meant be-
tween one and four months of additional detention in substantive terms. The 
next French elections were almost two years away at this point. On the institu-
tional location of the Employment Committee, which was discussed shortly 
after the 1999 European elections, Belgium is predicted to shift its position by 10 
scale points towards higher Commission influence. In substantive terms, this 
distance represented the difference between ensuring that influence was bal-
anced between the two institutions or giving an advantage to one. 
 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND CAUSAL INFERENCE 
I test the robustness of these results by addressing three types of concerns.38 
All results are provided in Table 2.3. First, I address the theoretical concern that 
the modes of responsiveness may not be specific to issue dimensions and that 
governments may apply both modes on both issue dimensions. In this case, 
governments would also sporadically increase their responsiveness on left-right 
due to salience shocks and systematise their efforts on pro-anti integration ac-
cording to the electoral cycle and system. To test these assertions, I use two in-
dicators of salience shocks on left-right. First, I use a measure of the change in 
opposition parties’ emphasis on left-right conflicts. In analogy to pro-anti inte-
gration this is operationalised as the average percentage of quasi-sentences op-
position parties devote to the CMP’s RILE categories in their election manifes-
tos minus their emphasis on RILE four years before. 
																													
38 Results of additional robustness checks are reported in Appendix 1. 
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TABLE 2.3: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON RESPONSIVENESS MODELS 
 Dimension-specific mode Dichotomous DV Measurement concerns 
 Left-right Integration Left-right Integration Left-right Integration 
Opinion  17.168 -2.146 2.642 0.773 28.758 2.310 
 (6.100)*** (73.897) (0.888)*** (1.331) (9.141)*** (19.352) 
Party emphasis (LR / EU) 0.250   -0.150   
 (3.141)   (0.077)*   
Opinion x Party emphasis (LR / EU) -0.049   0.522   
 (0.573)   (0.195)***   
Public salience (LR / EU) -2.394     -13.015 
 (20.680)     (4.741)** 
Opinion x Public salience (LR / EU) 1.272     35.423 
 (3.782)     (10.278)*** 
Days to election  0.200 0.343  6.041  
  (0.804) (0.140)**  (2.711)**  
Opinion x Days to election  0.599 -0.063  -1.103  
  (1.625) (0.026)**  (0.515)**  
District magnitude (ln)  -5.670 2.653  42.934  
  (13.636) (1.320)**  (16.586)**  
Opinion x District magnitude (ln)  2.888 -0.546  -8.544  
  (21.891) (0.251)**  (3.246)***  
EU event    -1.238   
    (0.342)***   
Opinion x EU event    1.923   
    (0.679)***   
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Fixed effects Policy issues, 
countries 
Policy issues, 
countries 
Policy issues, 
countries 
Policy issues, 
countries 
Policy issues Policy issues, 
countries 
Number of policy issues 172 82 172 82 172 82 
Number of countries 26 26 26 26 16 26 
N 2,865 1,448 2,965 1,448 2,406 1,430 
R2 0.28 0.30   0.25 0.31 
Type of robustness check Sporadic 
mode? 
Systematic 
mode? 
Binary DV Binary DV Western Eu-
rope only 
Public sali-
ence measure 
Notes: All are fixed effects linear regressions, except for ‘Dichotomous DV’, which are fixed effects logistic regressions; Deviations in the number of observations 
 due to missing country reports for public salience measure; Country-clustered robust errors in parentheses, except for ‘Western Europe only’ 
 with errors clustered by policy issue; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Second, as it is hard to identify a set of events that render left-right conflicts 
more salient across countries, I create an alternative measure of the public sali-
ence of left-right. For this I make use of country reports from The Political Data 
Yearbook, which is published annually by the European Journal of Political Re-
search. In these reports, experts discuss the most important political issues that 
shaped a country’s political agenda in a given year. I apply the Laver-Garry 
dictionary developed for party policy positions to these texts and calculate the 
percentage of economic left-right words used by the authors (Laver and Garry 
2000). This provides a proxy for whether left-right conflicts were salient politi-
cal issues in the country and the given year.39  
I interact both measures with left-right opinion and include all control varia-
bles. The results show that governments’ responsiveness efforts on left-right are 
neither related to fluctuations in opposition parties’ emphasis on left-right nor 
to whether left-right issues were salient on the country’s political agenda. This 
yields further evidence that governments routinise their responsiveness efforts 
on left-right and do not react to shocks that signal potential electoral salience. 
For pro-anti integration I simply use interactions between opinion and the dis-
tance to the next election as well as logged district magnitude. Again, the re-
sults provide strong evidence for the theoretical conjecture: governments do not 
plan or structure their responsiveness efforts according to the electoral cycle nor 
the electoral system on the pro-anti integration dimension. 
Second, I address concerns about the distribution of the dependent variable. 
Since a significant fraction of DEU policy scales are binary (e.g. the legislative 
conflict only offered two options), the extreme values 0 and 100 are overrepre-
sented, rendering the distribution skewed at both tails. In order to see whether 
this non-normality drives any results I create a second, dichotomised version of 
																													
39 I discuss the face validity of this measure in Appendix 1. 
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the dependent variable: if governments took more leftist / less integrationist 
positions between 0 and 49 this is coded as ‘0’ and more rightist / integrationist 
positions between 50 and 100 as ‘1’. The final models are re-estimated using 
fixed effects logistic regression. Again, this different specification yields qualita-
tively identical results, if anything at slightly higher levels of statistical signifi-
cance. 
Third, I address two concerns regarding measurement. With regard to left-
right I account for the potentially weak suitability of the left-right self-
placement as a measure of opinion in post-communist countries. Some studies 
suggest that citizens’ understanding of the left-right semantic may differ be-
tween Western and Eastern Europe, as citizens with strong conservation and 
security values tend to place themselves on the right side of the scale in West-
ern Europe but often to the left in post-communist countries (Aspelund, 
Lindeman, and Verkasalo 2013; Piurko, Schwartz, and Davidov 2011; 
Thorisdottir et al. 2007). This is caused by respondents associating the com-
munist past with ‘left’ ideology as well as traditionalism and security. A re-
estimation of model A2 from Table 2.1 excluding the 10 post-communist coun-
tries demonstrates that this potential measurement problem does not seem to 
drive any results.40  
With regard to pro-anti integration a central question is whether the modera-
tors investigated are adequate proxies of salience shocks. Sometimes other EU-
related events than those selected may trigger salience, and not every referen-
dum or EU presidency may actually resonate in the public sphere. Similarly, 																													
40 As excluding post-communist states reduces the number of countries from 26 to 16, I excep-
tionally estimate the model without country fixed effects to preserve variation and I do not 
report country-clustered robust standard errors that may not be reliable with a small number of 
clusters. Instead, I cluster errors by policy issue. Hence, the results should be treated with some 
caution. 
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emphasis on EU integration in election manifestos hardly captures all mobilisa-
tion activities of opposition parties and its quality as a proxy may be better 
around elections than during the term. In order to measure public salience 
shocks more directly, I create an alternative measure based on the country re-
ports from The Political Data Yearbook introduced above. Searching the reports 
for the terms ‘Europe*’ and ‘European Union’ and manually checking the rele-
vant sentences, I construct a dummy variable that is ‘1’ for years in which at 
least one aspect of EU integration was mentioned as a salient issue by country 
experts. Interacting this alternative measure with opinion produces the same 
results: responsiveness on pro-anti integration is triggered by public salience 
but is absent otherwise. 
The question remains of whether the relationship between opinion and gov-
ernments’ policy positions can be interpreted causally. The entire responsive-
ness literature is quite aware that elites attempt to prime, frame, and persuade 
the public, potentially causing ‘simultaneity’ or even ‘reversed causality’, so 
that governments may shape opinion more than they are influenced by it. 
However, most findings of this study point towards a bottom-up process. 
Above all, the relationship between opinion and governments’ positions only 
becomes significant with increasing electoral pressure in the domestic arena – 
be it an approaching national election, an elastic electoral formula, or potential-
ly increased electoral salience of integration due to opposition emphasis or EU-
related events. As Jacobs and Shapiro (2000: 43) have argued, manipulation of 
opinion by elites is the strategic choice in times of low electoral pressure but not 
if electoral incentives are imminent since then ‘it is less risky and faster to re-
spond to public opinion than attempt to change it’. Hence, if elite-led dynamics 
were prevalent, we should detect the strongest relationships between opinion 
and positions in periods distant from elections, in PR systems, and in times 
when integration has low public salience. This is precisely the opposite of what 
I find.  
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In total, the empirical analyses consistently support the notion of distinct 
modes of responsiveness which governments apply on the two issue dimen-
sions. The results suggest that governments systematise their responsiveness on 
left-right, as public opinion has a consistent impact on policy positions that in-
creases when elections approach and under high elasticity of seat-vote conver-
sion in majoritarian electoral systems. In turn, the empirical patterns on pro-anti 
integration suggest that governments only sporadically consider opinion in the 
context of salience shocks. Governments’ positions react to opinion when par-
ties increase their emphasis on integration or when major events happen, but 
they are isolated from public pressures at other times.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This study has investigated substantive government responsiveness in the 
EU’s two-dimensional policy-making space. I have argued that due to the dif-
ferent roles which left-right and pro-anti integration issues play in domestic 
electoral competition, distinct patterns of government responsiveness emerge 
on the two issue dimensions. While left-right issues are of high and stable sali-
ence in domestic elections, the electoral importance of pro-anti integration is-
sues varies greatly over time and is lower on average. This affects governments’ 
rational anticipation of which issue bundles will be electorally salient in the 
next election. As uncertainty about the salience of left-right issues is low, sys-
tematic responsiveness, characterised by long-term planning and structuring of 
responsiveness efforts along the electoral cycle, is rational and efficient. In turn, 
as the uncertainty about the salience of EU integration is high, sporadic respon-
siveness, in response to salience shocks that indicate the potential electoral rele-
vance of EU integration, is more appropriate.  
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The study findings contribute to our understanding of policy representation 
in EU politics. Existing studies of policy representation in the EU have pro-
claimed a link between public Euroscepticism and the legislative activity of the 
EU (measured as the sheer amount of legislative output) (Bølstad 2015; Toshkov 
2011). But they could not establish whether the actual substance and content of 
EU policy-making is responsive to public opinion. The results here provide 
strong evidence that, in many situations, national governments at least attempt 
to align the substance of policies to domestic public opinion. Thereby, they fur-
ther challenge the notion that the EU policy-making process is entirely unre-
sponsive to citizens’ demands and that a match between EU-level policies and 
opinion is merely a result of ‘happy coincidence’ (Føllesdal and Hix 2006: 556). 
Instead, in light of the results presented here, it appears likely that policy repre-
sentation in the EU is, at least partially, a result of reliable mechanisms rooted 
in governments’ electoral accountability at the domestic level. This is particular-
ly likely for left-right issues, on which we observe systematic responsiveness. 
Moreover, the findings potentially also contribute to our understanding of 
how issue characteristics influence responsiveness in general. While we have 
known for a long time that the level of electoral salience influences the strength 
of responsiveness in national politics, the findings suggest that we should also 
consider the consequences of variability in salience more thoroughly. For in-
stance, it may be no coincidence that most studies reporting significant electoral 
cycle effects assess responsiveness on issues with very stable salience, particu-
larly a liberal-conservative/left-right issue dimension (e.g. Canes-Wrone and 
Shotts 2004; Elling 1982; Kuklinski 1978; Lindstädt and Vander Wielen 2011).  
Null findings might also be reconsidered in the light of the results presented. 
For instance, so far scholars were unable to detect any relationship between re-
sponsiveness and variations over time in citizens’ responses to the ‘most im-
portant problem’ (MIP) question as a measure of public salience. While this has 
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been attributed to MIP measuring ‘problem load’ rather than ‘importance of an 
issue’, it could also partly be due to the fact that the issues investigated – pre-
dominantly defence spending in the US – are at the core of the liberal-
conservative cleavage (see Jennings and Wlezien 2011; Wlezien 2005). Given the 
comparatively low variability in the salience of such issues, representatives may 
systematise their responsiveness on such issues and respond irrespective of mi-
nor salience fluctuations.41  
While these considerations and the generality of the theoretical argument in-
dicate that different modes of responsiveness might also be relevant in other 
contexts and for other issues, future work is needed to determine the actual 
generalisability of the findings. This can involve the re-examination of existing 
datasets but also new studies comparing different issues and issue dimensions. 
Then, we will be able to determine whether distinct modes of responsiveness 
are an idiosyncrasy of EU policy-making, or whether they apply more generally 
beyond the EU context. 
																													
41 Interestingly, average levels of MIP across issues do predict responsiveness, suggesting some 
validity of the concept, while the variability of MIP over time does not (see Soroka and Wlezien 
2010: 100-102). 
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ABSTRACT 
Are governments responsive to public preferences when legislating in interna-
tional organisations? This article demonstrates that governments respond to do-
mestic public opinion even when acting at the international level. Specifically, we 
examine conflict in the European Union’s primary legislative body, the Council of 
the European Union. We argue that domestic electoral incentives compel govern-
ments to react to public opinion. Analysing a unique dataset on all legislative deci-
sions adopted in the Council since 1999, we show that governments are more likely 
to oppose legislative proposals that extend the level and scope of EU authority 
when their domestic electorates are sceptical about the EU. We also find that gov-
ernments are more responsive when the issue of European integration is salient in 
domestic party politics. Our findings demonstrate that governments can use the in-
ternational stage to signal their responsiveness to public concerns and that such 
signals resonate in the domestic political debate.  
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OVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS TO PUBLIC OPINION IS CENTRAL TO DEMO-
cratic representation. It implies that elected representatives are listen-
ing to and acting upon the wishes and views of the represented (see, for 
example, Mansbridge 2003; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). Various studies have 
shown that policy agendas, government spending, and legislative voting follow 
the changing policy preferences of citizens (Lax and Phillips 2012; Page and 
Shapiro 1983, 1992; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995; Wlezien 1995). The 
fear of electoral sanctioning is an important incentive for governments to act 
responsively. Not surprisingly, studies have therefore found that in systems in 
which there is low clarity of responsibility and limited information, where it is 
difficult for voters to identify policy shirking, elected representatives are also 
less responsive to public preferences (Besley and Burgess 2002; Carey 2008; 
Snyder and Strömberg 2008; Wlezien and Soroka 2012). On the one hand, we 
may expect governments to be less concerned about responding to public pref-
erences when legislating in international organisations (IOs) where clarity of 
responsibility is blurred by multilevel structures and public scrutiny is general-
ly less pronounced.42 On the other hand, increased transparency and scrutiny of 
decision-making in some IOs may give governments greater incentives to use 
this arena to signal that they are aligned with the public’s views and prefer-
ences. 
However, little evidence exists with regard to whether governments are in 
fact responsive to domestic public opinion pressures when acting in IOs. Alt-
hough public opinion is generally seen as an important factor explaining gov-
ernment behaviour in the domestic context, empirical literature on the role of 
																													
42 For discussions of transparency in international organisations, see e.g. Keohane (2003), Risse 
(2000), Stasavage (2004).   
G 
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public opinion in IOs is still sparse (see Stasavage 2004). Instead, studies of 
government behaviour in IOs have mainly focused on other drivers, such as 
geopolitics, military and economic resources, and special interest preferences 
(see, for example, Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 2014; Bailey, Strezhnev, and 
Voeten 2015; Dreher and Sturm 2012). The contribution of this study is to focus 
on the role of public opinion in shaping government behaviour in the European 
Union (EU) in order to understand whether and when governments use the 
international arena to signal to their domestic electorates. We argue that domes-
tic electoral incentives can compel governments to signal that they are respon-
sive to public opinion even when acting internationally. 
Our empirical investigation focuses on decision-making in the EU. The EU is 
arguably the world’s most advanced IO, presiding over a level of economic and 
political integration unmatched in global politics. We examine government be-
haviour in its primary decision-making body, the Council of the European Un-
ion (henceforth, the Council), where national ministers negotiate and adopt leg-
islative proposals. Legislative bargaining in the Council used to take place be-
hind closed doors; however, since 1999, an increasing amount of information on 
policy decisions and government positions has become available (Naurin and 
Wallace 2008). In this article, we analyse a unique data set covering all legisla-
tive acts since 1999 and investigate the extent to which government opposition 
in the Council is a response to popular opposition to European integration. 
Government opposition in the Council is still a rare event, but one that carries 
considerable significance (Mattila 2009; Novak 2013). Our argument is that 
when domestic electorates are negatively disposed toward European integra-
tion, governments can strategically oppose EU acts that are concerned with fur-
ther transfers of authority to the EU to demonstrate that their position is aligned 
with their public’s preferences. Hence, in contrast to the established wisdom 
that governments are shielded from public opinion when legislating interna-
tionally, we argue that popular Euroscepticism incentivises them to voice oppo-
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sition in the Council. While this is not ‘policy responsiveness’ in the classic 
sense of changing the overall policy direction of the Council, we conceptualise 
it as ‘signal responsiveness’ that serves to communicate governments’ positions 
to their domestic electorate. 
Our findings demonstrate that governments’ opposition to legislative pro-
posals is indeed shaped by public opinion on European integration wherever 
these proposals extend the level and scope of European integration. We also 
find that governments are more likely to signal their positions in the Council 
when the issue gains importance in domestic party competition and that these 
signals resonate in the national public sphere. Our findings thus not only con-
tribute to our understanding of policy-making in the EU, but may also have 
broader significance as IOs increasingly face pressures to deepen cooperation 
and increase transparency and accountability to domestic audiences. Moreover, 
our study enhances our understanding of democratic responsiveness by high-
lighting that governments use the international stage to signal to voters at home 
that they care about their views. 
 
GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS IN IOS 
The relationship between public preferences and government policy is at the 
heart of theories of democratic representation. There is a rich literature on gov-
ernment responsiveness, asking whether, when, and how government policies 
respond to changes in public opinion (see, e.g. Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 
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2002; Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Wlezien and Soroka 2010; Wlezien 1995).43 
Despite the scholarly focus on how public opinion shapes government positions 
and policies when they act domestically,44 far less attention has been paid to 
how public opinion influences government behaviour in IOs. Overwhelmingly, 
the literature on government positions and legislative behaviour in IOs, such as 
the EU, the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations, has focused on 
military and economic considerations, and special interests as drivers of gov-
ernment behaviour (see e.g. Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2015; Dreher and 
Sturm 2012; Hug and Lukács 2014). This is also true of the literature on gov-
ernment behaviour in the Council more specifically. 
Numerous studies have in recent years examined decision-making in the 
Council, not least due to improved public access to information. Yet, none of 
these have provided a rigorous study of how public opinion may shape gov-
ernment behaviour. Instead, the literature has centred on economic interests 
and government ideology as drivers of behaviour. A recent example is Bailer, 
Mattila, and Schneider's (2014) study of voting behaviour in the Council, which 
demonstrates that government opposition can largely be attributed to economic 
explanations, notably domestic specialised interests. Others have found that a 
north-south divide exists between the member states in their voting patterns 
(Mattila 2009; Thomson et al. 2006) or that the left-right ideology of govern-
ments affects their behaviour in the Council (Hagemann 2008; Hagemann and 
Høyland 2008; Mattila 2009). The general assumption in such studies is that as 
																													
43 The relationship between public opinion and government policy is, however, complex. Stud-
ies have stressed governments’ ability to manipulate opinion (e.g. Jacobs and Shapiro 2000), 
raised questions about who comprises the relevant ‘public’ (e.g. Gilens 2012), and highlighted 
the complex relationship between responsiveness and congruence (e.g. Lax and Phillips 2012). 
44 Some studies have also examined the impact of public opinion on politicians’ foreign policy 
positions; see, for example, Jacobs and Page (2005) and Milner and Tingley (2011). 
		 	90	
governments are largely insulated from electoral pressures when they legislate 
in the Council, constituency demands do not play a significant role. As Bailer, 
Mattila, and Schneider (2014: 441) note, 
[T]he electorate is usually not well informed about the Council deliberations as these 
negotiations are conducted mostly away from the public scrutiny […]. Therefore, nega-
tive votes and abstentions in the Council will be a signal to which mainly domestic inter-
est groups pay some attention.  
Public opinion is not entirely absent from the literature on EU policy-
making, however. Some studies have examined ‘systemic responsiveness’ by 
analysing whether the amount of legislation passed reflects public demands for 
further integration, showing a relationship between EU support and the 
amount of legislation (see Bølstad 2015; Toshkov 2011; de Vries and Arnold 
2011). Although this work is valuable for studying responsiveness at the system 
level, it provides limited insight into when and why we would expect individu-
al politicians to act responsively in the EU. Moreover, it is based on the strong 
assumption that more legislative acts necessarily imply more integration. 
In contrast to extant work on systemic responsiveness, we examine the mi-
cro-foundations of responsiveness by analysing government behaviour in the 
Council. If there is any relationship between public opinion and government 
behaviour in IOs, we would expect to find it in the EU, arguably the world’s 
most advanced IO with high levels of political and economic integration and 
increasing salience in domestic public spheres (Börzel and Risse 2009). Hence, 
we cannot easily generalise from the EU to other IOs. Yet, as a ‘most likely 
case’, the EU is an important starting point for the exploration of democratic 
responsiveness in the international arena. 
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The Council is the EU’s primary legislative chamber45 and we focus on gov-
ernment opposition to legislative acts. While the majority of acts adopted by the 
Council are supported by all member states, opposition in the Council has in-
creased during the past 10 to 15 years, with more legislation now adopted with 
one or more governments explicitly recording their disagreement (Naurin and 
Wallace 2008). Today, ‘vote intentions’ are publicly available ahead of Council 
meetings, and minutes and final legislative records from the meetings include 
information about votes and policy positions by the member states. Council 
votes are also reported more widely by national media (see below). In contrast 
to the prevailing wisdom, this study develops and tests the argument that pub-
lic opinion can play a role in shaping governments’ behaviour in the Council. 
 
RESPONSIVE OPPOSITION IN THE COUNCIL 
How would responsiveness to public opinion manifest itself in governments’ 
voting behaviour in the Council? We argue that governments can use opposi-
tion votes in the Council as public signals of their position on EU integration. 
This signal responsiveness is different from substantive responsiveness in that 
governments cannot directly change the policy substance with their opposition 
(as virtually all acts put to a vote eventually pass), but they can use it as a com-
munication tool to credibly signal their position on transfers of authority (closer 
European integration) to a wider audience. However, governments’ motiva-
tions for signalling their position are similar to when they change policies in 
line with public opinion during the legislative term. In both cases, it is a form of 																													
45 Legally speaking, the Council is one entity, but in practice, it is divided into ten configura-
tions (Competitiveness, Economic and Financial Affairs, etc.), and each Council has to adopt 
legislation according to a set of rules depending on the legal basis of the policy proposal in 
question. 
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‘anticipatory representation’ or ‘rational anticipation’, as they focus on what 
they think voters will reward in the next election rather than what they prom-
ised during the campaign of the previous election (e.g. Erikson, MacKuen, and 
Stimson 2002; Mansbridge 2003; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995). Crucial-
ly, however, the EU makes it more difficult for a single government to shift ac-
tual policy in line with domestic preferences. Yet, by voting in line with public 
preferences they are still able to send the signal that they are not out of step 
with the public mood. 
Recent studies have shown that citizens care about government responsive-
ness (see Bowler 2016; Rosset, Giger, and Bernauer 2016), and the issue of Euro-
pean integration has become increasingly salient to voters. Since the early 
1990s, Europe has witnessed a shift away from a ‘permissive consensus’ in fa-
vour of elite-led European integration toward more vocal and sceptical public 
attitudes toward the integration project, so-called Euroscepticism (see e.g. 
Hooghe and Marks 2009; de Vries and Hobolt 2012; de Vries 2007). The electoral 
consequences of Euroscepticism have been acutely felt by Europe’s mainstream 
parties as they suffered a loss of support due to the rise of Eurosceptic parties, 
mainly on the far right and the far left, both in national and European Parlia-
ment (EP) elections (see Hobolt and Spoon 2012; de Vries 2007). Hence, given 
the increasing salience of voters’ concerns about European integration in elec-
toral contests, political elites have been looking for ways of adjusting their posi-
tion on the issue. 
We argue that Council voting serves as a signalling tool that governments 
may adopt to communicate their positions on a given proposal, and on Europe-
an integration more generally, to a domestic audience. Given the strong consen-
sus culture in the Council, opposition sends a clear and generally unwelcome 
message to negotiation partners that may be costly in terms of reputation and 
related future negotiation success (see Miller 2013; Naurin and Wallace 2008; 
Novak 2013). Opposition can also have immediate consequences, as it may lead 
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to dismissal of the opposing government’s preferences when drafting the final 
policy text. Hence, as there are few benefits (the policy will be passed by the 
majority in any case) and several costs, it is not surprising that opposition is still 
relatively rare, accounting for less than 2% of votes during the 1999 to 2011 pe-
riod we investigate here. This means, however, that as a public signalling tool, 
opposition votes can be seen as more credible as they involve ‘observable costly 
effort’ (see Lupia and McCubbins 1998). 
To serve as a public signal of the government’s position on integration, an 
opposition vote must be interpretable as a stance against European integration. 
Most of the legislative proposals in the Council, however, do not relate to trans-
fers of authority to the EU level. Some policy areas, such as agriculture, deal 
primarily with rather technical amendments or issues in the remit of pre-
established EU competences, whereas other policy areas are concerned with 
extending the scope of authority by establishing EU legislation or programs in 
previously unaffected areas as well as its level by delegating new decisional 
powers to supranational bodies or agencies (Börzel 2005; Schmitter 1970). Our 
expectation is therefore that opposition which is aimed at appeasing public 
concerns about European integration will primarily relate to votes in policy ar-
eas concerned with extending the level or scope of EU authority. This leads to 
our first hypothesis concerning government responsiveness in the Council: 
H1: Governments are more likely to oppose legislative proposals that affect 
the authority of the EU when domestic public opinion is negatively disposed 
toward the EU than when public opinion is positively disposed toward the EU. 
The extent to which governments wish to use opposition votes as a signal to 
their publics is also shaped by domestic political competition. We expect that 
governments’ responsiveness is higher when the issue of European integration 
is salient in the domestic context. As signal responsiveness aims at communi-
cating positions (and shifts in positions) to the public, it becomes largely obso-
lete in situations when conflicts about integration are not politicised in the do-
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mestic political arena. Political elites play a crucial role in mobilising a new is-
sue in the domestic public sphere, including in the media, and thus making it 
relevant to voters’ choices (Carmines and Stimson 1986, 1989; Hooghe and 
Marks 2009). The abstract nature of European integration and multilevel gov-
ernance issues makes the actions of political elites all the more important, as 
such issues typically lack inherent news value (Soroka 2002). Instead, it is polit-
ical elites’ communication activities on these issues that render them newswor-
thy in the first place (Adam 2007; Boomgaarden et al. 2013). In turn, increased 
levels of (media) information on EU integration render the issue more im-
portant for electoral competition, as they facilitate ‘EU issue voting’, that is, 
they increase the impact of EU attitudes on vote choice (Tillman 2004; de Vries 
2007; de Vries, Edwards, and Tillman 2010). Research has shown that in party 
systems where there is more partisan conflict and media debate on European 
integration dimensions, EU issue voting is more likely (Hobolt, Spoon, and 
Tilley 2009; de Vries et al. 2011). When political opposition parties politicise the 
issue of European integration domestically, there are also greater incentives for 
governing parties to demonstrate that they adjust their position on European 
integration in line with public opinion. Hence, we expect that wherever opposi-
tion parties increase the salience of integration, governments will be particular-
ly prone to signal responsiveness.  
H2: Governments are more responsive to public opinion when domestic op-
position parties increase their emphasis on European integration.46  
The next sections discuss how we test these hypotheses empirically. 
																													
46 This hypothesis mirrors hypothesis EU-H1 from Paper 1. The findings below therefore cor-
roborate those on EU-H1 in Paper 1 by showing that under increasing opposition emphasis on 
integration not only the initial negotiation positions of governments are influenced by public 
opinion but also their voting behaviour. 
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DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
To test our propositions, we draw on a unique dataset of governments’ votes 
in the Council between January 1999 and October 2011.47 We define opposition 
as governments’ ‘No’ or ‘Abstain’ votes as abstentions always mean a deviation 
from the majority consensus and effectively count as a negative position when 
mobilising majorities to meet the required qualified majority threshold. Our 
dependent variable is therefore binary, with ‘1’ indicating that governments 
opposed a legislative act.  
As our main independent variable to test H1, we measure public opinion on 
EU integration with the Eurobarometer survey question on EU membership, 
which asks respondents whether their countries’ membership in the EU is ‘a 
good thing’, ‘a bad thing’, or ‘neither good nor bad’. This question has been 
widely used to measure dynamic preferences for EU integration. We operation-
alise public opinion by assigning ‘−1’ to all respondents who think EU member-
ship is a bad thing, ‘1’ to those who say it is a good thing, and ‘0’ to all who are 
undecided. Our measure of opinion is the survey-weighted mean of all valid 
responses by country, and runs from about 0 (when supporters and opponents 
of integration are neck and neck) to about 0.8 (when there is overwhelming 
support for EU membership).48 In all models, we use a six-month lag of opinion 
																													
47 Our time frame for the estimation of our voting models is restricted by the European Com-
mission’s decision to discontinue the question on EU membership in its Eurobarometer surveys 
from 2011 onward. Our extended dataset comprises all votes up to 31st of December 2013. We 
use this extended dataset for both quantitative text models we use in the paper (Wordscores 
and Latent Dirichlet Allocation). 
48 We use linear interpolation to cover time points between surveys (see also Soroka and 
Wlezien 2010). 
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from the voting date to represent the causal ordering between opinion and gov-
ernment behaviour in which governments react to public opinion.49 
To test our second hypothesis (H2), we construct a measure of dynamic op-
position emphasis on EU integration from the Comparative Manifesto Project’s 
(CMP) coding of party manifestos (Lehmann et al. 2015). We capture changes in 
opposition emphasis by first calculating the simple average percentage of quasi-
sentences opposition parties devote to European integration and linearly inter-
polate this measure over time. Our measure is the emphasis at the date of the 
Council vote minus the emphasis four years prior to this date.50 
As signal responsiveness is about anticipatory representation rather than a 
government fulfilling its electoral mandate, we have to rule out the possibility 
that the relationship between opinion and opposition votes is entirely driven by 
changes in government composition—that is, that when parties with a more 
Eurosceptic profile enter office, they also oppose EU legislation more often. We 
therefore control for the seat-weighted positions on EU integration as well as 
left-right of all government parties that were represented in the cabinet on the 
day of the Council vote.51 This parses out the effects of the electoral turnover 
mechanism on responsiveness and ensures that the effect of opinion only repre-
sents anticipatory efforts by the government. We measure both concepts with 
the CMP coding from the preceding elections and operationalise parties’ posi-
tions on EU integration as the difference in the percentages of positive and neg-
																													
49 In Appendix 2, we test the robustness of our results with regard to different lag lengths. 
50 See Paper 1 and Appendix 1 for details regarding this measure. 
51 Clearly, we expect that more Eurosceptic governments will more often oppose votes in the 
Council. With regard to ideology, we expect centre-right governments to oppose EU decisions 
less often as the centre-right not only formed a majority in the Council but also in the agenda-
setting Commission during the period under investigation (see Hagemann and Høyland 2008). 
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ative quasi-sentences on the EU as well as their left-right position captured by 
the CMP’s summative RILE measure.  
Furthermore, we control for several factors that have been shown to influ-
ence voting in the Council in previous studies. In particular, we control for eco-
nomic explanations of governments’ voting behaviour (see Bailer, Mattila, and 
Schneider 2014) by including a measure of countries’ annual net receipts from 
the EU budget (% of GDP) as well as unemployment and inflation rates. Finally, 
we include dummy variables for whether the legislative act was filed under the 
co-decision procedure, whether the country voting held the presidency of the 
Council as well as whether the voting took place before or after Eastern en-
largement. These differences in institutional and political circumstances could 
influence the level of opposition.52 
We only expect to find signal responsiveness on acts that have implications 
for the scope and level of EU authority. If acts establish EU activities in new 
areas, set up new supranational agencies, or enforce the harmonisation of rules, 
opposing such acts can be interpreted by the public as a general stance against 
‘more integration’ or ‘more authority’ of the supranational institutions. Our ex-
pectation is that such legislative acts are strongly clustered in particular policy 
areas. Specifically, policy domains like agriculture and fisheries or the internal 
market have been areas of (exclusive) community competence for decades and 
supranational authority in these areas is well-established (see Börzel 2005; Hix 
and Høyland 2011). In contrast, in areas where EU competences are not as well-
established such as civil liberties, justice and home affairs, or foreign policy, the 
boundaries of authority continue to shift. To rigorously determine which policy 
areas are characterised by changes within the boundaries of existing competen-
																													
52 More details on all variables, their sources, and operationalisations are provided in Appendix 
2. 
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cies as opposed to areas in which legislative activity pushes these boundaries, 
we set up a text scaling model based on the well-known Wordscores approach 
(Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003).53 For this purpose, we collected text summaries 
of the legislative acts in our dataset from the EP’s Legislative Observatory web-
site. These summaries of the European Commission’s legislative proposal de-
scribe the background, content as well as implications of the relevant act voted 
on in the Council. In total, we are able to obtain this textual information for 
1,793 out of 2,314 acts in our extended dataset.54 
The Wordscores approach takes as its starting point in a set of manually cho-
sen reference texts that represent the extremes of the substantive dimension of 
interest. The relative frequency of a particular word in each of the reference 
texts then provides naïve Bayes probabilities for whether a virgin text is from 
one or the other reference category. These probabilities are multiplied with cho-
sen values for the reference texts to ‘score’ each virgin text on the dimension of 
interest. The procedure is applied to each word in a text and the average word 
score of a text provides a document score. We create two long reference texts 
from our sample with negative scores representing acts operating on the basis 
of established competences and positive numbers representing texts that extend 
EU authority. 
Table 3.1 displays average rescaled scores of acts per policy area and shows 
that acts extending EU authority are clearly overrepresented in areas such as 
‘Employment, education, culture and social affairs’, as well as ‘Budget’, ‘For-
eign and security policy’, ‘Transport and telecommunication’, and ‘Civil liber-
																													
53 Further information on the Wordscores model is provided in Appendix 2. 
54 Where summaries were not available, this was mainly the case for acts related to specific ad-
justments of existing policies (e.g. extending certain derogations of particular member states) 
and where the EP was not involved procedurally. 
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ties, justice, and home affairs’. The analysis shows that three policy areas are 
evidently much more concerned with established EU competences rather than 
authority extension, namely ‘Agriculture and fisheries’, ‘Economic and financial 
affairs’, and ‘Internal market and consumer affairs’. This classification broadly 
corresponds with the expert judgments provided by Börzel (2005) and Hix and 
Høyland (2011) on EU authority across policy areas (see Appendix 2). We there-
fore exclude these areas from our analysis below. 
 
TABLE 3.1: WORDSCORES RESULTS BY POLICY AREA 
Policy area Extension of authority 
vs. established  
competences 
Agriculture and fisheries −.65 
Budget .68 
Civil liberties, justice, and home affairs .15 
Constitutional affairs and administration .14 
Development and international trade .12 
Economic and financial affairs -.11 
Employment, education, culture, and social affairs .94 
Environment and energy .22 
Foreign and security policy .46 
Internal market and consumer affairs -.03 
Transport and telecommunications .44 
Number of acts 1,793 
 
 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS  
To analyse this data, we use mixed effects logistic regression models with 
fixed effects for countries and a random effect for each legislative act voted on 
in the Council, based on the assumption that our large sample of acts can be 
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thought of as a random draw from an imagined population of Council acts.55 
The main results are reported in Table 3.2. First, we only include public opinion 
and the control variables in Model 1. The results show that public opinion has a 
significant effect on governments’ opposition in the Council in the policy areas 
included. The probability of an opposition vote decreases as the fraction of the 
population that supports EU membership of their country increases. Model 2 
adds the governing parties’ seat-weighted position on left-right and pro-anti 
integration to ascertain whether part of the opinion effect is due to changes in 
government composition. The inclusion of these terms leaves the results virtual-
ly unchanged, which demonstrates that responsiveness of governments in the 
Council is first and foremost a result of anticipatory dynamics, as government 
parties’ positions at the last elections only explain a marginal part of the rela-
tionship between opinion and voting in the Council. Hence, in contrast to the 
existing literature on decision-making in the Council, which claims that public 
opinion is of little significance, we find that if we focus on acts in policy areas 
that extend the scope and degree of EU authority, government opposition is 
clearly a reflection of domestic Euroscepticism. This supports our argument 
that governments use Council voting to signal responsiveness, adjusting their 
position during the legislative term in anticipation of electoral sanctions. 
 
																													
55 We implement fixed effects for countries with dummy variables and hence report a constant 
(the same applies to the models in Paper 4). We have some missing data related to party posi-
tions from the CMP. While we use list-wise deletion here, Appendix 2 demonstrates that our 
results are robust to using multiple imputations for these positions. We also present a series of 
further robustness checks in Appendix 2, including different random and fixed effects specifica-
tions, alternative operationalisations of opposition votes as well as party emphasis, different lag 
lengths of opinion, sensitivity analyses with regard to excluding / including policy areas from 
the sample, and jackknife resampling at the country level. 
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TABLE 3.2: MODELS OF OPPOSITION VOTES IN THE COUNCIL 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Public opinion -2.414 -2.392 -2.957 
 (0.981)** (0.983)** (1.003)*** 
Party emphasis (EU)   0.534 
   (0.141)*** 
Public opinion x Party emphasis (EU)   -1.590 
   (0.352)*** 
Government pro-anti integration position   -0.175 -0.224 
  (0.061)*** (0.064)*** 
Government left-right position  -0.009 -0.009 
  (0.008) (0.008) 
Net receipts from EU budget -0.236 -0.151 -0.179 
 (0.175) (0.178) (0.185) 
Unemployment 0.104 0.100 0.119 
 (0.035)*** (0.036)*** (0.037)*** 
Inflation 0.087 0.106 0.121 
 (0.062) (0.062)* (0.062)* 
Co-decision 0.755 0.744 0.769 
 (0.264)*** (0.262)*** (0.264)*** 
Post-enlargement 0.633 0.501 0.415 
 (0.288)** (0.289)* (0.290) 
Rotating presidency -1.246 -1.262 -1.352 
 (0.530)** (0.530)** (0.532)** 
Constant -6.676 -6.113 -5.961 
 (0.860)*** (0.889)*** (0.890)*** 
Fixed effects Countries Countries Countries 
Random effects Legislative 
acts 
Legislative 
acts 
Legislative 
acts 
Number of acts 915 915 915 
Number of countries 25 25 25 
N 18,687 18,687 18,687 
Log-likelihood -1185.03 -1180.22 -1169.48 
Notes: All are mixed effects logistic regressions; No observations for Malta due to missing CMP measures, 
no observations for Latvia due to no opposition votes cast; Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** 
p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Model 3 investigates our hypothesis H2 that party emphasis on EU integra-
tion moderates the opinion effect on opposition votes. For this purpose, we in-
clude an interaction term between public opinion and the increase in party em-
phasis on integration during the last four years. The results show that when 
opposition parties have increased their emphasis on European integration in 
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their manifestos, governments are more responsive to different levels of opin-
ion than in situations with decreased party emphasis on integration. The mod-
eration term is highly statistically significant and provides evidence for our con-
jecture that signalling activities of the government are conditioned by competi-
tion from the opposition parties.  
The results for the control variables are largely in line with expectations. We 
find that governments oppose acts more often if unemployment is high and if 
the act was filed under co-decision (when preference realisation is impeded by 
another veto player, the EP). Unsurprisingly, national delegations holding the 
presidency are also less likely to oppose acts they have negotiated. We also find 
that governments that present themselves as Eurosceptic in election manifestos 
oppose acts more often, which suggests some form of mandate fulfilment by 
government parties. In contrast, there is no evidence that right-wing govern-
ments opposed votes more often. Most interestingly perhaps, we find no evi-
dence that votes can be ‘bought’ with attributions from the EU budget (for 
contrasting findings, see Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 2014).  
Figure 3.1 demonstrates the substantive magnitude of these results by plot-
ting the conditional marginal effect of a unit change in opinion (in terms of 
changes in predicted probabilities) depending on whether party salience of EU 
integration has increased or decreased. These marginal effects range from es-
sentially 0 up to −2.4 percentage points for a unit change in opinion. Assuming 
that party salience of integration is increasing, typical movements in opinion 
within a country (e.g. one or two standard deviations) translate into changes of 
the predicted probability of opposition votes of about ±0.15 to 0.5 percentage 
points. Although this may appear small at first sight, it must be compared with 
the overall low frequency of opposition votes, which is just 1.46% in our estima-
tion sample. In this context, the leverage of public opinion is indeed very sub-
stantial. 
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FIGURE 3.1: PARTY EMPHASIS AND PUBLIC OPINION 
 
Notes: 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines. 
 
Government signals 
We have now established that government opposition in the Council is more 
likely when the domestic electorate is more sceptical about the EU, especially 
when the issue is also gaining salience among political parties. The next step is 
to look at the nature of this opposition and whether the government’s signal 
resonates in the domestic public sphere. 
Starting with the nature of the public signal, we seek to investigate the kind 
of issues on which governments signal their opposition. For this purpose, we 
use a topic model that allows us to identify the type of acts on which public 
opinion matters to government opposition. We apply a Latent Dirichlet Alloca-
tion (LDA) model (Blei, Ng, and Jordan 2003; Grimmer 2010; Quinn et al. 2010) 
to the legislative summaries of the 1,793 acts where these summaries were 
available. LDA is a hierarchical Bayesian model that builds on the idea that 
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each document consists of a mixture of topics that can be inferred from the co-
occurrence of words. The proportions dedicated to each of k topics are assumed 
to be drawn from a common Dirichlet prior. The word generating process with-
in each document is then modelled by first drawing the topic and then, condi-
tional on the topic, the respective word from a multinomial distribution (see 
Grimmer and Stewart 2013). Testing different numbers of topics and starting 
values, we arrive at a model with k = 45 topics that creates a good substantive 
delineation of topics and is indicative of key results we obtain across a variety 
of models.56 
Table 3.3 shows the results from the LDA model with 45 topics and each act 
allocated to its most likely topic. It should be noted that these findings are 
meant to be exploratory, providing greater insight into when and why govern-
ments choose to oppose, rather than a strict confirmatory test. The final column 
in the table indicates the effect of public opinion on government opposition for 
legislative acts in that category. It displays the difference in the percentages of 
opposition votes by countries with opinion below versus above the country 
mean. A high positive value shows that a Eurosceptic electorate makes gov-
ernment opposition in the Council more frequent; a negative value indicates the 
opposite (this is only significant in the instance of legislation on ‘Financial insti-
tutions [38]’). 
The findings are very much in line with our expectations that signal respon-
siveness is found when legislation is concerned with extending the level and/or 
scope of European integration, rather than in areas of established EU compe-
tence. Table 3.3 shows that public opinion has the greatest influence on gov-
ernment opposition on acts concerned with further integration in the field of 
environment, border cooperation and migration, data sharing and harmonisa-
																													
56 More details on the LDA model are provided in Appendix 2. 
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tion of statistical surveys, as well as in the area of EU funding for member 
states. In contrast, government opposition in the areas of agriculture, fisheries, 
and the internal market is not related to public opinion (see the last column, 
‘Difference by opinion’).  
 
TABLE 3.3: TOPIC MODEL OF COUNCIL ACTS 
 Description Key words 
Obs. 
(%) 
Opposition 
votes (%) 
Difference 
by opinion 
(%) 
1 
Budgetary surveillance of 
member states 
Economics, Budgetary, 
Surveillance, Stability, 
Imbalances, Deficit, Euro 
0.99 0.24 +1.3 
2 
Passenger rights and EU 
funding for disasters  
Transport, Passenger, 
Damage, Disaster, Fund, 
Solidarity 
0.88 5.30 +3.0 
3 
Regulation on food prod-
ucts 
Food, Regulation, Label, 
Consumers, Additives, 
Product 
2.91 4.58 -1.1 
4 
Communications and 
research 
Programme, Communica-
tions, Information 
4.12 2.22 +0.8 
5 Crime and justice 
Criminal, Offence, Judici-
ary, Crime, Law 
3.63 0.35 +0.0 
6 Maritime  
Ship, Maritime, Law, Reg-
ulation 
1.87 1.32 -0.0 
7 
Instruments and pro-
grammes to financially 
support non-EU countries 
Instrument, Financial, 
Assistance, Support, Fi-
nance, Region 
1.81 1.00 +1.3 
8 Agriculture 
Agriculture, Product, 
Market, Local, Organic, 
Trade, Forest 
2.25 4.15 -1.1 
9 
Companies and financial 
industry 
Companies, Payment, 
Financial, Transfer, Busi-
ness, Money 
2.09 2.25 +0.9 
10 Energy and environment 
Energy, Efficiency, Emis-
sion, Gas, Greenhouse, 
Renewable, Fuel 
1.43 0.96 -0.4 
11 
Environment and 
transport 
Emission, Vehicle, Limit, 
Air, Road, Engine, Reduc-
tion, Pollution, Noise 
2.80 2.80 +3.2*** 
12 Environment  Substance, Environment, 
Waste, Pollution, Recy-
2.86 2.17 +0.3 
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cling, Water 
13 
Common market in food 
products 
Market, Aid, Price, Regu-
lation, Year, Sugar, Prod-
uct, Quota 
4.56 5.46 -1.1 
14 
Health, risk management, 
culture 
Health, Protect, Threat, 
Emergency, Disease, Risk, 
Culture 
1.04 1.45 +0.1 
15 EU financial assistance 
Assistance, Guarantee, 
Loan, Financial, Fund, 
European Investment 
Bank 
1.48 0 0 
16 
Employment and social 
policy 
Employment, Social, Edu-
cation, Labour, Training, 
Work 
1.76 1.04 -0.9 
17 
Transportation and public 
works contracts 
Public, Contract, Air, Car-
rier, Airport, Transport 
1.92 1.16 +0.0 
18 
Accession of new member 
states and asylum matters 
Accession, Asylum, Ap-
plication 
2.25 1.06 +0.9 
19 
Regulation on external 
trade relations 
Regulation, Treaties, 
Trade 
3.85 0.74 -0.8 
20 
Consumer protection and 
legal enforcement 
Consumer, Protection, 
Rights, Courts, Law, Jus-
tice, Legal 
1.48 3.07 -0.2 
21 
Taxation and internal 
market 
VAT, Rate, Tax, Goods, 
Fraud 
2.09 0.24 -0.0 
22 
Common Agricultural 
Policy and rural develop-
ment 
Agriculture, Rural, Pay-
ment, Fund, CAP, Region-
al 
1.37 1.35 -1.4 
23 Internal market in energy 
Market, Network, Gas, 
Transmissions, Electricity, 
Energy 
0.82 0.29 -0.6 
24 EU budget 
Budget, Million, Payment, 
Expenditure, Commit-
ment, Amount, Financing, 
Resources 
1.54 4.07 +0.2 
25 
Animal welfare and dis-
ease 
Animals, Control, Health, 
Disease, Veterinary, Im-
port 
2.97 3.69 +1.7 
26 Customs union  
Customs Union, Duties, 
Import, Tax, Rate, Prod-
uct, Tariff, Excise 
1.48 0.63 -1.2 
27 
Establishment of agen-
cies and networks on 
border control, security 
and migration 
Agency, Network, Estab-
lishment, Security, Ex-
change, Border 
2.69 0.81 +1.4*** 
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28 
Common Agricultural 
Policy  
Farmer, Milk, Payment, 
Wine, Product, Quota, 
Market, Crop 
1.21 6.38 -2.9 
29 
Medicine, chemicals and 
research 
Medicine, Substance, Safe-
ty, Nuclear, Risk, Chemi-
cals 
1.76 2.64 +1.9 
30 Single Market 
Directives, Amendments, 
Requirements, Limits, 
Standards 
2.86 0.90 +0.0 
31 Implementation 
Implementation, Proce-
dure, Instruments, Regula-
tory 
2.91 0.07 -0.1 
32 Codification  
Codification, Act, Di-
rective, Incorporation, 
Formal, Law 
5.77 0.15 -0.0 
33 Fisheries 
Fisheries, Vessel, Stock, 
Conservation, Sea, Catch 
4.40 1.44 -0.5 
34 Single currency 
Euro, Counterfeit, Curren-
cy, Adopt, Circulate, Der-
ogation 
2.09 0.37 -0.2 
35 Research and technology 
Research, Technology, 
Project, Contribution, Fi-
nancing 
1.37 3.02 +0.1 
36 
Financial contributions 
to member state ex-
penditure and to EU 
funds 
Financial, Fund, Support, 
Assistance, Contribution 
2.03 2.98 +2.6* 
37 Import and export of goods 
Export, Import, Product, 
Market, Regulation, Rules, 
Standards 
2.31 2.01 -1.5 
38 Financial institutions 
Credit, Rate, Risk, Capital, 
Financial, Institutions, 
Banks 
1.10 1.60 -3.5*** 
39 Communications 
Communications, Mobile, 
Satellite, Providers 
1.15 3.18 +2.1 
40 
EU financing in innova-
tion and infrastructure 
Fund, Innovation, Invest-
ment, Financing, Infra-
structure 
1.87 1.54 -1.1 
41 Financial supervision 
Financial, Supervision, 
Authority, Bank, ESA 
0.66 0 0 
42 
Statistical surveys and 
data sharing  
Data, Statistics, Regula-
tion, Quality 
3.35 1.16 +1.1** 
43 
Transport safety and 
communications 
Safety, Railway, Rail, 
Network, Communica-
tions 
1.04 4.72 +0.6 
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44 
Schengen and border con-
trol 
Schengen, Visa, Border, 
Travel, SIS 
3.08 1.34 +0.5 
45 
Social security and em-
ployment 
Social security, Citizens, 
Rights, Profession 
2.09 4.43 +1.6 
Notes: Column ‘Obs (%)’ shows the fraction of observations allocated to the topic as a percentage of all 
observations; column ‘Opposition votes (%)’ shows the fraction of opposition votes as a percentage of the 
observations in the topic; column ‘Difference by opinion (%)’ shows difference in the proportions of oppo-
sition votes cast with opinion below vs. above the country mean; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Hence, while we find relatively high levels of opposition on acts about agri-
culture and budget matters, quite possibly related to special economic interests 
(see Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 2014), ‘signal responsiveness’ is only appar-
ent when national governments can use their opposition as a signal that they 
are standing up for national interests by opposing shifts toward further delega-
tion of powers to the EU. The topic model also implies that governments use 
opposition as a signal to domestic audiences mainly in areas that are likely to be 
of greater interest to the general electorate (e.g. border control and environ-
ment) rather than specialised interests (e.g. agriculture and fisheries). 
This leads us to the question of whether such ‘signals’ are visible in the do-
mestic public spheres. Our argument concerning signal responsiveness rests on 
the assumption that governments have a reasonable expectation that opposition 
in the Council may come to the attention of domestic electorates. If decisions 
made in the Council are taken entirely ‘away from the public scrutiny’ as Bailer, 
Mattila, and Schneider (2014: 441) argue, then it would be less plausible that 
opposition in the Council is driven by governments’ incentive to improve their 
standing with domestic electorates. Hence, to substantiate our argument, we 
investigate media coverage and subsequent public debate in a number of EU 
member states to show that Council politics is indeed visible to domestic elec-
torates. 
For this purpose, we use data provided by Reh et al. (2013), who collected in-
formation on the number of news stories in Italian-, German-, French-, and Eng-
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lish-speaking print media that dealt with EU legislative acts adopted under the 
EU’s co-decision procedure from mid-1999 to mid-2009 (i.e. for the fifth and 
sixth EPs). This data cover newspapers from seven different EU countries (Aus-
tria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and the United Kingdom). To 
test whether aggregate opposition in the Council is related to higher levels of 
media coverage, we regress the logged average number of newspaper stories 
regarding an act on the total number57 of governmental opposition votes sub-
mitted by the seven countries covered in Reh et al.’s data using ordinary least 
squares (OLS). As the last section has shown that opposition votes are more 
common on certain topics, we include fixed effects for the 45 topics identified in 
the LDA model. We find a highly significant relationship between the number 
of opposition votes and media coverage.58  
Figure 3.2 demonstrates the substantive consequences: with no opposition 
vote, an average of 0.4 newspaper articles cover the act; this number rises to 1 
article with two opposition votes, and 1.4 articles with three governments op-
posing. Hence, there are observable effects of government responsiveness: op-
position is related to higher media coverage of EU legislation, even when com-
paring between acts within the same 45 different topic categories.59 To provide a 
more in-depth look into the public attention to signal responsiveness, we have 
examined the media coverage of cases where a government opposed legislation 
in the Council at a time when the domestic population was particularly critical 
																													
57 If there was more than one vote occasion, we sum opposition votes across occasions. 
58 The regression results are reported in Appendix 2. 
59 Unfortunately, the available media data does not allow us to conduct a test of the relationship 
between government opposition and media attention in the entire EU; however, this analysis is 
indicative that government opposition in the Council resonates in national media. 
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(with a public opinion score below the country mean) and which falls under the 
topics identified in Table 3.3. 
 
FIGURE 3.2: NEWSPAPER STORIES AND OPPOSITION VOTES 
 
Notes: 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines. 
 
Our investigation reveals a number of cases where popular national news 
outlets report on Council agreements and on their government’s opposition 
vote. One example is a media case relating to a vote on ‘Environment and 
transport’ (Topic [11] in Table 3.3). In September 2011, Spain opposed a majori-
ty in the Council when it voted against an EU directive to substantially increase 
road tolls for heavy vehicles on European motorways.60 Spain – together with 
the Italian government – argued that the new directive would place a dispro-
																													
60 Council and EP Directive 2008/0147/COD. 
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portionate burden on the EU’s peripheral countries, as it would result in a sub-
sequent rise in the costs of export and import of goods. The Spanish media re-
ported extensively on the topic and explicitly mentioned the Spanish govern-
ment’s opposition in the Council.61 The government’s opposition was later also 
mentioned when the national media reported on discussions to extend in-
creased toll taxes to all vehicles crossing borders between EU member states.62 
This example illustrates how government opposition in the Council can be 
picked up by a broader public audience beyond the political insiders and nar-
row organised interest groups with a particular incentive to monitor EU legisla-
tive activities. Of course, many votes in the various Council configurations go 
largely unnoticed by the general public. Nevertheless, national media pay at-
tention to the Council agenda and now seek information on their national gov-
ernments’ positions on individual policies of particular national or regional in-
terest.63 Overall, this evidence suggests that opposition in the Council may be as 
much a political signal to domestic audiences as a policy stance vis-à-vis nego-
tiation partners at the European level. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The literature on responsiveness has mostly focused on how governments 
react to public opinion in the domestic context, whereas the literature on gov-
ernment behaviour in IOs pays little attention to the role of national public 
																													
61 For example, La Vanguardia 14/09/2011: ‘Los camiones pagaran los peajas mas caros.’ 
62 For example, RTVE 16/09/2011: ‘Cobrar peaje autovias para turismos, un modelo polemico 
aplicado solo en Portugal.’ 
63 See the Council’s press service: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/. See also Wessels 
et al. (2013) and www.votewatch.eu/media. 
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opinion. The latter generally assumes that governments act in isolation from 
domestic electoral pressures when they cooperate at the international level. 
However, this article has shown that governments do use the international 
stage to signal their responsiveness to domestic public opinion and that when 
they do so, this resonates in the domestic public debate. Focusing on the EU’s 
primary legislative body, the Council, this paper demonstrates that government 
opposition to legislative proposals is shaped by public opinion on European 
integration. When the domestic electorate is negatively disposed toward the 
EU, governments are more likely to oppose proposals that aim to extend the 
powers of the EU further. By focusing on legislation that transfers authority to a 
supranational organisation – the delegation of power to the EU – we are able to 
demonstrate the effect of public opinion, which has generally been overlooked 
in analyses that do not make distinctions between policy areas or the nature 
and types of legislation. 
It is important to note that the focus of this study has not been the traditional 
form of policy responsiveness, where governments change policy in response to 
changing public opinion. Instead, we show that governments use the IOs to sig-
nal that they are listening to domestic public opinion. We refer to this form of 
government responsiveness as ‘signal responsiveness’ and suggest that it is 
caused by governments’ incentives to convey their policy actions at the EU level 
to domestic audiences. This distinction is important because unlike policy re-
sponsiveness, signal responsiveness has no direct short-term consequences for 
policy output. Hence, while the presence of signal responsiveness indicates that 
citizens’ views are heard, it does not guarantee that they are represented.  
We also show that government responsiveness is conditioned by domestic 
party competition. When parliamentary opposition parties in the domestic are-
na compete on the issue of European integration, governments are more likely 
to signal their opposition in the Council in response to public opinion. Moreo-
ver, such actions are seen to shape the public debate: our analysis of media cov-
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erage shows that when governments show opposition in the Council, there is 
also greater coverage in the national media. Although this part of the analysis is 
limited to a subset of EU member states, the findings are compelling, and fur-
ther research should provide a more comprehensive analysis of how the domes-
tic public debate and public opinion react to government behaviour in the 
Council. 
This study provides an important starting point for understanding the link 
between citizens and their governments in the EU by going beyond the received 
wisdom that EU negotiations are conducted behind closed doors. Our findings 
point to an electoral connection between government ministers and national 
public opinion in European affairs when it comes to decisions on the scope and 
extent of supranational competences. This may well be relevant to other inter- 
national contexts too. Our expectation was that if we were to find evidence of 
government responsiveness to public opinion in any IO, it would be most evi-
dent in the EU Council. The fact that we find such compelling evidence that 
governments use their behaviour in the Council as a signal to domestic elec-
torates opens the door to future research into the connection between govern-
ments and citizens in other international bodies. As incentives increase for in-
ternational cooperation in many spheres of political life, and IOs gain compe-
tences to effectively manage such trans-border cooperation, domestic elec-
torates are likely to form more explicit opinions and preferences over such in-
ternational engagements. This is accompanied by growing pressures for ac-
countable and transparent decision-making at the international level. Taking all 
this together, governments may therefore increasingly see an opportunity to 
signal their responsiveness to domestic constituencies when acting in the inter-
national arena. 
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Enforcing the Compromise: How Executive and Legislative 
Institutions Serve Government Support Coalitions 
 
With Fabio Franchino 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We present a model of policy-making by multiparty coalitions that analyses 
how institutions serve parties in enforcing policy compromises. In contrast to exist-
ing research, the model accounts for the benefits not only of legislative but also of 
executive institutions and incorporates opposition parties as pivotal actors under 
minority governments. In equilibrium, ministers propose the coalition compromise 
when cabinet participation, executive coordination, and parliamentary oversight 
make it cheap for coalition partners to challenge the minister’s proposal and when 
ideological divisiveness increases the incentive to do so. We test this model with a 
dataset of 1,694 policies formulated by national governments at the European Un-
ion level. The findings demonstrate that executive institutions can substitute for a 
lack of legislative institutions, and strong parliaments are only crucial for reaching 
compromises under minority governments. Importantly, coalitions broadly fulfil 
their electoral mandates at the EU level, and parliamentary oversight and execu-
tive coordination in EU affairs effectively limit ministerial drift. 
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OALITION GOVERNMENT IS THE NORM IN NEARLY ANY DEMOCRACY IN 
which government survival depends on the support of legislative par-
ties. Often coalitions of government parties command a majority in parliament, 
but some have to rely on opposition parties to make policy. Coalition policy-
making can, however, be messy and obfuscating, undermining accountability 
and hampering the ability of voters to identify who is responsible for the poli-
cies being enacted. Understanding how the support coalition of the government – 
the set of cabinet and, possibly, opposition parties supporting the executive – 
solves conflicts and sets policies therefore has important implications for demo-
cratic representation. 
Two models of policy-making by coalitions of government parties have re-
ceived particular attention.64 In the first one, parties strike compromises and 
implement policies that are somewhere midway between the positions of indi-
vidual coalition parties (Austen-Smith and Banks 1988; Baron and Diermeier 
2001; Martin and Vanberg 2004, 2005, 2011; Straffin Jr and Grofman 1984). In the 
second model, individual ministers act as policy dictators, realising their pre-
ferred policy in their area of responsibility (Austen-Smith and Banks 1990; 
Laver and Shepsle 1990, 1996). In a competitive test, Martin and Vanberg (2014) 
have recently provided strong empirical evidence favouring the compromise 
model. 
We extend this research in a number of important respects. First, our model 
of policy-making by government support coalitions generalises existing models 																													
64 A third approach argues that policy-making is determined by the median legislative party or 
a centrally-located party (Baron 1991; Morelli 1999; Schofield and Laver 1990). Martin and Van-
berg (2014) do not find support for it, nor do we (see Appendix 3). A fourth approach highlights 
the pivotal role of the prime minister and her party (Dewan and Hortala-Vallve 2011). We like-
wise find no support for this argument (see Appendix 3). 
C 
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by accounting for a) the influence of opposition vis-à-vis cabinet parties under 
minority governments and b) the variety of legislative and executive institu-
tional settings under which governments operate. The model is a synthesis of 
the compromise and the ministerial autonomy models with equilibrium policies 
located in the interval spanning from the minister’s ideal point to the coalition 
partners’ ‘full compromise’ position. The model’s key expectations detail the 
conditions that render compromises likely and qualify formal and informal ar-
guments recently put forward by Martin and Vanberg (2005, 2011).  
Second, we adopt a novel empirical strategy and observe the actual ideologi-
cal location and content of policies instead of correlates, such as legislative 
amendments (Martin and Vanberg 2005, 2011, 2014: 995), process duration 
(Martin and Vanberg 2004, 2011), or parliamentary involvement (Franchino and 
Høyland 2009). Inference through correlates is often dependent on strong as-
sumptions. For instance, the identifying assumption in Martin and Vanberg's 
(2014: 983) tests of the compromise model is that position-taking incentives in-
duce government ministers to propose only policies that are located near the 
ideal point of their party. Without this assumption, parliamentary amendments 
cannot be evidence of compromising. In contrast, we directly measure com-
promise positions and policy content as the key game-theoretic parameters that 
underpin strategies and payoffs. Third, we significantly expand the geograph-
ical coverage of existing studies and take advantage of wide cross-country insti-
tutional variation. We employ data from legislative negotiations in the Council 
of the European Union, which allows us to compare 1,694 positions formulated 
on the very same issues by different governments across 22 European Union 
(EU) member states between 1996 and 2008. 
We find that the compromise model is especially relevant for majority gov-
ernments under strong executive coordination and that, in the case of minority 
governments, it further hinges on strong parliamentary oversight that enables 
opposition parties to challenge ministerial proposals. We also find that com-
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promises are more likely when parties in the support coalition are ideologically 
divided and divisiveness is especially important if institutions are weak. These 
results call into question Martin and Vanberg's (2011) claim that parties general-
ly use legislative institutions to enforce the compromise. Our study suggests 
that the legislature is a pivotal institutional venue primarily for supporting op-
position parties under minority governments, and that government parties can 
substitute parliamentary oversight by drawing on executive institutions at the 
cabinet and inter-ministerial levels. A diversity of institutions can therefore lead 
to a compromise mode of policy-making. Also contrary to Martin and 
Vanberg's (2011) conclusions, coalition divisiveness appears to matter more 
when institutions are weak, i.e. when the policy benefits from proposing a dif-
ferent measure are high enough to overcome the informational scarcity of a 
weak institutional environment.  
Our study challenges the popular analysis that national executives can use 
the EU arena for unconstrained realisation of their preferences (Goetz and 
Meyer-Sahling 2008; Ladrech 2010; Moravcsik 1993). Instead, it highlights that 
in many situations ministers broadly fulfil the electoral promises of their sup-
port coalition of parties, and institutional innovations of executive coordination 
and parliamentary oversight in EU affairs effectively limit ministerial discre-
tion. From a normative perspective, executive and legislative institutions in EU 
affairs are important to enforce inter-party negotiations, which are prerequisites 
for ‘fair compromises’ (Mansbridge and Warren 2013).  
 
COALITION POLICY-MAKING AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 
Government support coalitions comprise all parties on which the govern-
ment relies in order to pass and implement policy. Hence, they encompass all 
cabinet parties, but also include opposition parties under minority govern-
ments. We model policy-making as a sequence that starts with a minister’s pro-
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posal and provides the opportunity to the other parties to challenge the pro-
posal. Parties are asymmetrically informed. While the party of the responsible 
minister faces little uncertainty about a policy’s consequences, the other parties 
in the support coalition cannot be sure about the policy’s effects. This renders it 
costly for them to mount a challenge. Without a credible threat of a challenge, 
the minister proposes her own preferred policy. In contrast, if she expects a 
challenge, she proposes a compromise that is located within the ideological 
range spanned by the support coalition, with its exact location determined by 
several factors, including the strength of legislative and executive institutions, 
ideological divisions, and the distribution of bargaining power within the coali-
tion (see below). 
Importantly, executive and legislative institutions reduce coalition partners’ 
uncertainty about policy consequences and, in some cases, confer decision 
rights to parties. This makes compromises more likely. At a basic level, cabinet 
participation offers the opportunity to get better informed about government 
initiatives and confers upon cabinet parties decision rights in regular cabinet 
meetings. Executive (inter-ministerial) coordination further reinforces information 
exchange between the responsible ministry and coalition partners through reg-
ular inter-departmental meetings on all political and bureaucratic levels (e.g. 
inter-ministerial committee meetings, lower level official meetings), in which 
information is shared at an early stage of policy preparation. Moreover, coordi-
nation often also refers to a pivotal role of the prime minister’s office in adjudi-
cating between the ministries and facilitating cross-departmental information 
exchange (see also Indridason and Kristinsson 2013). Typical structures include 
a powerful coordinating office under the direct control of the prime minister 
(PM) which is involved in all policy preparation, expertise and staff capacities 
to evaluate ministerial proposals as well as the competence to return items en-
visaged for cabinet meetings to the minister. While such institutions may 
change in the long run, they have been described and analysed as sticky struc-
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tures characterising national executives (Gärtner, Hörner, and Obholzer 2011; 
Kassim 2013; Kassim, Peters, and Wright 2000; Laffan 2006; Schraad-Tischler 
and Kroll 2015).  
Lastly, parliamentary oversight provides information about the consequences 
of ministerial proposals to all parliamentary parties, including opposition par-
ties that support the government. In their classic form, such institutions encom-
pass tools for ex ante as well as ex post scrutiny. Their significance is related to 
the number, size and powers of parliamentary committees, access to docu-
ments, the ability to pose questions to the government and individual ministers, 
the possibility to schedule plenary debates as well as the staff resources of the 
parliament and its members. A large body of literature has investigated these 
institutions and their effects and discovered substantial variation between dif-
ferent parliamentary systems (e.g. Martin and Vanberg 2011; Strøm, Müller, 
and Smith 2010; Winzen 2012). 
In our model, the effects of cabinet participation, executive coordination, and 
parliamentary oversight are reflected in lower costs of mounting a challenge to 
a ministerial proposal. In addition, decision rights of cabinet parties and oppo-
sition parties in minority governments are modelled as parties’ influence on the 
location of the adopted policy. The likelihood and location of compromises then 
becomes a function of the institutions as well as the ideological divisiveness of 
the support coalition. Whilst for Martin and Vanberg (2005: 98, 2011: 132) divi-
siveness matters only under strong institutions, they only informally establish 
this conditioning, since their models already assume the existence of powerful 
institutions. We instead explicitly model the impact of institutions and the in-
fluence of the opposition, and we additionally argue that not only legislative 
institutions but also cabinet participation and executive coordination lower the 
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opportunity cost of enforcing compromises and may act as substitutes for par-
liamentary oversight.65  
 
A MODEL OF COALITION POLICY-MAKING IN PARLIAMENTARY 
SYSTEMS  
Consider a government composed of two parties (A and B) and an opposi-
tion party C. Parties have single-peaked preferences represented by ideal points !! where ! denotes parties !, !, and !, in a unidimensional66 policy space ! =  !. 
We assume that the ideal policy of party A is located at zero and that the gov-
ernment coalition is connected, that is, !!  >  !! > !! = 0. 
Let ! be the policy realised by the government. We assume that its conse-
quences ! are uncertain. In other words, policy ! is subject to a homogeneous 
random shock ! which is distributed uniformly between −! and !, that is, the 
probability density function of ! is !(!)  ∼  ![−!,!]. This shock is added to 
the policy position and represents the uncertainty about the consequences of a 
given position. Hence, ! =  ! +  !. 
																													
65 Shadow junior ministers represent another important executive institution. For instance, 
Lipsmeyer and Pierce (2011) show that they may be a substitute for strong legislative commit-
tees. But, despite earlier positive findings, Martin and Vanberg (2011) have recently concluded 
that shadow junior ministers only speed up legislative scrutiny. These scholars argue that they 
cannot rein in the position-taking incentives of ministers. 
66 Unidimensionality captures the departmentalisation along policy jurisdictions that is typical 
within executives as well as the EU Council of Ministers (Hayes-Renshaw 2002; Laver and 
Shepsle 1996). It also facilitates the analysis, but the model can be extended to a multidimen-
sional policy space.  
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Ministerial portfolios are distributed between government parties and the 
cabinet minister of party A, who is in charge of the portfolio for this issue, is 
responsible for proposing the initial policy position !!. This minister can rely on 
the resources and know-how of her department in drafting the initial position 
and she faces lower uncertainty about policy consequences. We account for this 
informational advantage by setting the parameter ! to zero for party A. On the 
other hand, party A pays a penalty ! > 0 if its proposal is challenged, hence 
capturing the opportunity costs, and perhaps audience costs67 of drafting a pro-
posal which is ultimately overturned. 
Parties B and C can challenge a policy position at a cost !! where ! = !, !. 
This parameter captures the resources that must be invested to mount a chal-
lenge (see e.g. Martin and Vanberg 2005, 2011). It varies for the two parties as a 
function of different institutional settings, which have both informational and 
decisional implications. First, cabinet participation allows party B to rely on the 
administrative machinery of the executive, lowering the search cost of finding 
alternatives and, therefore, the opportunity cost of challenging any proposal, 
hence !! > !! > 0 . Second, some government institutions, such as inter-
ministerial coordination, are designed to facilitate a common government posi-
tion, as they compel the minister in charge to justify her policy proposal before 
the whole executive. Coordination lowers the cost !! incurred by party B when 
challenging a proposal and, as we will show, facilitates common decision-
making. A less coordinated executive instead increases !! and, as a result, the 
government operates under ministerial dominance (Laver and Shepsle 1996). 
Similarly, some legislative institutions, such as strong parliamentary oversight, 
																													
67 Audience costs may be secondary in the context in which we test this model (EU Council 
legislative politics). This is also why we exclude position-taking incentives for the proposer. 
These are likely to be less significant for EU than domestic issues, since the former tend to be 
less salient and less publicised. 
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are specifically designed to gather and provide information about the conse-
quences of given government positions. They therefore lower the cost !!  of 
mounting a challenge by parliamentary parties. Note that, since !! > !!  >  0, 
legislative institutions set a ceiling to the cost of making proposals. 
This setup strikes an acceptable balance between verisimilitude and tractabil-
ity. The informational benefits of institutions could be operationalised more 
realistically, but this would significantly impair tractability.68 On the other 
hand, we could do away with policy uncertainty (the parameters ! and !) be-
cause, as we shall see, since uncertainty is exogenous and there is no learning, 
such parameters conveniently drop out when comparing expected utilities. 
However, one can hardly make a case for the informational role of institutions 
in a full information model. We therefore account for policy uncertainty that 
realistically has a negative effect on utility.69 
Once the initial proposal from party A is on the table, the other parties can 
challenge and amend the proposal – first party B, then party C. If there are chal-
lenges, there will be a bargaining process among the parties and we expect that 
they will eventually agree on what we call a ‘full compromise’, which is located 
in the Pareto set [0, !!] for ! = !, !. Although it is certainly relevant for determin-
ing the final government policy, we are not directly concerned with this bar-																													
68 For instance, parties may face a common proposal cost w and the informational benefit of 
institutions could be represented by a parameter 0 < ! < 1, which narrows the range [−!",!"]. 
The expected utility of equation (1) (see below) would become !!! =  −  !! !!!! ! !!"!"!!" !" − ! =− !! −  ! !  − !!!!! − ! for ! = !, !. The results would be substantively similar, but their repre-
sentation would be significantly more complex. 
69 In Martin and Vanberg (2011: 20), policy uncertainty is eliminated through Bayesian learning 
after the receiving party pays a cost for scrutinising a proposal. This party is either fully in-
formed or not informed at all. Our model introduces the different informational burdens facing 
parties in a tractable way. 
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gaining process here. Our interest lies in the institutions that systematically in-
fluence policy formulation. Hence, we exogenously set the full compromise at 
the mean of the positions of party A and of the parties that have proposed 
amendments. In other words, the full compromise is ! = !!!!!!, where ! = !, ! 
denotes the parties proposing amendments and ! is the number of such par-
ties.70 As we will see, the full compromise is an equilibrium outcome only under 
special conditions, while positions between zero and the full compromise – 
which we call ‘partial compromises’ – make up for the bulk of equilibriums. 
If no party proposes amendments, the initial proposal !! carries through. In 
the case of majority governments, the opposition party C has no decision-
making authority and no effect on the coalition compromise. Coalition govern-
ments are frequently based on explicit agreements and, if issues have not been 
agreed ex ante, negotiations within coalition partners are given primacy. Con-
cessions to opposition parties may be equivalent to undermining the agreement 
on which a government has been formed. On the other hand, in the case of mi-
nority governments the opposition party can alter the minister’s proposal or the 
minister’s proposal as amended by party B. 
 
1. The minister from party A proposes an initial position !! ∈ !. 
2. Government party B can choose either to accept this proposal or expend 
resources, at the cost !!, to reach a full compromise position. 
																													
70 This implies that parties are equally influential in determining the final compromise. Alterna-
tively, we could assume that party seat or portfolio shares or other measures of bargaining 
power affect the compromise. This would require the inclusion of an additional parameter (see 
e.g. Martin and Vanberg 2005) without modifying the results substantially. The empirical appli-
cation of the model weights parties’ positions by legislative seats. 
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3. Similarly, opposition party C can choose either to accept the outcome of 
stage 2 or expend resources, at the cost !!, to reach an alternative full 
compromise position. 
 
The final government policy, !, depends on the reaction of the government 
party B to A’s proposal as well as the reaction of the opposition party C to the 
other parties’ actions. Below we solve the model by backward induction for the 
cases of majority and minority governments. The game tree in Figure 4.1 sum-
marises the model for the case of minority governments.71  
 
FIGURE 4.1: OVERVIEW OF MODEL OF COALITION POLICY-MAKING 
 
																													
71 Note that, due to their complexity, players’ pay-offs are not included in the figure. 
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Note that the tree for the case of majority governments is exactly the same 
except for that the final policy ! is !! on the left branch irrespective of C’s ac-
tion, and it is !!!  on the right branch, again irrespective of C’s decision. 
 
Policy Formulation in Majority Governments 
First, consider the scenario of a majority government. Parties have quadratic 
preferences over the final policy outcome !. Since ! =  ! +  !, the expected utili-
ty for party C is 
!!! =  −  (!! !!!!)! !!!!! !" − !! = −(!! −  !)!  − !!! − !!  (1) 
The expected utility is a negative function of the difference between the par-
ty’s ideal policy and the equilibrium proposal, the level of uncertainty, and the 
cost of challenging A’s proposal if the party chooses to do so. A challenge from 
party C does not modify the equilibrium position. In other words, the final gov-
ernment policy is ! =  !! if there is no challenge from government party B; it is ! = !!!  if there is a challenge. In both cases, party C challenges a proposal if and 
only if −(!! − !)! − !!! − !! > −(!! − !)! − !!! . That is, if !! < 0. This inequality 
never holds and party C never challenges. 
For government party B, a challenge modifies the position of the govern-
ment. This party’s expected utility is the same as (1), but !! replaces !!, captur-
ing the lower cost for mounting a challenge or, equivalently, the informational 
advantage of being in government. Party B challenges a proposal if and only if − !!!! − !!! − !! > −(!! − !!)! − !!! . That is, if !!  < !! − !! + !!!!  . To simplify 
notation, we use the function !(!! , !!) ≡ !! + !!!!  . For any given proposal, the 
likelihood of a challenge increases with the divergence within the government, 
while it decreases with the cost of a challenge. This condition sets the threshold 
above which a proposal from party A is overturned.  
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Recall that party A faces no uncertainty about the consequences of a pro-
posal. Its utility is therefore !! =  −!! − !, where ! > 0 if its proposal is over-
turned. Consider now party A proposing !! = 0. This is the ministerial gov-
ernment of Laver and Shepsle (1996), and the dominant strategy of party A as 
long as !! > !!!!!  , because the proposal remains unchallenged. Otherwise, the 
proposal is challenged and the best proposal is !! = !! − !(!! , !!) to avoid 
paying the opportunity costs associated with overturning. A unique subgame-
perfect equilibrium of this scenario is 
Party A: If !! > !!!!! , propose !! = 0. Otherwise, propose !! = !! − !(!! , !!). 
Party B: If !! ≥ !! − !(!! , !!), accept !!. Otherwise, challenge and amend !!. 
Party C: Accept !!. 
The outcome is ! = !! − !(!! , !!) if !! < !!!!! , otherwise ! = 0. Party A only 
proposes the full compromise !!!  when !! = 0, that is, when challenging is cost-
less. If !! < !!!!!  , party A proposes a partial compromise between its ideal poli-
cy and !!! . Here, there is some ministerial drift: party A moves the proposal in 
B’s direction up only to the point where B is indifferent between enforcing the 
full compromise at a cost and accepting A’s proposal. In sum, we should expect 
more compromises in the case of more heterogeneous coalition governments (as !! increases), and when there are lower costs of challenging a proposal (as !! 
decreases), such as in the presence of executive coordination.  
 
Policy Formulation in Minority Governments 
Consider now the scenario of a minority government. Opposition party C 
now has the opportunity to challenge and amend a proposal. Let !! be the pro-
posal that comes out of the government decision-making process. It can take the 
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value of !!  or !!! . Party C challenges if and only if −(!! − !)! − !!! − !! >−(!! −  !!)! − !!! . That is, when !! = !! , if !! < !! − !! +  !!!!  ; and when !! = !!!  , if !! < (!! − !!! )!− (!!!!!!! )!. Since !! > !!, we should expect compro-
mise positions in case of more heterogeneous parliamentary support coalitions 
(as !! increases), and lower costs of challenging a proposal (as !! decreases), 
such as in the presence of strong parliamentary oversight institutions. To sim-
plify notation, we use !(!! , !!) ≡ !! +  !!!! , !(!! , !! , !!) ≡ !! +  ( !!!!!!! )! ,  
and !(!! , !!) ≡ (!! − !!! )!− (!!!!!!! )!. At its decision node, party B considers 
four scenarios. 
Scenario 1: !! > !! − !(!! , !!) and !! > !(!! , !!). Regardless of B’s decision, 
C will not challenge. Hence, B challenges if and only if −  !!!! − !! > −(!! −!!)!.  That is, if !! < !! − !(!! , !!), as in the case of majority government.  
Scenario 2: !! > !! − !(!! , !!) and !! < !(!! , !!). C challenges only if B 
challenges. B challenges if and only if − ( !!!!!!! )! − !! > −(!! − !!)!.  That is, 
if !! < !! − !(!! , !! , !!). 
Scenario 3: !! < !! − !(!! , !!) and !! > !(!! , !!). C challenges only if B 
does not challenge. B challenges if and only if − !!!!  − !! > −(!! − !!! )!.  That is, 
if !! < (!! − !!! )! − !!!! .72  
Scenario 4: !! < !! − !(!! , !!) and !! < !(!! , !!). Regardless of B’s decision, 
C challenges. B challenges if and only if − ( !!!!!!! )! − !! > −(!! − !!! )!.  That is, !! < (!! − !!! )! −  (!!!!!!! )!.73 
																													
72 The right hand side of this inequality is negative for !! < !! < 3!!. If C is relatively close to B, 
B does not challenge and free rides on C’s challenge. 
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Recall that party A prefers to avoid paying the costs of overturning. We limit 
our attention to the conditions that lead A to propose a compromise position, 
that is when !! > 0 , leaving aside which full or partial compromise will 
emerge.74 In scenario 1, A follows the same strategy as in the case of majority 
government. In scenario 2, party A proposes !! = 0 if !! > !!! − (!!!!!!! )!. Oth-
erwise, it proposes a compromise position. In both scenarios 3 and 4, A propos-
es a compromise. A unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in minority govern-
ment is 
Party A: If !! > !!!!!  and !! > !"#[!(!! , !!); !!!!! ] , propose !! = 0 . If !! > !!! − (!!!!!!! )!  and !(!! , !!) > !! > !!!!! , propose !! = 0 . Otherwise, pro-
pose a compromise. 
Party B: If !! ≥ !"#[!! − !(!! , !!); !! − !(!! , !!)] and !! ≥ !(!! , !!) , ac-
cept !! . If !! ≥ !"#[!! −  !(!! , !! , !!); !! − !(!! , !!)]  and !! ≤ !(!! , !!), ac-
cept !! . If !! ≤ !! − !(!! , !!) , !! ≥ (!! − !!! )! − !!!!   and !! ≥ !(!! , !!), accept !! . If !! ≤ !! − !(!! , !!), !! ≥ (!! − !!! )! −  (!!!!!!! )! and !! ≤ !(!! , !!), accept !!. Otherwise, challenge and amend !!. 
Party C: When !! = !! , if !! ≥ !! − !(!! , !!)  accept !! . When !! = !!! , if !! ≥ !(!! , !!) accept !!. Otherwise, challenge and amend !!. 
The outcome is a compromise position, that is ! > 0, if 
● !! <  !!!!!   and !! > !"#[!(!! , !!); !!!!! ] 
																																																																																																																																																																		
73 If !! = 2!!, B never challenges because the compromise position becomes !! after C’s chal-
lenge, while it may challenge as party C moves away from this value. 
74 We can derive more detailed equilibriums, but the measurement of the specific compromise 
positions, whether partial or full, is hardly accurate and these more fine-tuned expectations are 
therefore very hard to test empirically. 
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● !! < !!! − ( !!!!!!! )! and !(!! , !!) > !! > !!!!!  
● !!!!! > !! > !(!! , !!) 
● !! < !"#[!(!! , !!); !!!!! ] 
Since !!!!! > !(!! , !!)  for !! > !!, these inequalities can be simplified and the 
outcome is a compromise position if 
● !! <  !!!!!  and !! > !!!!!  
● !! < !!!!!  
In case of a homogenous parliamentary support coalition (as !! approaches !!) or weak parliamentary oversight (as !! increases), we should expect com-
promise positions under the same conditions as in majority government. Oth-
erwise, we should expect compromise positions in case of more heterogeneous 
parliamentary support coalitions (as !! increases) or when the costs of challeng-
ing a proposal are lower (as !! decreases), such as in the presence of strong par-
liamentary oversight (these results hold if we increase the number of govern-
ment parties or change the proposing party, see Appendix 3). Considering both 
majority and minority governments, we can therefore specify the following 
testable hypotheses: 
H1: Coalition compromises are more likely to be reflected in the policies of 
support coalitions in the presence of strongly coordinated executives. 
H2: Coalition compromises are more likely to be reflected in the policies of 
support coalitions when the divisiveness of positions in the coalition is broader. 
H3: Coalition compromises are more likely to be reflected in the policies of 
support coalitions of minority governments in the presence of strong parlia-
mentary oversight. 
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We can produce an additional expectation from the model. Let us drop party 
B from the minority scenario and consider two coalitions: a majority govern-
ment between parties A and B, and a minority government between parties A 
and C. In the latter case, the outcome is a compromise position if !! < !!!!! . Re-
call that the condition for compromise is !! < !!!!!  in a majority government. 
Assume also that parties B and C share policy positions, that is !! = !! > !! =0. Since !! > !! (cabinet participation lowers the opportunity cost of challeng-
ing proposals), we can produce the following expectation: 
H4: Coalition compromises are more likely to be reflected in the policies of 
support coalitions under majority rather than minority governments. 
Compare these expectations to those of Martin and Vanberg. First, hypothe-
sis 4 runs counter to their finding that minority status has no impact on the al-
teration of policy proposals; in their work it only slows down scrutiny when 
legislative oversight is weak (Martin and Vanberg 2011: 138). Second, Martin 
and Vanberg (2011: 97-155, 132) argue that greater policy divisions within the 
government produce more changes to ministerial proposals under strong par-
liamentary oversight, but not under weak oversight, as parties would lack an 
‘effective institutional mechanism for scrutiny and change’ (Martin and 
Vanberg 2011: 132). Taken to its logical conclusions, this suggests that compro-
mises are out of reach and coalition divisions therefore irrelevant under weak 
oversight. We account for different degrees of institutional strength and hy-
pothesis 2 emerges as an unconditioned version of Martin and Vanberg’s expec-
tation on divisiveness. Third, for these scholars, institutional strength and divi-
siveness should be positively related to each other. We reach opposite conclu-
sions: divisiveness (!!,!) should have weak effects when cabinet participation, 
strong executive coordination, and parliamentary oversight (low !!,!) result in 
minimal costs of amending a proposal, as partners in coalitions of virtually any 
compactness can ‘afford’ the compromise. However, with weak institutions the 
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high costs of proposing alternatives are weighted against policy benefits, and a 
compromise emerges at high but not low levels of divisiveness. In other words,  
H5: The marginal effect of divisiveness on coalition compromises is negative-
ly related to institutional strength (and vice versa). 
Divisiveness should predominantly matter for minority governments with 
weak executive and legislative institutions, but less so for majority governments 
with strong institutions. 
 
EMPIRICAL APPROACH TO TESTING THE EXPECTATIONS 
In order to test our expectations, we use data from EU policy-making, specif-
ically the Council of the EU (henceforth, the Council). The Council is the EU’s 
primary legislative body, where national ministers discuss and negotiate su-
pranational legislation. In particular, we want to ascertain the extent to which 
governments’ policy positions in the Council reflect ideological compromises of 
their domestic supporting parties. At first sight, Council legislative politics may 
seem isolated from domestic politics, but an established scholarly tradition has 
shown that the formulation of the policies with which governments come to the 
negotiation table in Brussels takes place in and is strongly shaped by the do-
mestic political arena (e.g. Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Finke and Herbel 
2015; Kassim, Peters, and Wright 2000; Moravcsik 1998; Thomson 2011). Indeed, 
as we shall see, several executive and legislative institutional innovations at the 
domestic level have diffused throughout Europe during the last decades, specif-
ically designed for the purpose of formulating national policy positions in the 
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EU (Kassim 2013; Winzen 2012).75 The process should therefore, in principle, be 
subject to the same domestic dynamics outlined by our model.  
Focusing on the EU-level policies of governments therefore enables us to as-
certain whether the new institutions are indeed effective in limiting the discre-
tion of individual executives and enforcing more inclusive decision-making. 
Moreover, our test with EU-level policies, compared to relying on policies for-
mulated for domestic implementation, also has a decisive methodological ad-
vantage for identifying the effects of cross-national variation in institutions: 
those policies are formulated with regard to a common legislative agenda (that 
of the EU). Hence, they relate to the very same substantive issues across coun-
tries. If we instead analysed the formulation of domestic policies, the effects of 
institutions could be potentially confounded with the effects of varying political 
agendas, thus increasing the risk of omitted variable bias. Here, we draw on a 
sample of governments’ initial policy positions on 145 different policy issues 
that were discussed in the Council. For our purpose, this data covers 22 coun-
tries, for which the number of reported policy positions varies.76 This compara-
																													
75 These EU affairs specific institutions partly mirror pre-existing institutions for the coordina-
tion of domestic policies.  
76 Data sources and descriptive statistics are in Appendix 3. We lack party position data for 
Malta and institutional data for Romania. Moreover, Greece, Spain, and the United Kingdom 
are excluded because they did not experience coalition governments during the observation 
period. While our observations are not equally distributed across countries, we have nine coun-
tries for which over 100 policy positions are available, and another seven with more than 40 
policy positions (see Appendix 3). Importantly, the main reasons for the unbalanced numbers of 
observations are varying phases of coalition vs. single-party rule as well as the fact that new 
member states joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, and hence no positions are available for them 
before these dates. With 20% of observations from minority governments our sample is quite 
representative of the population with regard to minority vs. majority governments. 
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tively large country sample makes selection bias as a prime concern of empiri-
cal research into coalition politics less pressing.  
 
Governmental policy positions 
As our dependent variable we take governments’ policy positions on contro-
versial aspects of the Council’s legislative agenda from a subset of the Decision-
making in the European Union (DEU) dataset (Thomson et al. 2006, 2012). This 
dataset contains spatial information on actors’ policy positions regarding 331 
controversial issues from the 1994-1999 and the 2004-2009 legislative terms. 
DEU is based on 349 semi-structured interviews with experts from member 
states’ permanent representations and EU institutions, who were asked to re-
port controversial legislative issues and locate governments on corresponding 
spatial policy scales. It is the most widely used dataset on EU decision-making 
and has been employed in a diverse range of applications.  
While the DEU experts were instructed to report actors’ sincere ideal policy 
positions, one concern is that governments may strategically misrepresent their 
positions in order to gain in the EU legislative process. If experts were unable to 
separate strategic from sincere positions, DEU positions would no longer reflect 
the domestic bargain but partially EU-level considerations. However, the fea-
tures of EU Council decision-making (open rule, supermajority and – when the 
European Parliament is involved – inter-institutional negotiations) make voting 
(veto) power more important than proposal power and weaken the incentives 
to misrepresent positions (for a fuller discussion, see Appendix 3). Similarly, 
position-taking incentives are unlikely to exercise a significant influence given 
the lower public exposure of EU negotiations compared to domestic ones. 
For our analysis, we focus on economic left-right policy issues as the major 
substantive dimension of party competition throughout the EU (Bakker, Jolly, 
and Polk 2012; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Whitefield 2002) and identify all DEU 
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policy issues relating to economic left-right conflicts with an original coding 
scheme. The guiding principle was to construct categories reflecting a construct 
of ‘left-right’ that does not only fit with the DEU issues but can also be linked to 
standard measurements of left-right party ideology. The resulting scheme con-
sists of six categories representing the economic left-right dimension; they cover 
conflicts ranging from economic regulation, protectionism, and equality, to con-
sumer and environmental protection. The coding of the DEU issues77 reveals 
that about half of all salient issues fall into one or multiple economic left-right 
categories, whilst the rest are either related to left-libertarian/right-authoritarian 
issues,78 pro-anti integration conflicts, or to non-ideological cleavages (e.g. ge-
ography). Wherever necessary we linearly rescaled the DEU issue scales with a 
predefined range of 0-100 so as to ensure that 100 represents the most ‘right’ 
and 0 the most ‘left’ option advocated by any national government in our esti-
mation sample.79  
Figure 4.2 illustrates the governments’ policy positions – our dependent vari-
able – on a legislative proposal concerning the inclusion of the aviation industry 
in the EU carbon emission trading system (COD/2006/304). In this case, the 
amount of emission allowances to be allocated to the industry was contested: 
some governments opted for a smaller and others for a larger amount, these 
representing economic left and right positions respectively. 
																													
77 The full codebook with descriptive statistics is in Appendix 1 and information on inter-coder 
reliability is available in Appendix 3.  
78 We do not include left-libertarian/right-authoritarian issues in our analysis, since it is a matter 
of on-going discussion whether such issues are adequately reflected by the categories and the 
left-right scale of the Comparative Manifesto Project (Alonso and da Fonseca 2011; Protsyk and 
Garaz 2011).  
79 We exclude some policy issues due to high missingness. Rescaling removes issues on which 
all national governments in the sample agreed. See Appendix 3 for details. 
		 	135	
FIGURE 4.2: ILLUSTRATION OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 
 
Notes: AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; CY: Cyprus; CZ: The Czech Republic; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; FI: 
Finland; FR: France; DE: Germany; EL: Greece; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IT: Italy; LV: Latvia; LT: Lithua-
nia; LU: Luxembourg; MT: Malta; NL: The Netherlands; PL: Poland; PT: Portugal; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slo-
vakia; ES: Spain; SE: Sweden; UK: The United Kingdom 
 
 
Coalition compromise, divisiveness, and institutions 
To calculate the expected ideological compromise position of the govern-
ment’s support coalition, we rely on party positions from the Comparative 
Manifesto Project’s (CMP) coding of election manifestos (Lehmann et al. 2015). 
For our particular application, using the CMP instead of expert survey data on 
parties is imperative for at least two reasons: first, election manifestos record 
party positions temporally close to elections and cabinet formation. Assuming 
that parties struck some binding agreements when entering a support coalition 
at the start of the legislative term, the CMP likely provides a better clue to the 
compromise positions than expert surveys conducted at arbitrary times during 
the term. At least, the CMP eliminates electoral cycle factors as a source of het-
eroscedastic measurement error across countries. Second and most importantly, 
the CMP is more exogenous to parties’ behaviour than expert data. The CMP 
merely captures statements, intentions, and promises, whereas experts may 
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evaluate parties on the basis of their actual behaviour (Budge 2000; Volkens 
2007). As we are aiming to explain the policy-making behaviour of parties, ex-
pert surveys could lead to circular analyses, and thus the CMP is more suitable 
for our specific purpose. 
We use the CMP’s standard left-right (RILE) scale to calculate a compromise 
position of the government’s support coalition. Importantly, the 26 constitutive 
CMP categories of RILE map neatly onto our coding scheme for the DEU issues. 
In particular, our scheme reflects key contrasts of RILE, such as ‘Market Regula-
tion’ vs. ‘Free Enterprise’, ‘Protectionism: Negative/Positive’, ‘Controlled Econ-
omy’ vs. ‘Economic Orthodoxy’, or ‘Labour Groups: Negative/Positive’. As the 
proposing party in EU Council politics cannot be identified,80 we use the full 
compromise position as the most well defined measure based on the CMP. 
Hence, we operationalise the compromise as follows: a) In the case of majority 
governments, it is the seat-weighted RILE of all cabinet parties; b) In the case of 
minority governments, it is the midpoint between the seat-weighted RILE of the 
cabinet parties and the seat-weighted RILE of all opposition parties (in the case 
of changing support patterns), or alternatively of those opposition parties sup-
porting the government (in the case of explicit, stable deals).81 Seat-weighting, 
																													
80 Neither national nor EU institutions report which minister deals with a legislative file, and 
available proxies (e.g., Council participant lists) are not reliable (see also Appendix 3). Hence, 
partial compromise positions cannot be operationalised as their location depends on the pro-
posing party. In contrast, the full compromise is proposer-invariant. 
81 For each minority government we use The Political Data Yearbook, a series of annual country 
reports published by the European Journal of Political Research, to ascertain whether the govern-
ment was supported by one or more particular parties or whether it gathered support on an 
issue-by-issue basis. Only for about a quarter of our observations on minority governments 
could we identify a fixed supporting party. In the majority of cases governments relied on al-
ternating parties from the opposition. Hence, our results for minority governments highlight 
the influence of opposition parties in general rather than a specific supporting party.  
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particularly for the calculation of the cabinet’s compromise position, is suggest-
ed by recent findings (e.g. Martin and Vanberg 2014). Taking the midpoint be-
tween the cabinet and the opposition parties reflects the idea that minority gov-
ernments are tolerated because supporting parties obtain disproportionate poli-
cy influence.82 
In order to test the impact of ideological divisiveness on the relevance of the 
compromise position, we operationalise the absolute distance on the RILE scale 
between the most left-wing and the most right-wing party of the government 
support coalition, i.e. the ideological range. With regard to executive institu-
tions, we use a dummy variable that is ‘1’ for countries with strong executive 
coordination in EU policy-making and ‘0’ for countries with little to no coordi-
nation. We take the classification of countries from Kassim (2013).83 Finally, we 
operationalise parliamentary oversight, as the strength of the legislature’s rights 
with respect to EU affairs, using a comprehensive database created by Winzen 
(2012, 2013). In our sample this measure runs from 0.29 (in Cyprus throughout 
as well as Ireland in the 1990s) to 1.75 (in Finland and Lithuania). As we expect 
the effect of parliamentary oversight to play out mostly under minority gov-
																													
82 This calculation of the compromise yields the clearest support in favour of our model. But our 
main results are largely robust to at least two alternative calculations of the compromise posi-
tion (see Appendix 3). In general, results become weaker if we reduce the influence of opposi-
tion vis-à-vis cabinet parties under minority rule. 
83 We assign ‘1’ for countries employing what Kassim calls ‘centralized coordination’ in EU 
policy-making that entails inter-ministerial meetings or committees on EU issues as well as a 
central ‘troubleshooter’ (often the PM’s office) (Kassim 2003). Kassim contrasts this mode with a 
‘decentralized, even ministerial, approach to coordination’ (Kassim 2013: 286), in which the 
responsible ministry leads and active coordination ‘tends to be minimal’ (Kassim 2003: 95). 
Countries with coordination in our sample are the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, and Sweden. See also Gärtner, 
Hörner, and Obholzer (2011). 
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ernments, we include a dummy variable for whether the cabinet parties held a 
minority of seats in the legislature. 
In addition, we control for several factors that are known to influence gov-
ernments’ position-taking in the Council and might at the same time correlate 
with the compromise position. First, we include a measure of public opinion as 
the average ideological left-right self-placement of respondents from the Euro-
barometer survey series.84 This ensures that the effects of the compromise posi-
tion are not conflated with governments’ efforts to respond to public opinion 
(Hagemann, Hobolt, and Wratil 2016). Second, we account for a potentially rel-
evant redistribution cleavage of rich versus poor countries with a measure of 
countries’ annual net receipts from the EU budget (% of GDP) (Bailer, Mattila, 
and Schneider 2014; Zimmer, Schneider, and Dobbins 2005). Third, we include 
national unemployment and inflation rates to ensure that the relationship be-
tween parties’ and government’s policy positions is more than a reflection of 
macroeconomic fluctuations. Fourth, we broadly capture the idea that member 
states may try to transfer their domestic policies to the European level (Börzel 
2002) with a measure of domestic economic freedom from the Fraser Institute’s 
Economic Freedom of the World dataset (Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall 2013; see 
also Thomson 2011a). Lastly, we also control for a country’s population (in mil-
lion inhabitants), as ‘big’ member states may differ in their preferences from 
‘small’ (e.g. Schure and Verdun 2008; Thomson 2011a). For instance, small 
states typically have a less diversified economy and smaller domestic markets 
than big states. Therefore, they may be advocates of market-enabling, more 
rightist measures.  
 
																													
84 We linearly interpolate opinion between surveys and use a six-month lag (see Hagemann, 
Hobolt, and Wratil 2016). 
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ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
To model the relationship between governments’ policy positions in the 
Council and the ideological compromise position of their support coalition, we 
use linear regressions with fixed effects for the 145 policy issues in our sample. 
The fixed effects estimator is based on the within-transformation, i.e. we de-
mean our data for each policy issue, which is best suited to obtain consistent 
estimates in the face of our heterogeneous set of policy issues. Moreover, we 
employ the Huber-White sandwich estimator of variance to provide standard 
errors that are robust to clustering at the country level. We test our hypotheses 
by including interaction terms between the compromise position and the mod-
erators (ideological divisiveness and institutions) (see Berry, Golder, and Milton 
2012). Hence, all models take the following general form: 
 
 !!,! − !! = !! !!,! − !! + !! !!,! − !! + !! !!,! − !! !!,! − !! +. . .+ !!,! −!!  
 
Where !!,! is the policy position of the government of country k on issue j, !!,! is the ideological compromise position of its support coalition, !!,! is one of 
the moderating variables, and !!,! denotes the position-specific error term.  
The main results are reported in Table 4.1. We regress the government’s left-
right policy position on the compromise position of the government’s support 
coalition of parties. We also allow the effect of the compromise to vary accord-
ing to the ideological divisiveness of the support coalition, executive coordina-
tion, and – in the case of minority governments – the strength of parliamentary 
oversight. The results yield strong support for our expectations.  
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TABLE 4.1: EFFECT OF COALITION COMPROMISE ON POLICY POSI-
TIONS 
 Estimates 
Compromise position -0.176 
 (0.310) 
Ideological divisiveness -0.068 
 (0.123) 
Ideological divisiveness x Compromise position 0.038 
 (0.018)** 
Executive coordination -6.533 
 (3.771)* 
Executive coordination x Compromise position 0.545 
 (0.225)** 
Minority government -9.290 
 (8.894) 
Parliamentary oversight -1.710 
 (4.076) 
Minority government x Parliamentary oversight 1.294 
 (8.235) 
Minority government x Compromise position -4.025 
 (1.688)** 
Parliamentary oversight x Compromise position -0.622 
 (0.373) 
Minority government x Parliamentary oversight x Compromise position 3.412 
 (1.182)*** 
Left-right public opinion 9.510 
 (5.188)* 
Net receipts from EU budget 8.300 
 (1.569)*** 
Unemployment -0.478 
 (0.779) 
Inflation -1.790 
 (0.949)* 
Economic freedom 2.210 
 (2.263) 
Population 0.077 
 (0.085) 
Fixed effects Policy issues 
Number of policy issues 145 
Number of countries 22 
N 1,694 
R2 0.30 
Notes: Fixed effects regression; No observations for countries without coalition governments; Country-
clustered robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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First, the positive and significant interaction term between coordinated exec-
utives and the compromise position demonstrates that the relevance of com-
promises is stronger in countries that employ inter-ministerial coordination in 
EU policy-making. This confirms hypothesis H1 and is in line with the expecta-
tion that coordination lowers the search costs for cabinet parties and thereby 
increases incentives to formulate alternative policies that challenge ministerial 
proposals. Second, the positive and significant interaction term between the 
compromise position and ideological divisiveness indicates that the compro-
mise is a stronger predictor of governments’ policy positions when supporting 
parties are more dispersed on the left-right spectrum. This is in line with hy-
pothesis H2, and provides evidence for the idea that actors’ incentives to invoke 
the compromise position increase with ideological divisions.  
Third, the positive and significant three-way interaction between minority 
governments, parliamentary oversight, and the compromise position provides 
evidence that compromises have more influence on policy formulation under 
minority governments when the parliament can scrutinise the government in 
EU affairs. This is supportive of our hypothesis H3 and suggests that strong 
parliamentary oversight serves (supporting) opposition parties in policing the 
bargain.85 Finally, we also find clear evidence for hypothesis H4, which expects 
compromises to be more relevant under majority rule. The interaction between 
the dummy variable for minority governments and the compromise position is 
negative and significant, indicating that compromises are generally less likely if 
one party (the supporting opposition party) is not part of the executive.  
 																													
85 We verified that the linear combination of the coefficients on the three-way interaction and 
the two-way interaction between parliamentary oversight and the compromise, indicating the 
effect of oversight on the marginal effect of the compromise position under minority govern-
ments, is significant at the 5% level. 
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FIGURE 4.3: COMPROMISE POSITION AND DIVISIVENESS 
 
Notes: 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines; Histogram of observations as shaded areas. 
 
We illustrate our results in Figures 4.3 and 4.4, which plot the marginal effect 
of the compromise position under different conditions. Both figures also in-
clude histograms of the number of observations under these conditions. Figure 
4.3 displays the impact of ideological divisiveness. It shows that the compro-
mise position has little relationship to negotiation positions when the support 
coalition is ideologically compact. In turn, if supporting parties diverge by at 
least 25 points on the RILE scale, the compromise position turns into a highly 
significant predictor of the government’s negotiation positions.  
Figure 4.4 illustrates the role of executive and legislative institutions and 
plots the marginal effect of the compromise position on policy positions in four 
scenarios depending on majority status of the government, executive coordina-
tion, and parliamentary oversight. The upper left and right quadrants show that 
the compromise position has virtually no significant influence on governments’ 
policy positions under uncoordinated executives. The confidence intervals for 
all observations in our sample always cross the x-axis.  
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FIGURE 4.4: COMPROMISE POSITION, EXECUTIVE, AND LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS 
 
Notes: 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines; Histogram of observations as shaded areas.
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Hence, for uncoordinated executives the baseline case in our sample is either 
ministerial autonomy or significant ministerial drift. In contrast, the lower left 
and right quadrants show that coordinated executives increase the relevance of 
the compromise. Under majority governments the marginal effect of the coali-
tion compromise is significant for 60-70% of the observations in our sample and 
only becomes insignificant at high levels of parliamentary oversight (in our 
sample, these observations stem from the Czech Republic, Finland, Lithuania, 
and Latvia).86 In contrast, under minority governments parliamentary oversight 
facilitates the compromise, turning its marginal effect significant wherever 
oversight is stronger than 1.24 (these observations stem from the Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, Lithuania, and Latvia). Below this value cabinet parties may be 
able to rule alone, but above it supporting opposition parties can rely on strong 
parliamentary oversight institutions to formulate alternative proposals that 
would engender compromises. 
In the next step, we investigate the interaction between ideological divisive-
ness and institutional strength (hypothesis H5). For this purpose, we consider 
whether governments operate in a strong, medium, or weak institutional envi-
ronment. Majority governments with executive coordination enjoy strong (= ‘2’) 
institutions, since all government parties benefit from information-sharing and 
decision rights in cabinet and inter-ministerial meetings. Minority governments 
lacking either coordination or above median parliamentary oversight operate 
instead in a weak (= ‘0’) institutional environment. In such arrangements, at 
least one supporting opposition party does not benefit from cabinet participa-
																													
86 This might indicate that opposition parties (or alternatively, diverging intra-party factions) in 
strong parliaments may have some clout on the negotiation position even though the cabinet 
parties control a majority of seats. However, this is only speculative, since the interaction term 
between parliamentary oversight and the compromise is negative but not statistically signifi-
cant.  
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tion, and either it also lacks influence through the parliament, and/or infor-
mation exchange among cabinet parties is limited in the absence of executive 
coordination. Finally, majority governments with uncoordinated executives as 
well as minority governments with above median parliamentary oversight and 
executive coordination fall into the medium category (= ‘1’). 
We test a three-way interaction between the compromise position, ideologi-
cal divisiveness, and this ordinal measure of institutional strength, also includ-
ing our set of controls. Our results are reported in Table 4.2. As expected, the 
three-way interaction turns out to be negative and significant at the 5% level.87 
It therefore indicates that ideological divisiveness becomes less important for 
whether the compromise is reflected in policy positions as institutions become 
stronger.  
Figure 4.5 shows the impact of ideological divisiveness at each level of insti-
tutional strength. Whereas the range increases the relevance of the compromise 
position under weak and – to a lesser extent – under medium institutions, it has 
virtually no effect under strong institutions. This indicates that parties weigh 
policy concerns against the information costs of challenging a proposal under 
weak and medium institutions. But once institutions are strong, such as in the 
case of coordinated majority governments, challenging a proposal is convenient 
enough for parties that the minister generally proposes a compromise, irrespec-
tive of divisiveness. This finding runs counter to Martin and Vanberg's (2011) 
informal argument about a positive interaction between divisiveness and insti-
tutional strength. 
 
																													
87 This result should be treated with caution because we do not find this interaction to be signif-
icant with the other two alternative operationalisations of the compromise position we test for 
our main results in Appendix 3. 
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TABLE 4.2: IDEOLOGICAL DIVISIVENESS AND INSTITUTIONAL 
STRENGTH 
 Estimates 
Compromise position -1.867 
 (0.885)** 
Ideological divisiveness 0.017 
 (0.178) 
Ideological divisiveness x Compromise position 0.074 
 (0.030)** 
Institutional strength 3.160 
 (5.676) 
Institutional strength x Ideological divisiveness -0.043 
 (0.137) 
Institutional strength x Compromise position 1.208 
 (0.542)** 
Institutional strength x Ideological divisiveness x Compromise position -0.041 
 (0.019)** 
Left-right public opinion 5.055 
 (6.151) 
Net receipts from EU budget 4.969 
 (0.859)*** 
Unemployment -0.225 
 (0.801) 
Inflation -0.663 
 (1.161) 
Economic freedom -3.037 
 (3.471) 
Population -0.022 
 (0.088) 
Fixed effects Policy issues 
Number of policy issues 145 
Number of countries 22 
N 1,694 
R2 0.29 
Notes: Fixed effects regression; No observations for countries without coalition governments; Country-
clustered robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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FIGURE 4.5: COMPROMISE POSITION, IDEOLOGICAL DIVISIVENESS, AND STRENGTH OF INSTITUTIONS 
 
Notes: 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines; Histogram of observations as shaded areas.
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In summary, we find ample support for our model of coalition policy-
making. Government support coalitions are more likely to coordinate on com-
promises when they are majority governments, when the ideological stakes are 
high, when executives coordinate internally, and when supporting parties can 
police the government from the opposition ranks in the parliament. Additional-
ly, we have some indication that ideological divisions are less relevant to 
whether the compromise is reflected in policy positions if strong institutions 
lower the information search costs to the parties. We corroborate these results 
with various robustness checks reported in Appendix 3. In particular, we ac-
commodate for concerns regarding the calculation of the compromise position, 
heteroscedastic measurement error of the CMP estimates, model specification, 
and missing data.  
Lastly, in contrast to Martin and Vanberg (2011), we find no general effect of 
strong parliamentary oversight on the likelihood of compromises, but only a 
conditional effect for minority governments. Cabinet participation and execu-
tive coordination appear to serve as substitutes for parliamentary oversight in 
the case of majority governments. How, then, can we account for Martin and 
Vanberg's (2011) findings on the crucial role of legislative institutions? In Ap-
pendix 3 we demonstrate that we do indeed find an unconditional, positive ef-
fect of parliamentary oversight on the relevance of the compromise position as 
predicted by Martin and Vanberg (2011) in the sample of five countries includ-
ed in their work. However, as we have shown above, this effect is not present in 
the full data covering 22 countries, and it is likewise not present for the 13 
Western European countries in our data. While we have no explanation why 
the five countries included in Martin and Vanberg (2011) differ so markedly, 
their result of a key role of parliamentary institutions in facilitating compromis-
es may be due to selection bias on the country level. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Managing differences is at the centre of coalition politics. The preferences of 
parties diverge, but only one common policy can be adopted. Understanding 
which institutions structure intra-coalitional negotiations and influence whose 
preferences will be reflected in the settlement of conflicts is therefore a salient 
concern for scholars of comparative politics. While the literature provides vari-
ous models of coalition policy-making, key empirical evidence has recently 
drawn the field’s attention to the compromise model (see Martin and Vanberg 
2014). In this study, we have analysed which institutional arrangements enable 
parties to enforce the compromise and thus are boundary conditions of the 
model. Our results are clear. Compromises are foremost agreed upon by majori-
ty governments at the cabinet table and in inter-ministerial committees, where 
parties share information at the early stages of policy preparation. In addition, 
support coalitions that are divided into cabinet and opposition parties can end 
up striking compromises in the legislature if procedures serve opposition par-
ties in extracting information from their cabinet counterparts.  
We do not find support for the claim that majority government coalitions are 
in need of the legislature to organise compromises. Instead, our findings sug-
gest that executive institutions can act as substitutes. In contrast to existing 
work, we observe the actual ideological location of a policy. This is imperative 
if more than one institutional venue is used by coalitions: if parties strike com-
promises in inter-ministerial committees, parliamentary activity reveals as little 
about coalition policy-making as cabinet bargaining does if compromises are 
made in the legislature. It is even more imperative if ministers sometimes di-
rectly propose a compromise in order to forestall its anticipated institutional 
enforcement. In this perspective, the seminal findings of Martin and Vanberg 
(2011) tell us that governments in particular countries (Denmark, and potential-
ly Germany and the Netherlands) use the legislature to establish compromises, 
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while others do not (France and Ireland). But they do not enable us to conclude 
the opposite: that no use of the legislature means that no compromise has been 
reached. In our data, French and Irish governments are estimated to rely rela-
tively strongly on compromises due to executive coordination, at least in EU 
affairs. 
Our results have important implications for the debate on citizen representa-
tion in EU policy-making. Most importantly, they demonstrate that in certain 
institutional settings government parties broadly fulfil their electoral mandates 
at the EU level, and thereby act in line with the ‘responsible party model’ 
(Budge and Hofferbert 1990; Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994; Ranney 
1962). It is true that our analyses do not tap into the fulfilment of specific party 
pledges but only gauge correlations between central government ideology and 
policy positions. But a broad correspondence between policy positions and the 
promised ideology of the government support coalition of parties appears de-
sirable in itself and is likely a prerequisite for any more specific form of man-
date fulfilment. Hence, our results suggest that institutional innovations for 
managing EU affairs could be further diffused, as they effectively curtail minis-
terial discretion and enforce compromises as a more ‘inclusive’ form of repre-
sentation.  
This point can be put in a broader perspective. In any non-minimalist ac-
count of democracy, the quality of the negotiation process by which policies are 
agreed matters. As Mansbridge and Warren have noted, ‘the question of justice 
in the process of negotiation is ultimately part of the question of the justice in 
democratic representation’ (2013: 92). To the extent that the institutions investi-
gated here enforce joint decision-making over single-handed actions by minis-
ters, they strengthen the democratic intuition that ‘those who have rightful 
claims to inclusion should also have the means for inclusion’ (Mansbridge and 
Warren 2013: 92). In fact, if ministerial autonomy is the alternative, these insti-
tutions are effectively prerequisites for any inter-party negotiations at all. Nev-
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ertheless, from the perspective of deliberative political theory, the legislature as 
opposed to the cabinet or inter-ministerial venues is the preferable negotiation 
forum to reach fair compromises due to its greater inclusiveness. Hence, our 
finding that parties, at least under the baseline of majority rule, rely more on 
executive than legislative institutions highlights a key challenge for the quality 
of democratic representation in European democracies.  
Lastly, our results have important implications for the measurement of citi-
zen representation. For instance, most studies on ideological congruence be-
tween citizens and government policy make assumptions about the location of 
government policy in a left-right space. They have either argued that policy is 
best represented by the median legislative party’s position (McDonald and 
Budge 2005; McDonald, Mendes, and Budge 2004) or alternatively by a seat-
weighted coalition compromise (Powell 2000). But what is the better proxy? 
Our work suggests that it may depend on the country’s institutional setup and 
the compactness of the support coalition. Future work should at least control 
for these influences and test the robustness of findings to these alternative ex-
planations for variation in congruence.  
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PAPER 4 
 
 
Territorial Representation and the Opinion-Policy Link-
age: The Case of the European Union 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
A key feature of federal systems is the representation of sub-national units or 
constituencies by ‘territorial representatives’ in policy-making at the federal level. 
How do such arrangements influence the linkage between public opinion and poli-
cy outputs? I argue that we should expect policy in such systems to be systemati-
cally skewed towards opinion in those constituencies where citizens care about a 
policy issue and have a uniform view on it. Statistical analyses of 167 policy issues 
from European Union policy-making with over 5,000 observations of opinion-
policy dyads provide strong empirical evidence for this claim. Public support for 
policy change in those countries whose citizens care most about an issue is a better 
predictor of policy change than average EU-wide opinion. Moreover, congruence 
between state-level opinion and EU-level policy becomes more likely, the more sa-
lient and clear-cut opinion in a member state. These findings refine our under-
standing of the role public salience plays for policy representation. 
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TERRITORIAL REPRESENTATION’ IS A FREQUENT FEATURE OF REPRESENTATIVE 
democracies. Most prominently, several of the world’s most studied de-
mocracies are federations of constituent states featuring diverse forms of repre-
sentation of their territorial ‘units’ in federal level policy-making (e.g. state rep-
resentatives in an ‘upper chamber’ of parliament).88 How do such arrangements 
of territorial representation affect the translation of public opinion into policy? 
To whom exactly should we expect policy to respond under strong territorial 
logics and who will get policies congruent with her preferences in such systems? 
The rich literature on policy representation has generally neglected the effects 
of federalism and territorial representation more broadly, and instead focused 
on other key questions such as the effects of economic inequality or policy at-
tributes on the opinion-policy linkage (e.g. Gilens and Page 2014; Gilens 2012; 
Lax and Phillips 2009, 2012; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Wlezien and Soroka 
2007).  
Here, I address the open question and argue that the effects of strong territo-
rial representation arrangements on the opinion-policy linkage can be under-
stood by considering the distribution of bargaining power between state repre-
sentatives as well as differences in opinion and public salience regarding policy 
across constituencies or states. Assuming representatives are purely re-election 
motivated and therefore attempt to follow the median voter in their state, con-
flicts about policy direction between the publics of different territories can be 
																													
88 Many unitary systems also rely on variants of territorial representation by electing represent-
atives in single- or multi-member districts or from regional lists. In fact, only national level, 
closed-list pure PR electoral systems are entirely free of any territorial dimension of representa-
tion. However, strong geographical differences in opinion and salience as well as a weakly inte-
grated party system are important background conditions for territorial representation to make 
a difference (see below). Both conditions seem more relevant in federal than unitary systems. 
‘ 
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resolved by state representatives’ vote trading and logrolling across policies. 
Representatives will offer their agreement to policy change that is undesired by 
the majority of their constituents if this opinion is ambivalent or less salient, and 
they will – in return – demand support from other representatives if their con-
stituents’ opinion is clear and salient. As a consequence, federal policy will be 
responsive to the power-weighted opinion of citizens in those states that care 
about an issue, and federal policy will match state-wide majority opinion the 
clearer and the more salient this opinion is. 
I test these claims with a novel dataset from European Union (EU) politics 
containing information on cross-national public support for policy change as 
well as the EU’s implementation record89 for 167 policy issues on the EU’s 
agenda between 2004 and 2010. Methodologically, my dataset builds upon im-
portant ‘best practices’ from studies of policy representation in the US (e.g. 
Gilens 2012; Lax and Phillips 2012). Focusing on the EU case is effectively inves-
tigating a ‘most likely case’ for the effects of territorial representation, as opin-
ion and salience vary across constitutive units, inter-regional logrolling and 
package deals are standard practice, and territorial dynamics are facilitated by a 
weakly integrated party system. This makes the EU the case to test whether ter-
ritorial representation should ever matter for the opinion-policy linkage – if not 
here, where else?  
Empirically, I first map the EU’s ‘opinion space’, uncovering substantial in-
ter-regional differences in public opinion and salience on EU politics across 
member states. These differences strikingly reflect well-known preference con-
figurations in EU policy-making reported in previous studies. I then show how 
these differences in opinion are channelled in the policy process: analysing the 
																													
89 When I use ‘implementation’ in this paper, I refer to the legal adoption of policy at the EU 
level and not to compliance with, or implementation of EU laws in the member states. 
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responsiveness of EU-level policy reveals that the simple average of public 
opinion for those countries where an issue is salient is a better predictor of poli-
cy change than opinion across all countries. Inversely, the analysis of over 5,000 
dyads of EU level policies and related opinion in each of the member states 
shows that congruence between state-level opinion and EU-level policy be-
comes more likely the more salient and clear-cut state-level opinion is. I also 
determine that this finding is driven by variation in opinion and salience across 
countries for the same policy issue and cannot be traced back to differences in 
average opinion between policy issues. 
The results highlight a second – so far under-appreciated – role which public 
salience plays for the opinion-policy linkage. It may not only influence the kind 
of issues on which governments are more responsive to opinion (Wlezien 1995, 
2004), but when citizens in some states or constituencies care more about an 
issue than others, the dynamics of policy-making under territorial representa-
tion may attribute disproportionate influence to these citizens. 
 
THE NEGLECT OF TERRITORIAL REPRESENTATION 
A wide range of studies have investigated the relationship between public 
opinion and policy in various Western democracies (for an overview see 
Wlezien and Soroka 2007). Many of these studies find significant empirical 
support for the responsiveness of policy output to public opinion (a change in 
opinion induces a change in policy in the same direction) as well as congruence 
of policy with majority opinion (implemented policies match the preferences of 
the majority of citizens) (e.g. Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Gilens 2012; 
Lax and Phillips 2012; Page and Shapiro 1983; Soroka and Wlezien 2010).  
However, almost none of the existing studies address the question of how 
territorial representation affects the opinion-policy linkage. To be clear, by territo-
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rial representation I refer to the representation of subnational units or states in 
political decision-making at the federal level by regionally, (in)directly elected 
representatives. Territorial representation in this sense is typically a core ele-
ment of the definition of federalism (e.g. Wibbels 2005: 26), and is commonly 
associated with state representatives in an upper, ‘territorial chamber’ of the 
national legislature. How do democracies with such arrangements deal with the 
divergent views of their citizens across sub-national units or states? This lacuna 
in existing research is particularly surprising, as several federal systems, most 
importantly the US, Germany, and Canada (see above; see also Brooks 1990), 
have been the focal point of research on the opinion-policy linkage. 
Certainly, some limited work has scrutinised the effects of federalism on the 
opinion-policy linkage, but its focus has been on federalism’s impact on citi-
zens’ ‘policy responsiveness’ in the ‘thermostatic model’ of public opinion and 
policy (Wlezien 1995, 2004). This work highlights that the various layers of poli-
cy-making under federalism make it difficult for citizens to identify responsibil-
ity for policy and therefore cushion citizens’ reactions to policy-making (Soroka 
and Wlezien 2010; Wlezien and Soroka 2012). This, in turn, diminishes electoral 
incentives for governments to represent public opinion in policy-making (see 
also John, Bevan, and Jennings 2011). However, despite showing that the 
strength of representation is diminished, this research has not addressed the 
question of whether federalism alters the focus of representation (Weßels 2007: 
838-840) at the federal level, i.e. who exactly is represented. 
To my knowledge, Bølstad's (2015) study is the only one that addresses how 
opinion in different territories is represented in federal level policy-making. 
Bølstad finds that public opinion on EU integration has a ‘core’ and a ‘periph-
ery’ trend, represented by different groups of countries (Germany, France, Ita-
ly… vs. UK, Denmark, Ireland…), and that EU-level policy-making responds to 
both opinion series. However, he does not analyse under what conditions opin-
ion in one group of member states becomes relatively more influential com-
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pared to opinion in other member states. As he has to rely on support for EU 
membership as a rough measure of ‘public mood for integration’ he cannot 
identify substantive conflicts over policy between citizens in different territo-
ries, and hence, he cannot address how such conflicts are resolved.  
In turn, I here develop a micro foundational argument about the interactions 
of sub-national or state representatives that predicts when certain publics 
should be influential in federal level policy-making. Moreover, as I employ 
opinion data on very specific policy issues, I am able to ascertain who gets their 
preferences realised in case of disagreement. 
 
THE OPINION-POLICY LINKAGE UNDER TERRITORIAL REPRESEN-
TATION 
In the development of my argument I presume acceptance of the core ideas 
of electoral representation models (Barro 1973; Fearon 1999; Ferejohn 1986; 
Mansbridge 2003; Stimson 1999) in order to focus on the exact impacts of terri-
torial representation. In particular, I assume that representatives purely care 
about re-election and therefore try to follow the median voter in their constitu-
ency or state. In turn, constituents partially evaluate representatives on the ba-
sis of federal level policy change, even though control of policy-making at the 
federal level is divided between all representatives. The basic idea is that terri-
torial representation creates an inter-regional bargaining space, in which terri-
torial representatives negotiate over policy change. Assume the following sim-
ple preference function of each representative in the case of policy change: 1 : !!!!!"#$ = !! ∗ (!! − 50%) 
Where !! is the salience (or importance) her constituents attach to a policy is-
sue ! and !! is the constituents’ support for policy change on the issue (i.e. the 
percentage of constituents supporting change). Note that this utility is positive 
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in the case of policy change that is supported by a majority of constituents (i.e. 
the median voter in the state or sub-national unit), and negative otherwise. This 
represents the idea that constituents will use the next elections to reward (sanc-
tion) representatives for past policy-making that was in line with (against) their 
preferences. The size of the reward (sanction) depends on issue salience, which 
ties in with key arguments and findings from the policy representation litera-
ture (Burstein 2006; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Lax and Phillips 2009, 2012; 
Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Wlezien 2004). Further assume !!!" = 0, if the status 
quo (SQ) prevails and no policy change occurs.  
Representatives vote with a particular decision rule (e.g. majority, unanimi-
ty) and have to organise coalitions to pass policy change. Given that representa-
tives’ constituents differ in their opinions on policy issues and the salience they 
attach to them, representatives can engage in logrolling or vote-trading across 
issues in order to maximise their utility from a set of issues !: !!!!!! . In essence, 
representatives agree to undesirable policy changes or status quos on issues 
that are of little importance to their constituents, and in return receive the sup-
port of other representatives on issues their constituents care about and have a 
clear opinion on. More precisely, representatives will trade their vote on issues 
for which they face a small utility difference between policy change and the 
status quo !!!!!"#$ − !!!" = !!!!!"#$ − 0  , and they ask for the votes of oth-
ers on issues where this difference is substantial. 
This straightforward micro foundational argument about bargaining be-
tween territorial representatives relates to a wide class of more specific ‘ex-
change’, ‘logrolling’ or ‘vote-trading’ bargaining models developed in political 
science and sociology (e.g. Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Carrubba and Volden 
		 	159	
2000; Coleman 1966a, 1966b; Riker and Brams 1973; Stratmann 1992).90 As 
Coleman (1966a: 615) has put it succinctly, negotiators ‘exchange their partial 
control over issues that interest them little for greater control of those that inter-
est them more’. In our case, !!!!!"#$  represents precisely this ‘interest’ of nego-
tiators. In the political science literature (e.g. Riker and Brams 1973), this ‘inter-
est’ has sometimes been called ‘salience’, which should not be mixed up with !!, 
the salience in the form of the importance constituents attach to the issue. Nev-
ertheless, the central claim here is that when negotiators are electorally sensitive 
representatives, their ‘interest’ or ‘salience’ becomes a direct function of constit-
uents’ opinion on and salience attached to the issue (see equation (1)). This 
means the salience of issues for negotiators is endogenised so as to capture con-
stituents’ demands.  
As representatives may differ in their power to influence whether policy 
change occurs or not, let this power be represented by ! for representative ! 
and a total number of representatives !, such that !! = 1!!!! . This parameter 
does not only capture the share of total votes a representative has (if this num-
ber differs), but also and more importantly, her ability to log-roll with others 
(e.g. her position in the bargaining space) as well as any other resources of 
power (e.g. vote-buying, see Aksoy and Rodden 2009; Lee 2000; Rodden 2002). 
We can now easily see the consequences of territorial representation for the 
opinion-policy linkage. First, consider responsiveness, i.e. the question of wheth-
																													
90 It is not important for the argument of the paper which specific exchange model characterises 
inter-regional bargaining. As long as the underpinning model allows representatives to – at 
least marginally – increase their influence on some issues at the expense of influence on other 
issues, territorial representation should have the consequences shown here. This includes mod-
els of diffuse instead of specific reciprocity, models with certain norms as well as potentially 
bargaining models with representatives that aim at satisficing rather than optimising their utili-
ty function. 
		 	160	
er a change in opinion induces changes in policy. Under territorial representa-
tion the probability of policy change on a particular issue Pr !!!!!"#$  should 
increase with either the power of the supporting representatives, or the utility 
they derive from the change, which is in turn a function of constituents’ opinion 
and salience (see equation (1)): 
2 : ∆Pr !!!!!"#$∆ !!!!,!!!!"#$!!!! > 0 
As a result, policy-making under strong territorial logics should be more re-
sponsive to certain constituencies or states with power, strong opinions, and 
high interest in an issue than to average polity-wide opinion. These constituen-
cies may vary on an issue-by-issue basis and their citizens may favour different 
policies than the system’s average citizen. 
Second, the congruence of policy-making with opinion, i.e. an actual match 
between majority opinion and policy, is influenced by territorial representation. 
Importantly, congruence can be assessed on the constituency or state level. The 
probability that majority opinion in a particular constituency is congruent with 
adopted policy (i.e. the majority favours change and it occurs OR the majority 
favours the status quo and it prevails) should increase with the power of this 
constituency as well as the difference in representatives’ utility between policy 
change and the status quo:   
3 : ∆Pr !!!!!"#$ !!,! − 50% > 0% + ∆Pr !!!" !!,! − 50% ≤ 0%∆ !! !!,!!!!"#$ > 0 
Hence, as constituents either care more about or have more uniform opinions 
on an issue, congruence of policy-making with their views becomes more likely, 
as their representative will focus on these issues in his logrolling strategies. 
Note that without territorial representation, congruence should be unrelated to 
state-level opinion and salience if we exclude polity-wide opinion and salience 
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as potential confounders, i.e. expression (3) should equal 0, when holding 
‘global’ opinion and salience constant. 
When will territorial representation make a significant difference for the 
opinion-policy linkage? Certainly, its effects become stronger, the more dis-
persed opinion and salience across territories and the less proportional power 
to constituencies’ voter populations. It is therefore likely to be particularly rele-
vant in federal systems of diverse sub-national units. Moreover, the more pow-
erful a territorial chamber vis-à-vis a first, territorially undivided chamber (e.g. 
elected on nation-wide, pure proportional representation (PR)), the stronger the 
effects of territorial representation should be. Similarly, strong ‘unit representa-
tion’ (e.g. US Senate) in the territorial chamber should accentuate effects, 
whereas more ‘population-proportional representation’ (e.g. German Bundes-
rat) is likely to attenuate them (Crémer and Palfrey 1999).  
Yet, while the presence and policy influence of territorial representatives is a 
necessary condition for any significant effects, inter-regional logrolling or vote-
trading is the key mechanism that manipulates the opinion-policy linkage. In 
this respect, the integration of the party system may absorb many effects of ter-
ritorial representation in federal systems by thwarting inter-regional bargaining 
(Beramendi 2009: 768; Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova 2004: 190-196; 
Rodden 2006; Rodden and Wibbels 2002; Wibbels 2001). If strong polity-wide 
parties exist and their leaderships can discipline sub-national party elites and 
territorial representatives through career incentives or organisational com-
mand, intra-regional logrolling may be minimised (Riker and Brams 1973: 
1238). Party leaders may, in particular, sanction representatives for vote trades 
across party lines, and instead try to gear policy-making to polity-wide opinion. 
This is especially rational if federal party leaders’ own career ambitions are 
linked to a largely polity-wide constituency (e.g. if the core executive is elected 
by popular vote or by a pure, nation-wide PR lower chamber of parliament). 
Nevertheless, work on the US Congress has stressed how party leaders can ac-
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tually facilitate intra-party logrolls (Koford 1982) and collected important em-
pirical evidence for logrolling practices in the US (Stratmann 1992, 1995).  
In order to test whether territorial representation can ever make a difference 
for the opinion-policy linkage, I focus here on policy-making in the European 
Union as a ‘most likely case’. The EU’s political system – no matter whether it is 
described as ‘federal system’ or ‘federation’ (e.g. Kincaid 1999) – shares a cen-
tral design principle with any ‘truly’ federal state, namely strong territorial rep-
resentation (Börzel and Hosli 2003). The Council of the EU (henceforth, the 
Council) is effectively the system’s upper chamber, it features mild population-
disproportional unit representation by national governments (specifically their 
ministers), and its influence in policy-making is – to say the least – on equal 
footing with the lower chamber, the European Parliament (EP) (e.g. Costello 
and Thomson 2013; Franchino and Mariotto 2012). Furthermore, where policy is 
made outside the treaties’ framework, the only viable procedure is bargaining 
between territorial representatives (i.e. the national governments) in inter-
governmental conferences.  
Importantly, compared to party systems in virtually any national federal 
state, the EU’s party system is much less integrated (Thorlakson 2005). Parties 
in the member states are largely independent from each other and only loosely 
organise transnationally in a number of ‘Europarties’ with rather weak organi-
sational and financial resources. It is true that Europarties play an important 
role in EU legislative politics, e.g. by lowering transaction costs (Hix, Noury, 
and Roland 2007a; B. Lindberg, Rasmussen, and Warntjen 2008: 1111-1114), 
most visibly through their groups in the EP. But they lack command and con-
trol over EU-level legislators. Not even members of the EP, let alone national 
ministers in the Council, have been found to be consistently loyal to their Euro-
pean party (Hix 2002; Hix and Lord 1997; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007b). In-
stead, disciplining authority largely remains with national parties. 
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The lack of a disciplining federal party system is reflected in logrolling and 
package deal practices within the Council and across EU institutions, for which 
scholars have developed theoretical models and provided substantial evidence 
(Aksoy 2012; Crombez 2000; Golub 2012a; Kardasheva 2013). In particular, the 
so-called ‘compromise model’, which has been found to best explain bargaining 
in the Council over continuous policy alternatives, is closely related to the 
aforementioned models of vote-trading and logrolling concerned with binary 
choices (particularly to Coleman 1966a, 1966b) (see Achen 2006a, 2006b; 
Thomson 2011b).91 It posits that the outcome of Council negotiations is a 
weighted average of national governments’ spatial policy positions, where the 
weights are the product of each government’s issue salience and power. The 
high relevance of logrolling and vote-trading makes the EU an excellent case to 
identify the impact of territorial representation on the opinion-policy linkage.92 
Building on my general expectations above, I now specify hypotheses for the 
EU case. While opinion and the salience of a policy issue can be directly meas-
ured from public opinion data, I have to make assumptions about the bargain-
ing power of the different territorial representatives based on existing findings. 
While some early literature, especially by Andrew Moravcsik (1993, 1998), has 
argued that the ‘big’ EU member states (Germany, France, UK) dominate nego-
																													
91 Other well-performing models of Council negotiations also allow exchanges and trades (e.g. 
Arregui, Stokman, and Thomson 2006; König and Proksch 2006) 
92 While territorial dynamics should be particularly strong in the EU case, historically some 
scholars have argued that citizen representation in EU policy-making is weak due to the pub-
lic’s lack of interest and little electoral accountability (Føllesdal and Hix 2006; Haas 1958: 16-19; 
Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). However, recent empirical results have challenged this notion 
and provided evidence for classical patterns of representation due to strong politicisation of EU 
matters since the 1990s (e.g. Bølstad 2015; Hagemann, Hobolt, and Wratil 2016; Toshkov 2011). 
For a comprehensive overview see Hooghe and Marks (2009). 
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tiations in the Council as well as in intergovernmental conferences, most subse-
quent studies could not provide any consistent evidence for this claim. Instead, 
bargaining models that assume more equal distributions of power between 
member states have generally been found to yield more accurate predictions of 
outcomes than those assuming disproportionate power for a particular group of 
states (Arregui and Thomson 2009; Finke 2009; Golub 2012b; Thomson 2008, 
2011e).93 This result seems to hold despite the continuing replacement of una-
nimity with qualified majority voting. My assumption is therefore that bargain-
ing power is equally distributed between state representatives, which renders ! 
analytically irrelevant in the inequalities (2) and (3) for the EU case. This yields 
the following expectations with regard to the responsiveness and congruence of 
EU-level policies: 
H1 (Responsiveness): The greater the support for policy change among those 
national publics that view the issue as salient, the higher the likelihood of EU-
level policy change.  
H2 (Congruence): The greater the national opinion majority on an issue and 
the more salient an issue is to the national public, the higher the likelihood of 
congruence between country-level opinion and EU-level policy change. 
 
 
 
																													
93 Of course, bargaining power may vary over time and across policy areas, but most studies 
using a large number of legislative files and areas could not detect any systematic and signifi-
cant overall differences. Hence, on average the assumption of equal power should be most ap-
propriate. However, I also challenge this assumption in the robustness checks section below, 
and provide results for a regressive distribution of power. 
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A NEW DATASET ON POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN THE EU 
In order to test these expectations, I collected a novel dataset of public opin-
ion and policy implementation in EU politics.94 The data covers 167 concrete 
policy issues that occurred on the EU’s agenda after the bloc’s enlargement to 
25 members with the accession of 10 Eastern European democracies in May 
2004. Policy issues were selected from the universe of question items covered in 
the European Commission’s (henceforth, the Commission) regular ‘Eurobarom-
eter’ survey series.  
In a first step, all question items in ‘Standard’, ‘Special’, and ‘Flash’ Euroba-
rometers with a fieldwork start date between 1st of May 2004 and 31st of Decem-
ber 2010 were screened for a set of keywords (such as ‘agree’, ‘disagree’, ‘ap-
prove’, ‘oppose’, ‘favour’, etc.). In a second step, items with at least one of the 
keywords were included in the dataset if they fulfilled additional criteria: they 
surveyed opinion on policy change, without any conditional twists, they were 
specific enough to ascertain policy implementation, and the policy domain lay 
within the potential and growing competences of the EU.  
Most of the 167 policy issues identified with this approach were surveyed 
only once during the period under study. However, a few items (especially on 
enlargement) were surveyed several times in consecutive years. Out of these, 
each item was included only once per calendar year, with the most recent sur-
vey being selected. Different question wordings on the same policy were treat-
ed as separate policy issues. This resulted in a final dataset of 201 questions on 
policy change. 
																													
94 Appendix 4 provides detailed information on the new data, including the selection of ques-
tions about policy issues, concerns with certain question formats, (re-)scaling of public opinion 
measures, the coding of implementation records and related variables, and further discussion of 
potential biases. 
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Human coders ascertained the implementation record for the selected poli-
cies on the basis of official, publicly available sources (e.g. EU institutions’ web-
sites; EUR-Lex), and where those were not informative, through written re-
quests to the Directorates-General of the Commission. Coders checked whether 
the proposed policy change was implemented after the fieldwork start date of 
the survey.95 Implementation was usually achieved through EU secondary law, 
sometimes through primary law, and rarely through bureaucratic acts or 
changes in bureaucratic practice. The key implementation variable is binary 
with ‘0’ indicating that the status quo prevailed and ‘1’ denoting policy change. 
Implementation occurred in 33% of the cases and after a median time lag of 
1315 days from the survey’s fieldwork date. 
In order to ensure a consistent linkage between the public opinion and the 
implementation data, all Eurobarometer public opinion measures were trans-
formed to reflect the support for change in policy. While most questions implicit-
ly asked about change, few items asked about support for an existing status 
quo. In these cases, the public opinion measures were recoded as the disap-
proval of this status quo, and hence, reflect support for change. As the survey 
questions used a small number of different answer formats, all response options 
affirmative of policy change were merged (e.g. ‘totally agree’ and ‘tend to 
agree’) to measure the total percentage of respondents supportive of change. 
The EU-wide mean support for change across all questions was 61%. 
The outlined approach to data construction closely replicates approaches 
used in prominent US studies on policy representation, most importantly in 
Martin Gilens' work (2012, Chapter 2) (see also Lax and Phillips 2012). But an 																													
95 As over 90% of implementations took place within five and a half years from the survey’s 
fieldwork, later implementations were not counted (status quo prevails = ‘0’) to ensure a close 
link between opinion and the recorded occurrence of policy change. See Appendix 4 for details 
and robustness checks in this respect. 
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important difference between the US and the EU case has to be considered: 
while US studies rely on question items from several independent survey com-
panies, for this data the single source is the Eurobarometer, conducted by TNS 
Opinion and financed by the Commission. This poses the questions of selection 
bias and sponsor desirability bias: 1) To what extent are the topics of Eurobarome-
ter questions representative of the EU’s political agenda? 2) To what extent is 
item design sufficiently neutral to measure representation?  
Table 5.1 displays the distribution of policy questions in the data across 13 
hand-coded policy areas. This illustrates that the data is broadly representative 
of the EU’s agenda.96 Importantly, about 26% of the data relates to ‘Constitu-
tional affairs, agencies and enlargement’, which reflects the EU’s strong focus 
on the Constitutional Treaty and Lisbon Treaty process as well as EU-28 en-
largement between 2004 and 2010. Equally, the regulation of the internal market 
as a long-runner in EU politics is the second best covered area – the revision of 
the tobacco and data protection directives as two key policy initiatives are rep-
resented with several items in the data. Not surprisingly, key new policy areas 
like ‘Health’, ‘Environment, animals and energy’ as well as ‘Justice and home 
affairs’ also feature prominently in the data. Some readers may be worried 
about the relatively weak coverage of ‘Economic and financial affairs’. Howev-
er, it has to be stressed that most of the data relates to the period before the fi-
nancial crisis reverted attention to economic and financial issues. Nevertheless, 
the data includes key policy issues from the ECOFIN Council agenda such as 
on the EU’s planned financial transaction tax, bankers’ bonuses, and the super-
vision of hedge funds.  
																													
96 See also Haverland, Ruiter, and Walle (2015), who show that most Flash Eurobarometers are 
about topics in areas of ‘shared competences’, where EU activity is still increasing. In contrast, 
areas of long-established, exclusive EU competences as well as exclusive national competences 
are less covered. 
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I conjecture that Eurobarometer questions on policy change are broadly rep-
resentative of the EU’s political agenda precisely because the Commission uses 
the survey as a ‘governance tool’ (Signorelli 2012). According to Hartlapp, 
Metz, and Rauh (2014: 234-235), it is common practice that Directorates-General 
(DGs) buy question batteries in the Eurobarometer to survey opinion on legisla-
tive files they are preparing or negotiating with the other institutions. Public 
opinion can then be used as a ‘bargaining chip’, either internally between the 
DGs, or when defending policy positions vis-à-vis the Council of the EU or the 
EP. In Appendix 4, I demonstrate that the overwhelming share of policy ques-
tions are fielded by the Commission either during the phase of policy prepara-
tion (three to five years before implementation), or in the ‘end game’ of negotia-
tions (shortly before implementation). This confirms that the questions broadly 
reflect the central agenda-setter’s policy activity. 
 
TABLE 5.1: DISTRIBUTION OF QUESTIONS ACROSS POLICY AREAS 
 Questions % Cum.% 
Constitutional affairs, agencies and enlargement 52 25.87 25.87 
Internal market and consumer protection 33 16.42 42.29 
Health 20 9.95 52.24 
Environment, animals and energy 19 9.45 61.69 
Justice and home affairs 15 7.46 69.15 
Economic and financial affairs 10 4.98 74.13 
Agriculture and rural development 9 4.48 78.61 
Research, development and space 9 4.48 83.08 
Transport, infrastructure and public safety 9 4.48 87.56 
Foreign policy, defence and neighbourhood 8 3.98 91.54 
Cohesion policy 7 3.48 95.02 
Trade and international development 7 3.48 98.51 
Other 3 1.49 100.00 
TOTAL 201 100  
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Obviously, if the Eurobarometer is a governance tool, sponsor desirability 
bias may be a problem, i.e. the Commission may try to instil biases with their 
question designs in order to receive the ‘desired answers’ (Höpner and Jurczyk 
2012, 2015). Arguably, it may be a key interest of the Commission staff to back 
policies the Commission wants to implement anyway with figures of high pub-
lic support, and therefore perceived democratic legitimacy. I therefore caution 
against interpreting any correlation between the absolute figures of support for 
policy change in the Eurobarometer and policy implementation as an indication 
of policy representation. Different question designs to survey support for the 
very same policy may yield 40, 50, or 60% support. However, I argue that rela-
tive figures of support between different geographies or social strata still pro-
vide accurate information about the relative distribution of preferences. Engi-
neering overall figures of support is much easier than manipulating the differ-
ences in support between groups. In addition, it is doubtful whether the Com-
mission has any interest in deforming relative patterns of support in a systemat-
ic way across a large number of policy issues.  
Importantly, the Eurobarometer has the strong advantage of providing pre-
cise measures of opinion on the same issues for all EU countries. Sample sizes 
per member state vary between 500-2,000 respondents, providing for small 
standard errors. This renders the widespread use of the multilevel regression 
and post-stratification (MRP) method for obtaining regional opinion measures 
redundant and circumvents well-known weaknesses of MRP (Buttice and 
Highton 2013; Toshkov 2015). In particular, MRP is weak in recovering accurate 
relative rankings of country means, which is of prime importance when as-
sessing territorial representation. To sum up, the new dataset broadly reflects 
the EU’s policy agenda and provides precise measures of relative differences in 
opinion between EU countries. 
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MAPPING OPINION AND SALIENCE ACROSS THE EU 
In the following I use the dataset to investigate the consequences of territorial 
representation for the opinion-policy linkage in the EU. As I have pointed out, 
territorial representation will only make a difference if opinion and salience 
vary substantially across countries creating inter-regional vote trading oppor-
tunities. I start by assessing to what extent this prerequisite is given. 
First, I demean country-level opinion by question item, i.e. I subtract the av-
erage support for policy change across countries (as percentage and excluding 
‘don’t know’ and refusal responses) from the specific support in each country 
(!!,!!"#"$%"& =  !!,! − !!). Hence, the variable represents positive or negative de-
viations of country-specific support from average support. This demonstrates 
that opinion on the same issue varies greatly between countries (see Table 5.2). 
The standard deviation of country-specific support is about 10.6 percentage 
points on average and almost 15 percentage points in the most contested policy 
area of ‘Constitutional affairs, agencies and enlargement’. Country opinions 
also differ strongly on the internal market and agriculture, and less so on issues 
such as cohesion, trade, and transport. More than 50% of the country opinions 
deviate more than ± 5 percentage points from mean support across countries 
and the mean range in support (most supportive minus least supportive coun-
try) is a remarkable 37 percentage points. This is evidence of striking variation 
in citizens’ support, especially when compared to the variation explained in US 
studies focusing on differences between income groups. For instance, in Gilens' 
(2012: 86-87) ‘Affluence and Influence’, the median income group deviates from 
the rich by less than 10 percentage points on more than 80% of the policies in 
his sample. 
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TABLE 5.2: VARIATION IN QUESTION-DEMEANED OPINION AND SALI-
ENCE 
 Opinion Salience  
 SD Max Min SD Max Min N 
Constitutional affairs, agencies and 
enlargement 
14.68 -44.13 45.16 7.49 -24.83 20.23 1,396 
Internal market and consumer protec-
tion 
10.15 -29.63 30.73 7.41 -35.74 24.96 883 
Health 8.46 -28.64 28.39 4.82 -26.03 23.16 526 
Environment, animals and energy 8.89 -29.23 33.72 5.19 -27.46 14.40 503 
Justice and home affairs 7.09 -23.26 20.29 5.44 -19.91 13.12 397 
Economic and financial affairs 7.91 -27.32 20.39 7.05 -32.27 15.85 226 
Agriculture and rural development 10.02 -25.78 27.92 6.02 -28.54 11.61 243 
Research, development and space 8.41 -21.47 27.98 7.66 -26.20 19.69 237 
Transport, infrastructure and public 
safety 
6.93 -40.78 18.89 3.02 -15.16 5.81 243 
Foreign policy, defence and neigh-
bourhood 
8.35 -25.92 36.96 6.79 -21.07 13.00 216 
Cohesion policy 6.41 -22.10 15.07 6.67 -32.54 19.18 189 
Trade and international development 6.74 -24.75 17.48 5.53 -17.09 10.72 183 
Other 14.26 -33.89 36.75 6.43 -19.53 15.39 77 
TOTAL 10.64 -44.13 45.16 6.52 -35.74 24.96 5,319 
 
 
Second, in line with existing literature (Brooks 1990; Gilens 2005, 2012; Page 
and Shapiro 1983) I measure the public salience of a policy issue from the frac-
tion of ‘don’t know’ and refusal responses. As Page and Shapiro (1983: 181) put 
it: ‘When the proportion of don't knows is relatively low – that is, when more 
people are willing to offer a preference – it is a sign of more public interest and 
attention and perhaps also stronger, more intensely held opinions’. Certainly, 
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this link only holds to the extent that respondents without a preference indicate 
that they ‘don’t know’ and those with a preference abstain from doing so. It is 
well-known that this is only approximately the case (for a review see Krosnick 
1999: 556-559): about 20-40% of respondents provide opinions on fictitious po-
litical issues (Bishop, Tuchfarber, and Oldendick 1986), and social norms and 
satisficing behaviour may lead respondents to report that they ‘don’t know’ 
instead of revealing or trying to access their actual preference. Yet, Gilens (2012: 
35-37) has demonstrated that the resulting distortions in ‘don’t know’ responses 
are rather small for typical policy questions. More importantly, as my main in-
terest is in differences in salience across countries and not across questions, dis-
tortions from varying question designs are of less relevance here.  
Hence, I construct a measure of salience as the percentage of preference-
revealing (support/oppose) responses (!!,! =  100− %!" +%!"#$%&' ) and its 
question-demeaned version as above (!!,!!"#"$%"& =  !!,! − !!). Like opinion, sali-
ence also varies substantially across countries with a standard deviation of 6.5 
percentage points (see Table 5.2) and a mean range between the country with 
most and least salience of 21.7 percentage points. Interestingly, EU citizens dis-
agree the least about the importance of ‘Transport, infrastructure and public 
safety’ issues and the most about ‘Research, development and space’. In each 
policy area we find observations of stark deviations from mean salience by ± 
15-35 percentage points (min/max). 
But do state representatives, in our case national governments, represent the-
se differences in opinion and salience when negotiating in the Council of the EU 
or in intergovernmental conferences? In particular, we should expect that gov-
ernments’ initial positions – before logrolls and vote-trades take place – reflect 
opinion differences. Regrettably, we have no information about governments’ 
initial positions on the policy issues in the dataset. However, what we can do is 
compare the structure of the opinion differences in this sample of issues with 
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the structure of initial negotiation positions previous work has discovered for 
other issues.  
For this purpose, I use exploratory factor analysis to uncover the latent pat-
terns of opinion differences across countries. My 25 manifest variables measure 
the question-demeaned opinions in each EU country. 97  Using the Kaiser-
Guttman criterion of an eigenvalue greater than 1, I retain five factors with the 
principal factor method on 198 observations of questions on policy change.98 
The eigenvalues and factor loadings are reported in Table 5.3. The five factors 
explain about 87% of the variation and the first two factors already sum to 61%. 
While a screeplot does not show any clear ‘elbow’, the eigenvalue of the third 
factor is less than half of the eigenvalue of the second factor. I therefore focus 
here on the interpretation of the first and the second factor.  
 
TABLE 5.3: FACTOR ANALYSIS OF COUNTRY DIFFERENCES IN OPINION 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Uniqueness 
 Eigenvalue 
6.78 
Eigenvalue 
4.23 
Eigenvalue 
2.10 
Eigenvalue 
1.56 
Eigenvalue 
1.17 
 
AT 0.749 0.116 0.025 0.270 0.150 0.330 
BE 0.636 0.215 0.180 0.172 -0.353 0.362 
CY -0.422 0.489 -0.107 0.172 0.007 0.542 
CZ -0.041 -0.120 0.694 -0.197 0.380 0.319 
DE 0.847 -0.005 0.100 0.287 -0.029 0.190 
DK 0.497 -0.528 -0.001 -0.428 0.070 0.286 
EE -0.485 -0.530 -0.211 0.283 0.166 0.332 
EL -0.109 0.552 -0.197 0.119 0.264 0.561 
																													
97 As Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in January 2007 and opinion on 33 questions is miss-
ing for these countries, I exclude them here. 
98 Three questions concerned the common currency and non-euro countries were not surveyed 
on these questions. Hence, the number of observations is 198 instead of 201 (the number of 
questions) as in all other analyses. 
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ES -0.385 0.574 0.107 -0.310 -0.308 0.320 
FI 0.568 -0.491 -0.303 0.038 0.314 0.244 
FR 0.745 0.224 0.130 0.137 -0.164 0.332 
HU -0.277 -0.007 0.569 0.078 0.114 0.581 
IE 0.112 0.542 -0.501 -0.124 0.208 0.385 
IT 0.321 0.708 -0.005 0.051 0.060 0.390 
LT -0.640 -0.326 0.051 0.311 -0.176 0.354 
LU 0.776 0.060 0.006 0.264 -0.177 0.293 
LV -0.300 -0.270 -0.319 0.532 0.095 0.443 
MT -0.601 0.067 -0.480 -0.168 -0.134 0.358 
NL 0.537 -0.478 0.199 -0.236 -0.327 0.281 
PL -0.828 -0.012 0.078 -0.157 -0.079 0.278 
PT -0.079 0.762 -0.025 -0.224 -0.098 0.353 
SE -0.016 -0.771 -0.263 -0.286 -0.148 0.233 
SI -0.463 -0.222 0.048 0.177 -0.307 0.609 
SK -0.507 0.040 0.514 0.045 0.322 0.372 
UK 0.540 0.013 -0.273 -0.406 0.254 0.404 
Notes: Principal factor method; five retained factors (eigenvalue > 1); factor loadings greater than ±0.45 in 
bold; AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; CY: Cyprus; CZ: The Czech Republic; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; FI: Fin-
land; FR: France; DE: Germany; EL: Greece; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IT: Italy; LV: Latvia; LT: Lithuania; 
LU: Luxembourg; MT: Malta; NL: The Netherlands; PL: Poland; PT: Portugal; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slovakia; 
ES: Spain; SE: Sweden; UK: The United Kingdom. 
 
Figure 5.1 plots the factor loadings for factors one and two. This shows that 
factor one captures a contrast between ‘core’ Western European member states 
(Germany, France, Belgium, Austria, and Luxembourg) and the new member 
states (in particular, Poland, Lithuania, and Malta). In turn, the second factor 
relates to a contrast between northern member states (Sweden, Denmark, Neth-
erlands, Finland, and Estonia) and southern member states (Portugal, Italy, 
Spain, and Greece, but also Ireland). Strikingly, this structure of old vs. new and 
north vs. south in opinions is exactly the same structure studies have found to 
be present in initial negotiation positions of governments in the Council of the 
EU (Plechanovova 2011; Thomson 2009, 2011c) (see Appendix 4 for details).99 
																													
99 In Appendix 4, I discuss favoured policy changes that are associated with extremity on each 
factor. This confirms that the opinion conflicts between new vs. old and north vs. south are also 
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This suggests that state representatives do indeed represent broad opinion pat-
terns in EU policy-making (see also Hagemann, Hobolt, and Wratil 2016). 
 
FIGURE 5.1: THE EU’S PUBLIC OPINION SPACE 
 
Notes: Factor loadings for factors one and two. AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; CY: Cyprus; CZ: The Czech Re-
public; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; FI: Finland; FR: France; DE: Germany; EL: Greece; HU: Hungary; IE: 
Ireland; IT: Italy; LV: Latvia; LT: Lithuania; LU: Luxembourg; MT: Malta; NL: The Netherlands; PL: Po-
land; PT: Portugal; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slovakia; ES: Spain; SE: Sweden; UK: The United Kingdom. 
 
ASSESSING RESPONSIVENESS AND CONGRUENCE 
Having provided evidence for the central prerequisites for any influence of 
territorial representation, I ascertain whether the opinion-policy linkage is af-
fected as predicted by my hypotheses about responsiveness and congruence 
(H1 and H2).  																																																																																																																																																																		
similar in substance to those known from Council studies relying on initial positions of gov-
ernments.    
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Responsiveness 
In a first step, I investigate responsiveness by modelling the probability of 
policy change using the binary implementation measure as the dependent vari-
able. In order to see whether the probability of policy change increases with 
public support in those countries that view the issue as most salient, I create a 
measure that is the simple average of opinion in the five (and as an alternative: 
ten) countries with the lowest share of don’t know (DK) or refusal responses on 
a question. 
As opinion correlates across countries, a significant effect of this measure of 
most salient opinion on the probability of policy change could be caused by a 
confounding alternative of opinion. It is therefore advisable to compare this 
measure to its theoretical alternatives. Hence, following a ‘placebo logic’ I con-
struct a second opinion measure that is the simple average of opinion in the five 
(ten) countries with the lowest salience on a question (least salient opinion). As 
representatives of these countries should sell their vote on low salience issues, 
the measure should clearly do worse in predicting policy change than that of 
countries with high salience. As a second potential confounder I consider sim-
ple survey-weighted EU-wide opinion. If territorial representation makes a dif-
ference to the opinion-policy linkage, a measure correcting for salience and an 
equal distribution of power should outperform average opinion. 
I control for two factors that are likely to influence the baseline probability of 
policy change. First, I include factor variables for the EU competence in imple-
menting the policy issue (‘Mixed competence’, ‘Mainly EU competence’, as op-
posed to ‘Mainly national competence’ as reference category), as I expect that 
EU level implementation is more likely with clear competences at that govern-
ance level. Second, I expect that policy issues on which the member state repre-
sentatives can only agree policy change with unanimous agreement are less 
likely to be implemented. To test this, I include factor variables for the decision 
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rule (‘Unanimity’, ‘Unclear decision rule’, as opposed to ‘QMV’ as reference 
category).100  
As some policy issues were surveyed more than once and hence questions as 
implementation opportunities are nested within policy issues, I use logistic re-
gressions with a random intercept at the policy issue level.101 Results are report-
ed in Table 5.4. Model R1 and Model R2 compare opinion in the five (ten in R2) 
countries for whom the issue is most salient to the five (ten in R2) countries for 
whom the issue is least salient. The coefficient on most salient opinion is posi-
tive and highly statistically significant in Model R1 and close to significance in 
Model R2, with a p-value of 0.065. In turn, the coefficient on least salient opin-
ion is indistinguishable from zero in both models. Hence, as expected, most sa-
lient opinion is clearly a better predictor of policy change than least salient 
opinion, and the EU system is more responsive to those publics that care about 
an issue than to those that do not. 
 
																													
100 Interestingly, the results on the decision rule are in an unexpected direction, as unanimity 
increases the probability of policy change. An interpretation of this effect is provided in Ap-
pendix 4. 
101 As only 29 policy issues were asked more than once, clustering is only partial (i.e. most of the 
level-two ‘groups’ are singletons containing one observation only). Estimates of level-two vari-
ance components are likely biased in such settings but are of little substantive interest here. In 
contrast, the estimation of level-one fixed effects, in our case the public opinion variables, has 
been shown to be mainly unaffected by modelling choices regarding partial clustering (Bell et 
al. 2010; Bell, Ferron, and Kromrey 2008; Clarke and Wheaton 2007). The choice of a multilevel 
model is therefore justified theoretically to acknowledge clustering but may not provide any 
empirical leverage here. Estimating a pooled logistic regression yields almost identical results 
(stronger findings in Model R2 and weaker in Model R6). 
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TABLE 5.4: RESPONSIVENESS OF POLICY TO PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR POLICY CHANGE 
 Model R1 Model R2 Model R3 Model R4 Model R5 Model R6 
Most salient opinion (five/ten countries) 0.429 0.353 0.416 0.371 0.406 0.407 
 (0.114)*** (0.185)* (0.128)*** (0.154)** (0.175)** (0.244)* 
Least salient opinion (five/ten countries) -0.146 -0.107 -0.093 -0.043   
 (0.108) (0.132) (0.136) (0.148)   
EU-wide opinion     -0.118 -0.118 
     (0.171) (0.239) 
Mixed competence 9.790 9.147 3.244 3.591 9.866 8.802 
 (3.504)*** (3.887)** (3.829) (3.931) (2.716)*** (3.520)** 
Mainly EU competence 11.910 10.675 12.342 11.552 11.954 12.703 
 (4.058)*** (4.640)** (4.831)** (4.695)** (3.523)*** (4.550)*** 
Unclear decision rule -0.797 -0.693 -0.669 1.335 -0.750 -0.140 
 (3.443) (3.495) (5.394) (4.075) (2.996) (5.865) 
Unanimity 7.321 6.425 13.505 12.265 6.732 8.187 
 (3.503)** (3.511)* (6.024)** (4.149)*** (2.669)** (3.386)** 
Constant -36.061 -31.732 -38.029 -36.611 -36.518 -37.322 
 (9.063)*** (11.562)*** (14.206)*** (15.449)** (7.253)*** (12.769)*** 
Random effect Policy issues Policy issues Policy issues Policy issues Policy issues Policy issues 
Number of policy issues 167 167 79 79 167 167 
N 201 201 96 96 201 201 
Log-likelihood -87.91 -89.61 -40.66 -41.43 -87.95 -90.01 
Notes: All are mixed effects logistic regressions; Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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One problem with testing effects of territorial representation on the sample 
of all policy issues is that for about half of all issues the majority of citizens in 
all EU countries agreed on whether they favoured change or the status quo (de-
spite substantial variations in the levels of support). On such ‘consensus issues’ 
we should not actually observe much effect of any intra-regional bargaining, as 
purely re-election motivated representatives should universally agree on such 
issues. Instead, ‘conflict issues’ on which national opinion majorities were split 
between change and the status quo should provide the strongest evidence for 
the consequences of territorial representation. In Model R3 and Model R4 
(five/ten countries) I demonstrate that results hold and even slightly increase in 
statistical significance if the sample is restricted to such conflict issues.102 
Next, I check whether most salient opinion is a better predictor of policy 
change than EU-wide opinion. The results in Model R5 and Model R6 (five/ten 
countries) are affirmative: opinion in countries that care most about an issue is a 
statistically significant predictor of policy change even if we control for EU-
wide opinion that has a negative sign and is far from any statistical significance 
in both models.103 In sum, these results strongly support H1 that policy change 
occurs the greater the public support in those countries that care about an issue. 																													
102 Note that correlated measurement error of the two opinion variables used in each model 
may cause attenuation of coefficients and incidental sign switches (Achen 1985). This is particu-
larly likely if the two opinion variables are very highly correlated (Bashir 2015), which is the 
case in Model R1 and Model R2 (i.e. correlation > 0.9). Importantly, this correlation is much 
smaller in the sample of conflict issues (i.e. about 0.67 to 0.69). This renders the results in Model 
R3 and Model R4 particularly reliable.  
103 As EU-wide opinion and most salient opinion are very highly correlated (i.e. > 0.9), the re-
sults should be interpreted with caution (see footnote [101]). Certainly, even if average EU-wide 
opinion had some significant effect on policy change, this would not contradict the argument, 
as territorial representation renders the geographical distribution of salience and opinion rele-
vant – but does not necessarily make average opinion irrelevant. 
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Moreover, they also show that this is not driven by any correlation between 
salient opinion and EU-wide average opinion. In fact, territorial representation 
in the EU has a clear, independent effect on the opinion-policy linkage. 
 
Congruence 
In a second step, I investigate congruence between EU-level policies and the 
opinion of the majority of citizens in individual member states. The binary de-
pendent variable is ‘1’ if either the opinion majority in a country was against 
policy change and the status quo prevailed, or the opinion majority was in fa-
vour of policy change and this change occurred. In turn, it is ‘0’ if the opinion 
majority opposed change which nevertheless occurred, or desired change that 
did not occur. This yields over 5,000 observations of opinion-policy dyads and 
reveals that EU-level policy and national opinion were congruent in about 56% 
of the cases.  
Following hypothesis H2 that congruence becomes more likely as the opin-
ion majority in a country and the salience citizens attach to the issue increase, 
the main interest is in an interaction effect of these two independent variables.104 
Opinion majority size measures the amount by which the opinion majority ex-
ceeded 50% support for either policy change or no change and is constructed as !!,! − 50% . In turn, salience is operationalised as above, exploiting DK and re-																													
104 Lax and Phillips (2012) argue that the opinion majority size and salience should have inde-
pendent, direct effects on congruence. If I do not include the interaction term, I do find a highly 
significant effect of the opinion majority size but not of salience on congruence. However, theo-
retically the case for an interaction effect is more plausible than for direct effects, since the inter-
action of both defines representatives’ pay-offs from congruence (see equation (1)). Direct ef-
fects may be especially unlikely under territorial representation, as representatives cannot di-
rectly implement policy (as US state governments can), but have to focus on a few high pay-off 
issues they can influence through logrolling. 
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fusal responses. All models include interaction terms of the two variables. In 
parallel to the analysis of responsiveness, I use dummies for EU competence 
and decision rule as control variables. Given that the observations are now clus-
tered in countries as well as in policy issues, I use mixed effects logistic regres-
sions with fixed effects for countries (implemented with dummy variables) and 
a random intercept on the level of policy issues. 
The results are reported in Table 5.5. The baseline Model C1 shows that there 
is indeed evidence for a strong interaction effect between opinion majority size 
and salience. The relevant coefficient is positive and statistically significant (at 
the 5% level). This supports the theoretical idea that representatives will jointly 
consider the opinion majority and the salience of the issue, and engage in nego-
tiation exchanges to bring about congruent policy-making on issues for which 
the product of both is big. As in the responsiveness analysis, we have to check 
whether this result could potentially be driven by another form of opinion high-
ly correlated with country-level opinion and salience. The obvious, remaining 
candidate is the EU-wide version of both. If EU policy-making exclusively re-
acts to an EU-wide average, country-level opinion and salience may still look as 
if they had an impact on congruence, simply because they are correlated with 
EU-wide opinion and salience. Hence, in Model C2 I include a second interac-
tion term that is made up of the EU-wide opinion majority size and salience of 
an issue. The results show that the interaction term between country-level opin-
ion majority size and salience remains positive and statistically significant. 
Moreover, the interaction term of the EU-wide average measures is indistin-
guishable from zero, indicating that overall majority sizes and salience are irrel-
evant to congruence after having accounted for country-level opinion majorities 
and salience.  
 
 
		 	182	
TABLE 5.5: CONGRUENCE OF POLICY WITH COUNTRY-LEVEL OPINION 
 Model C1 Model C2 Model C3 
Opinion majority size -0.098 -0.090 -0.106 
 (0.056)* (0.056) (0.060)* 
Salience -0.012 -0.009 -0.014 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Opinion majority size x Salience 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** 
EU-wide opinion majority size  0.342  
  (0.366)  
EU-wide salience  0.042  
  (0.076)  
EU-wide opinion majority size x EU-wide salience  -0.003  
  (0.004)  
Mixed competence 2.729 3.345  
 (0.974)*** (1.073)***  
Mainly EU competence 1.728 2.554  
 (1.175) (1.274)**  
Unclear decision rule -0.217 0.303  
 (0.613) (0.636)  
Unanimity -0.322 0.623  
 (0.710) (0.776)  
Constant -0.497 -7.227 3.640 
 (1.639) (7.098) (1.647)** 
Fixed effects Countries Countries Questions,  
Countries 
Random effects Policy  
issues 
Policy  
issues 
 
Number of policy issues 167 167 167 
Number of countries 27 27 27 
N 5,319 5,319 2,554 
Log-likelihood -1544.86 -1540.51 -1213.56 
Notes: All are mixed effects logistic regressions, except for ‘Model C3’ which is fixed only;  
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
In order to entirely rule out EU-wide average opinion and salience or any 
other question-level confounders as causes of the results, I re-estimate the first 
congruence model adding fixed effects for questions (instead of a random effect 
for policy issues) in Model C3. This estimator is therefore only capturing effects 
from within-country, within-question variation. Implementing this estimator 
leads to complete separation for questions on which the opinion majorities 
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across all countries were either uniformly supporting change or the status quo. 
Hence, the resulting sample is made up of conflict issues only (compare Model 
R3 and Model R4 in Table 5.4). It is therefore exactly the sample on which we 
expect the territorial representation effects to unfold most clearly through log-
rolling. In line with this, the results provide for the highest coefficient on the 
central interaction term across the three models estimated. Recall that in a pure-
ly naïve model of the opinion-policy linkage focusing on polity-wide averages 
we should not observe any effects of country-level opinion or salience on con-
gruence, once we have removed all between-question variation with fixed ef-
fects. This confirms the central thesis of this paper that territorial representation 
has significant consequences for the opinion-policy linkage. 
In Figure 5.2 I plot the predicted probability of congruence depending on 
opinion majority size at different levels of salience estimated from Model C3. 
This demonstrates that when public salience is low (e.g. 15-25% DK/refusal), the 
probability of congruence is around 50%, irrespective of opinion. But if a policy 
issue is important to the national public (e.g. 0-10% DK/refusal), the probability 
of congruence increases from around 50% to about 65-75%, as the opinion ma-
jority increases from just about 50% to 95%. Unreported results show that the 
opinion majority size exerts a statistically significant marginal effect on congru-
ence when the fraction of DK/refusal is ≤ 17%. This is the case for 72% of the 
observations in the sample of conflict issues.  
In substantive terms this indicates that for around 28% of the policies that are 
least salient to the national public, the probability of congruence is largely de-
coupled from opinion on the issue. However, on the remaining more salient 
policies, a greater majority in opinion significantly increases the probability of 
congruence between national public opinion and EU-level policies. The magni-
tude of this effect is about 2-6 percentage points increase in the predicted prob-
ability of congruence for 10 percentage points increase in the opinion majority. 
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Hence, the results provide strong support for hypothesis H2, as congruence is 
more likely with a greater opinion majority and higher salience. 
 
FIGURE 5.2: INTERACTION BETWEEN OPINION MAJORITY SIZE AND 
PUBLIC SALIENCE 
Notes: 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines. 
 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
I test the robustness of the results with regard to a number of critical issues. 
The two most important checks are reported in this section (see Table 5.6); sev-
eral more can be found in Appendix 4.  
First, I challenge my assumption from the theory section that bargaining 
power in EU policy-making is roughly equally distributed among national gov-
ernments. If this assumption was significantly wrong, !! would no longer be 
analytically irrelevant in inequalities (2) and (3).  
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TABLE 5.6: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON CONGRUENCE ANALYSIS 
 Model RC1 Model RC2 
Opinion majority size -0.068 0.029 
 (0.100) (0.275) 
Salience 0.017 -0.087 
 (0.020) (0.051)* 
Votes 0.141  
 (0.116)  
Opinion majority size x Salience 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.003) 
Opinion majority size x Votes -0.005  
 (0.007)  
Salience x Votes -0.001  
 (0.001)  
Opinion majority size x Salience x Votes 0.000  
 (0.000)  
Implementation lag  -0.003 
  (0.003) 
Opinion majority size x Implementation lag  -0.000 
  (0.000) 
Salience x Implementation lag  0.000 
  (0.000) 
Opinion majority size x Salience x Implementation lag  0.000 
  (0.000) 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Questions Countries 
Random effects Countries Policy issues 
Number of questions 96 67 
Number of countries 27 27 
N 2,554 1,789 
Log-likelihood -1239.09 -348.12 
Notes: Both are mixed effects logistic regressions; Standard errors in parentheses;  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
Instead, the effects of salience and opinion would likely vary with bargaining 
power. Therefore, I consider the most prominent alternative to the equal distri-
bution of power, namely a regressive distribution (according to the number of 
votes per country), which is usually the second-best performing distribution in 
tests of different variants of the Nash bargaining solution in Council negotia-
tions (see Thomson 2011b). Model RC1 demonstrates that including a three-way 
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interaction between the opinion majority size, salience, and the number of a 
country’s votes in the Council (e.g. 29 votes for Germany, France, UK, and Italy, 
and only three votes for Malta) does not yield any statistically significant terms 
in the congruence analysis. Similarly, in the responsiveness analysis a vote-
weighted version of most salient opinion does not perform better than the non-
weighted version (see Appendix 4). Hence, we have no evidence that differ-
ences in formal voting weights affect the opinion-policy linkage in the EU.  
Second, I address concerns about the direction of causality in the opinion-
policy linkage. If national governments are able to anticipate negotiation out-
comes at the EU level years ahead of implementation, they could potentially 
send cues to their national public to influence opinion in a direction that is con-
sistent with the expected outcome (e.g. to increase the attention or interest of 
the public regarding issues that will be implemented in their favour). Govern-
ments could more influence opinion than being influenced by it. A problem for 
this endogeneity story is the time lag between the survey fieldwork and the im-
plementation date. The longer the lapse of time, the less likely it is that the gov-
ernment in office during survey fieldwork a) can anticipate the eventual negoti-
ation outcome at the EU level, and b) has an incentive to manipulate opinion, as 
it may be replaced in due course. Restricting the sample to the 30% of issues on 
which change occurred (and we therefore know the time lapse), Model RC2 
shows that there is no impact of the implementation lag on the congruence 
analysis. If elite manipulation explained the correlation between opinion and 
salience at the state level and EU-level policy, we would expect this correlation 
to be particularly strong if the time lag between the survey and policy imple-
mentation is short. The data provides no evidence for this.105  
																													
105 As the implementation time is only known if policy change occurs, no related robustness 
check could be performed for the responsiveness analysis. For defences of the causality assump-
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CONCLUSION 
I have argued that strong territorial representation arrangements in federal 
systems modify the way in which policy responds to opinion. Where opinion 
on and salience of policies varies starkly across geographies, and state or con-
stituency representatives have considerable power in policy-making, logrolls 
and vote-trades may take place that redistribute influence to sub-national pub-
lics on an issue-by-issue basis. The publics to which policy-making will respond 
and be most congruent with are typically those that care a lot about the issue 
and have a clear opinion on it. My analyses of 167 policy issues (and 201 im-
plementation opportunities) in EU policy-making provide strong empirical evi-
dence for this argument. While I do not directly observe the exchanging of 
votes between territorial representatives, but rely on substantial evidence of it 
from existing studies (e.g. Achen 2006a; Aksoy 2012), patterns of responsive-
ness and congruence strongly follow a territorial logic. 
The findings contribute to our substantial knowledge about the role that sali-
ence plays for the opinion-policy linkage (Burstein 2006; Jacobs and Shapiro 
2000; Lax and Phillips 2009, 2012; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Wlezien 2004). In 
particular, they highlight that the popular notion that higher polity-wide salience 
means higher responsiveness and congruence to polity-wide opinion may be too sim-
plistic under territorial representation, even if it may often hold by coincidence. 
Instead, the findings stress the importance of the distribution of salience and 
opinion across constituencies, and they suggest that wherever the two are 
strongly (negatively or positively) correlated, territorial representation may 
lead to unexpected results. Representatives that fully and only comply with 
their regional electoral mandates may pass policies that are not favoured by the 
average citizen and reject policies that are favoured. Certainly, this should not 																																																																																																																																																																		
tion pertaining to very similar datasets see also the online appendix in Lax and Phillips (2012) 
and Gilens (2012: 93-96). 
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suggest that average opinion and salience have no impact under territorial rep-
resentation, but rather that their effects are complemented by their sub-national 
equivalents. 
This work also contributes to the small but growing literature on the opin-
ion-policy linkage in the EU (e.g. Bølstad 2015; Toshkov 2011). It is the first as-
sessment of policy representation on the level of actual, substantive, and specif-
ic policies, while previous studies were confined to investigating patterns in 
rough aggregate measures of policy such as the number of legislative acts. The 
results challenge the widely held view that the EU system is largely unrespon-
sive to public sentiment (e.g. Føllesdal and Hix 2006). The evidence presented 
rather suggests that while territorial representation may modify the opinion-
policy linkage in the EU, a particular sort of representative logic is at play. 
Viewed in conjunction with previous findings on the equal distribution of pow-
er in the Council, the results create an image of EU politics that starkly differs 
from a German or Franco-German dominated union. Instead, each national 
public has an effective chance for representation depending on relative prefer-
ence intensity. 
As I have pointed out, the EU case is a ‘most likely case’ for the impact of ter-
ritorial representation, especially as it lacks a fully integrated party system. This 
poses the question of the generalisability of these findings. From my perspec-
tive, US federal policy-making is arguably the case with the next highest likeli-
hood of a significant impact of territorial representation. The Senate (but to 
some extent also the House) provides for strong representation of territorial 
interests, logrolling is a common feature of negotiations in Congress (Koford 
1982; Stratmann 1992, 1995), and the party system is much less integrated than 
in most Western European federations. In addition, the polarisation of US poli-
tics which we have seen during the last years may have further contributed to 
substantial opinion and salience differences across the states. Yet, substantial 
further work is needed to ascertain whether territorial representation only af-
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fects the opinion-policy linkage under rather special conditions (the EU case), or 
whether this also applies to some of the most studied democracies. 
The question of the normative implications of territorial representation dy-
namics in the opinion-policy linkage should also be addressed in more depth. 
Most importantly, wherever we apply a model of polity-wide median voter 
representation as a yardstick to evaluate democracy (McDonald and Budge 
2005; Powell 2000), territorial representation will potentially confound our find-
ings. While in the literature on federalism the ‘demos-constraining’ quality of 
unit representation in territorial chambers and supermajoritarian decision rules 
are well-acknowledged (Stepan 1999), the representation literature has engaged 
less with the consequences: should we assess policy representation in strong 
federal systems entirely on the basis of polity-wide averages? Or do we have to 
develop assessment criteria that do more justice to territorial logics? The sug-
gestions I make in this respect (responsiveness to most salient opinion and con-
gruence between constituency-level opinion and federal level policy) are pre-
liminary and need more normatively informed advancements. A crucial aspect 
in the development of more suitable assessment criteria may be the conditions 
under which territorial representation leads to Pareto-efficient outcomes, some-
thing which has been subject to intense discussion from the viewpoint of the 
central logrolling mechanism (e.g. Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Coleman 1966; 
Koehler 1975; Riker and Brams 1973; Schwartz 1977). 
		 	 190	
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Citizen Representation and Popular Legitimacy in the Eu-
ropean Union 
 
 
 
O WHAT EXTENT, UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS, AND IN WHAT WAY DO PUBLIC 
preferences influence policy-making in the EU? This broad research 
question has been addressed from different angles by the four papers of this 
thesis. As argued in the introduction, this question is highly relevant for the 
debate on the EU’s alleged democratic deficit. Therefore, in this conclusion I 
first discuss the contributions and limitations of the thesis in light of the demo-
cratic deficit debate. Second, I consider the relationship between representation 
and legitimacy, and explore whether better citizen representation on the ‘do-
mestic route’ is likely to increase the popular legitimacy of the EU. Third, I 
briefly highlight the broader contributions of the thesis to research in the fields 
of representation and coalition politics. Fourth, I point to key areas and tasks for 
future research on citizen representation in the EU. 
 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT DEBATE 
The papers of this thesis demonstrate surprising patterns of citizen represen-
tation in EU policy-making with regard to the three assessment criteria tested.  
 
T 
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Key contributions 
First, Paper 3 provides strong evidence for mandate fulfilment by national 
governments in the Council. Ministers of particular national governments 
adopt negotiation positions on legislative proposals that reflect the central eco-
nomic left-right ideology promised by their domestic supporting parties in their 
election manifestos. However, this pattern of mandate fulfilment is only statisti-
cally significant if governments rely on strong executive coordination in EU 
affairs and, in the case of minority governments, it further hinges on parliamen-
tary oversight in EU affairs. According to Kassim (2013), only 14 of the EU-27 
member states have developed structures of centralised executive coordination 
in EU affairs.106 Hence, on the basis of the evidence provided, we must infer that 
significant mandate fulfilment is only realised by governments of these coun-
tries, or at least, that the extent of mandate fulfilment realised by them is signif-
icantly greater.  
Second, Papers 1, 2, and 4 provide strong evidence for various forms of re-
sponsiveness on the part of national governments in the Council as well as in 
final EU policy output. On legislative issues concerning left-right ideological 
conflicts, governments adopt negotiation positions that reflect domestic public 
opinion, and responsiveness is higher with majoritarian electoral systems and 
peaks before elections. On legislative issues concerning conflicts over pro-anti 
integration, governments are not responsive in general but only when domestic 
opposition parties or EU-related events heighten the salience of EU integration. 
Then, governments consider public opinion when adopting negotiation posi-
tions or voting on such issues in the Council. According to these findings, we 
																													
106 Denmark as the EU country with regular minority governments relies on strong executive 
coordination as well as strong parliamentary oversight in EU affairs. The count of 14 is there-
fore also accurate when considering the role of parliamentary oversight under minority rule. 
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should expect particularly strong responsiveness from the French and UK gov-
ernments on left-right issues due to their SMD electoral systems, and from cab-
inets in countries like Denmark or Ireland on pro-anti integration issues due to 
their frequent EU referendums. In addition, Paper 4 demonstrates that EU-level 
policy output is most responsive to the opinion of those national publics that 
care intensely about a policy issue.  
Third, Paper 4 provides strong evidence that the level of congruence between 
EU-level policies and country-level opinion increases with the size of the na-
tional opinion majority and the salience national publics attach to the issue. One 
direct implication that follows is that wherever EU issues are politicised in the 
sense that they enjoy public resonance, salience, and audience expansion (de 
Wilde 2011; de Wilde, Leupold, and Schmidtke 2016), the chance of congruence 
should increase. Clearly, when the preferences of citizens differ starkly between 
member states and the issue is equally salient across the EU, there is a real 
trade-off in citizen representation, as congruence for one half is incongruence 
for the other. But the evidence from Paper 4 shows that where the salience of a 
policy varies across the EU, the more ‘politicised publics’ with regard to the 
issue are more likely to get represented. 
 
Implications for the ‘standard version’ of the democratic deficit 
These findings have major implications for the debate on the EU’s democrat-
ic deficit, in which claims about citizen representation are major contested is-
sues. Importantly, they speak to four of the five elements of the so-called 
‘standard version’ of the democratic deficit thesis, which are 1) executive domi-
nance in EU affairs, 2) the institutional weakness of the EP, 3) the lack of ‘truly’ 
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European elections, 4) the EU’s distance to its voters, and 5) policy drift from 
voters’ preferences (see Føllesdal and Hix 2006: 534-537).107 
 First, the findings provide evidence with regard to the first element, which is 
exemplified by claims that ‘European integration has meant an increase in ex-
ecutive power and a decrease in national parliamentary control’ (Føllesdal and 
Hix 2006: 534). The major concern behind this criticism pertains to the image of 
uncontrolled executives (and their top bureaucrats) who use their wide discre-
tion in Brussels to drift away from their electoral mandates. On the one hand, 
the evidence presented in Paper 3 supports this suspicion with regard to the 
criterion of mandate fulfilment. In countries without executive coordination (or, 
for minority governments, parliamentary oversight) in EU affairs, we find no 
systematic relationship between the electoral programmes of the parties sup-
porting the government and ministers’ adopted policy positions. Ministers 
seem able to drift away from their mandates in such contexts. On the other 
hand, the findings stress that ministerial drift is not inevitable: if countries rely 
on executive and legislative institutional innovations in EU affairs, these institu-
tions effectively constrain ministers to adopt policy positions reflecting central 
government ideology as promised in parties’ manifestos. The thesis therefore 
provides evidence for the relevance of the executive power claim, but at the 
same time points to institutional innovations as effective remedies.  
In this respect, it is important to note that the evidence suggests that majority 
governments, in particular, rely more strongly on executive institutions than on 
																													
107 Throughout, I refer to the standard version of the democratic deficit as presented in Føllesdal 
and Hix (2006). In later work, Hix (2008) presents the standard version slightly differently by 
merging components two (weak EP) and three (second-order European elections) and introduc-
ing a new component three (lack of electoral contest for EU political office). It is important to be 
aware that while Føllesdal and Hix (2006) present the standard arguments, they only partially 
agree with them (see also Hix 2008: 72-76). 
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legislative institutions to limit ministerial drift and negotiate compromises. In 
contrast, the existing academic literature as well as the EU’s constitutional pro-
cess have paid most attention to the role of national parliaments (e.g. Goetz and 
Meyer-Sahling 2008; Raunio 1999; Winzen 2013) and considered them potential 
cornerstones for democratisation (e.g. Auel 2007; Bellamy and Kröger 2014; 
Rizzuto 2003). I suggest that while parliaments may be important for tackling 
other aspects of the democratic deficit, the oversight institutions which current-
ly exist may be dispensable for the specific problem of spatial policy drift, ex-
cept for the rare cases of minority rule. Executive coordination proves empiri-
cally more effective in limiting policy drift in mandate fulfilment and substi-
tutes for parliamentary oversight under majority rule. The findings therefore 
suggest that scholars and, indeed, policy-makers should pay more attention to 
how executive institutions can improve citizen representation in EU affairs, for 
instance, through intra- and inter-party monitoring. 
Second, the findings, if less directly, also speak to the second and third ele-
ments of the standard version: the institutional weakness of the EP and the lack 
of ‘truly European’ elections (Føllesdal and Hix 2006: 535-536). In terms of the 
chain of policy representation (see Introduction, Figure 1.1), these points essen-
tially stress that the European route of policy representation – connecting citi-
zens with EU policy-making through European elections, the EP and the Com-
mission – is largely dysfunctional. While the empirical accuracy of this claim is 
well corroborated,108 liberal intergovernmentalist sceptics of the democratic def-
icit thesis have insisted that the deficiencies of the European route can be com-
pensated by the domestic route (Moravcsik 2002). According to their analysis, 
‘the most fundamental source of the EU’s legitimacy lies in the democratic ac-
																													
108 This applies particularly to the claim regarding the second-order nature of European elec-
tions (e.g. Hix and Marsh 2008; Reif and Schmitt 1980). 
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countability of national governments’, which connect citizens with EU policy-
making through national elections and the Council (Moravcsik 2002: 619).  
Major advocates of the democratic deficit thesis have acknowledged that 
‘[i]ndirect control via national governments certainly provides some control 
over EU policy outcomes’ (Føllesdal and Hix 2006: 544). However, they remain 
critical of whether a system of representation relying almost exclusively on the 
domestic route is ‘sufficiently responsive to the best interests of voters’ 
(Føllesdal and Hix 2006: 545). In particular, they suspect that any relationship 
between EU policies and citizens’ preferences may be more a result of ‘happy 
coincidence’ than of reliable mechanisms of democratic accountability 
(Føllesdal and Hix 2006: 556). In their view, EU policy-makers may be ‘benevo-
lent but non-accountable rulers’, acting broadly in line with citizens’ prefer-
ences, but with no mechanism ensuring their or their successors’ future respon-
siveness (Føllesdal and Hix 2006: 545). Such a governance mode of ‘benevolent 
authoritarianism’ is observationally hard to distinguish from a ‘fully-
democratic majoritarian’ mode (Føllesdal and Hix 2006: 545), particularly if citi-
zens’ preferences change little due to a lack of deliberation and party contesta-
tion on EU issues. Then, what appears to be responsiveness to the people might 
merely be the outcome of coincidentally representative elite bargains. 
The findings of the thesis challenge the notion of benevolent authoritarian-
ism in important respects. Paper 1 provides evidence that national governments 
do not behave as typical benevolent rulers in the EU setting, particularly not 
with regard to left-right issues. If national governments were simply benevolent 
rulers, we would expect their policy positions to correlate almost invariably 
with citizens’ preferences. But the findings of the paper show that correlations 
are much stronger before national elections and in SMD electoral systems. This 
indicates that not happy coincidence but reliable mechanisms of electoral ac-
countability make national governments systematically consider citizens’ pref-
erences in Brussels. Moreover, Papers 1, 2, and 4 all highlight that policy posi-
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tions as well as final policy output correlate more strongly with citizens’ prefer-
ences whenever EU issues are publicly salient and are politicised by parties or 
EU-related events. It is under these very conditions that we would expect citi-
zens’ preferences on EU policy-making to be in flux and to be changed by pub-
lic deliberation and contestation. That such conditions are simultaneously asso-
ciated with stronger and not weaker correlations between policy-making and 
citizens’ preferences suggests a minimum level of responsiveness instead of 
pure coincidence. 
Interestingly, this has mixed implications for the second and third compo-
nent of the standard version of the democratic deficit. On the one hand, the 
findings provide evidence for the liberal intergovernmentalist claim that de-
spite the weakness of the EP, EU policy-making is already in its current state, at 
least somewhat, ‘responsive to the demands of European citizens’ (Moravcsik 
2002: 605). The domestic route of policy representation is more effective than is 
often claimed. On the other hand, the findings also support the proposal by a 
prominent advocate of the deficit thesis that politicisation can help to fix the 
EU’s democracy problem (Hix 2008), at least in terms of strengthening citizen 
representation. But whereas politicisation is often associated with first-order 
European elections and political contests over top jobs in the EU institutions, i.e. 
the European route to representation, the thesis stresses that the public reso-
nance of integration will also make the domestic route more effective.  
Lastly, the findings also have implications for the fifth component of the 
standard version: the claim that the EU produces ‘’policy drift’ from voters’ 
ideal policy preferences’ to the extent that policies ‘are not supported by a ma-
jority of citizens in many or even most Member States’ (Føllesdal and Hix 2006: 
537). While I have indicated that my novel dataset presented in Paper 4 might 
not be perfectly suited to assessing absolute levels of representation, it is the 
first dataset available that allows us to check the policy drift claim beyond an-
ecdotal evidence. Hence, while the following numbers on policy drift should be 
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read with caution, they are presumably the most rigorous evidence available. 
When the EU adopted a policy change after Eastern enlargement and had pre-
viously surveyed citizens’ opinion on the issue, change was congruent with 
opinion in the majority of member states for more than 90% of adopted policies. 
For about 80% of adopted policies, change was congruent with opinion in at 
least 20 member states. Indeed, incongruence primarily occurred when the EU 
did not adopt policies but retained the status quo. In about 65% of those cases, 
the citizens in a majority of member states would have preferred change. 
Hence, we can tentatively conclude that during the last decade the EU has been 
drifting away from citizens’ preferences due to a status quo bias rather than 
policy activism.  
In fact, Føllesdal and Hix (2006: 545) have acknowledged that policy drift 
may be limited and granted that ‘policy outcomes from the EU may be relative-
ly close to some abstract European-wide ‘median voter’’. In this respect, Paper 4 
demonstrates that rather than representing an EU-wide median voter, EU poli-
cies are most responsive to and congruent with the views of those national pub-
lics that care about an issue, i.e. the ‘salient national median voter’. According 
to the argument in the paper, this is probably caused by dynamics of logrolling 
between territorial representatives. It is therefore most likely to be a conse-
quence of the dominance of the domestic route to representation in the EU. 
Whilst this is hard to anticipate, several arguments suggest that strengthening 
the European route of representation, as advocated by some (e.g. Hix 2008), 
would realign EU policy representation from the salient national median voter 
to the EU-wide median voter. In particular, a strong, agenda-shaping Commis-
sion appointed and elected on the basis of the results of EU-wide elections has 
clear incentives to consider the EU-wide median voter, instead of the median 
voters in countries with salient opinion (see also Hartlapp, Metz, and Rauh 
2014, Chapter 9).   
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Cautionary notes regarding two limitations 
Two important limitations of the findings should be stressed with regard to 
these implications. First, throughout the thesis it has often been difficult to 
characterise and assess the exact extent or magnitude of representation. While 
the thesis enacts the crucial shift from studies that simply count directives (e.g. 
Bølstad 2015; Toshkov 2011; de Vries and Arnold 2011) to the assessment of the 
substantive content of policy-making, it often pays a price for this. On the one 
hand, forcing data on diverse legislative substances into single summative issue 
dimensions to make them comparable for analysis often leads to rather opaque 
interpretations of the magnitude of effects. What does a movement of 10 scale 
points on the DEU policy scale really mean in a real-world context (see Papers 1 
and 3)? Is this ‘a lot’ or ‘a little’? On the other hand, where I have been able to 
use measurement concepts with a more straightforward interpretation, such as 
issue-specific congruence of opinion and policy (see Paper 4), I faced re-
strictions from the data-generating process. Is an average rate of congruent pol-
icy change of 56% a lot given that the Commission selected the policy issues? 
Second and partly as a consequence of this, the findings of the thesis are lack-
ing in comparability between EU-level and national representation. If we apply 
citizen representation as a nation state standard of democratic legitimacy to the 
EU, it is of obvious interest to compare the EU’s performance to that of national 
systems (see also Wimmel 2009; Zweifel 2002). However, as studies use very 
different data sources and effect magnitudes are hard to interpret (see above), it 
is virtually impossible to precisely compare the extent of EU representation to 
the extent of representation found by studies of national systems. I therefore 
cannot answer the question of whether the EU is doing any worse than the po-
litical systems in the member states, let alone how much worse. Yet, it is inter-
esting to note that numerous patterns of policy representation frequently found 
at the national level are also present at the EU-level: representation is stronger 
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when policy issues are publicly salient and it varies with the electoral cycle and 
system as well as executive-legislative relations in EU affairs. 
Clearly, both limitations also apply to other, even landmark studies in repre-
sentation research that have summarised diverse policy substances on abstract 
issue dimensions (e.g. Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Stimson, 
MacKuen, and Erikson 1995) and as single-country studies are unable to com-
pare representation across systems (e.g. Gilens 2012; Hakhverdian 2010). Never-
theless, these limitations caution us against making generalised claims about 
the democratic deficit. Yes, the evidence clearly shows that institutional innova-
tions in EU affairs help to improve mandate fulfilment. But are they effective 
enough to achieve satisfactory representation, similar to the level of representa-
tion in domestic politics? We do not know. Yes, the papers provide evidence 
that EU policy-makers are not just benevolent rulers, but that they significantly 
and reliably respond to public demands. But does this responsiveness grant 
people sufficient control, proportional to their control in domestic politics on 
similar issues? We do not know. Yes, the evidence clearly suggests that when 
the EU changes policy, it often does so in congruence with the majority of citi-
zens in most member states, especially in those which care about the policy and 
have clear-cut opinions about it. But is the EU’s level of congruent policy-
making similar to that in domestic politics and is the EU’s representational bias 
towards the salient national median voter instead of the polity-wide median 
voter ‘normal’ for federal systems? We do not know. 
Leaving these cautionary notes aside, my net result is that while less seems 
to be ‘wrong’ with the EU as a democratic system than some critics have 
claimed, the cures they suggest – politicisation and institutional innovations for 
dealing with EU affairs – prove effective in strengthening citizen representa-
tion. 
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CITIZEN REPRESENTATION AND LEGITIMACY 
For most political actors, and possibly even most academics, improving citi-
zen representation in the EU is not only a goal in itself, but is also associated 
with the hope of strengthening the EU’s democratic legitimacy. In some concep-
tions of legitimacy, representation is indeed a component part or indicator of 
legitimacy. For Beetham and Lord (1998), representation is a criterion of the 
normative principle of popular sovereignty that is at the core of the authors’ 
notion of ‘liberal-democratic legitimacy’. However, the authors’ emphasis is 
more on the formal principles underlying the system of representation than on 
its actual empirical performance. Some accounts of measuring legitimacy use 
citizens’ perceptions of representation as indicators, for instance, whether they 
think the government or politicians pay attention to the people’s views (e.g. 
Weatherford 1992). Yet, many conceptions separate representation from legiti-
macy and instead conjecture that a high quality of representation will positively 
affect legitimacy. 
 This makes particular sense if legitimacy is conceptualised as popular (or so-
cial) legitimacy, i.e. citizens’ conviction that it is ‘rightful and proper’ to accept 
the political regime and abide by its rules (Easton 1965, 1975; Føllesdal 2006; 
Gilley 2006). In Easton's (1965, 1975) system-theoretical account of politics, the 
beliefs of citizens regarding legitimacy are one dimension of ‘diffuse system 
support’ for the polity. In contrast to specific support that relates to citizens’ 
evaluations of current political decisions, policies, or actions, diffuse system 
support ‘tends to be more durable’ (Easton 1975: 444). However, ‘over a long 
time period’ diffuse system support may change as ‘a product of spill-over ef-
fects from evaluations of a series of outputs and of performance’ (Easton 1975: 
446). This directly leads to the idea that the representational performance of the 
EU system could affect its popular legitimacy in the long run: if the EU contin-
ually delivers outputs that conflict (or conform) with citizens’ preferences, citi-
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zens might lose (or gain) belief in the EU’s rightful and proper exercise of pow-
er over them.109  
Nevertheless, studies providing empirical evidence for a link between the 
quality of representation and popular legitimacy are scarce – not only in the 
case of the EU but in general.110 A key reason for this is certainly the lack of data 
on cross-temporal and cross-national variation in the actual quality of represen-
tation. Hence, the few existing studies have largely reverted to the ‘perceived 
quality’ of representation among citizens. Interestingly, we have some evidence 
that citizens who believe the EU institutions to take decisions in their interest, 
or at least think the EU takes account of their voice or that of their country, have 
more system support for the EU (Ehin 2008; Rohrschneider 2002). An obvious 
problem of these findings is that they investigate perceived rather than actual 
representative performance, and such perceptions may well be endogenous to 
legitimacy beliefs. This means system support may in fact shape whether re-
spondents perceive EU policy-making to be representative – and not the other 
way around. 
Some limited evidence suggests that citizens who are actually, and not only 
perceptually, better represented by EU policies more readily support the re-
gime. These studies have focused on respondents’ left-right self-placement as 
an indicator of policy preferences and investigated its relationship to support 
for the EU. The findings illustrate the effect of policy representation evolving 
over time: up to the Maastricht Treaty, when EU policy outputs focused on lib-																													
109 This argument loosely connects to Scharpf's (1999) argument that the EU lacks ‘output legit-
imacy’. Yet, in his work the focus is not on how accurately citizens’ preferences are reflected in 
outputs, but on whether the EU retains a basic problem-solving capacity as well as on potential 
trade-offs between participation and effectiveness. 
110 For a recent study of the impact of congruence on satisfaction with democracy across 25 
countries, see Mayne and Hakhverdian (2016). 
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eralising, unregulated market integration, right-wing citizens were more sup-
portive of the EU than left-wing citizens. But when political integration after 
Maastricht questioned national identity and sovereignty, right-wing opposition 
increased too and the relationship became curvilinear (van Elsas and van der 
Brug 2015). Some research also demonstrates that the effect of left-right prefer-
ences on EU support varies between contributor and recipient countries from 
the EU budget (Lubbers and Scheepers 2010) as well as depending on whether 
existing domestic policies are more left or right (Hix 2008: 57-63). This suggests 
that citizens evaluate EU policy output in light of how it conforms to their con-
textually shaped preferences when forming their EU support. 
What can the thesis contribute to this literature? The central advantage of the 
studies presented here is that they provide an understanding of which national 
publics should be best represented by EU policy-making, as their countries 
have the factors strengthening representation on the domestic route. The ‘ideal 
type’ country for representing its citizens in EU policy-making has 1) a majori-
tarian electoral system, 2) strong party emphasis on the EU, 3) high public sali-
ence of EU integration due to events such as EU referendums, and 4) strong 
executive and legislative institutions in EU affairs. The thesis (Paper 4) further 
shows that the size of a country does not matter for citizens’ chance to be repre-
sented by EU policy-making. Hence, size can be disregarded as a factor here.  
In Appendix 5, I provide a rough and tentative classification of all EU-27 
countries with regard to whether they fit the four criteria just outlined. For each 
criterion I identify the top and bottom countries and assign ‘1’ (top) or ‘-1’ (bot-
tom) and ‘0’ for all others. Summing across the four criteria shows that coun-
tries providing rather strong citizen representation on the domestic route 
should be: Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Ireland, Latvia, and the 
UK, which come top in one or several of the criteria. In turn, we would predict 
weak representation for Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Nether-
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lands, Romania, and Spain, which come bottom in one or several of the criteria. 
All other countries are classified with medium representation. 
If there were a strong link between actual citizen representation on the do-
mestic route and popular legitimacy, we should expect citizens in countries 
with strong representation to be more supportive of the EU and its democratic 
system ceteris paribus. While I cannot investigate this relationship in any detail 
here, I can provide some tentative and explorative evidence. For this purpose, I 
use two survey items to measure system support on the legitimacy dimension, 
namely institutional trust in the EU111 and satisfaction with how democracy 
works in the EU (taken from the Eurobarometer, for details see Appendix 5). 
While these indicators have been criticised and are far from perfect, they are 
probably the best ones readily available and have been used in various studies 
on democratic legitimacy and democratic deficits (e.g. Anderson and Guillory 
1997; Ehin 2008; Hobolt 2012; Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2003; Norris 2011a; 
Rohrschneider 2002).112  
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 plot country averages for trust and satisfaction with how 
democracy works in the EU for the years 2004-2008 (before the global financial 
																													
111  Easton (1975) distinguishes legitimacy and trust as the two main components of diffuse sys-
tem support. Hence, trust in the EU could be viewed as measuring a concept distinct from actu-
al legitimacy beliefs. I nevertheless include it here, as in some of the literature it is either treated 
as an indicator of popular legitimacy (e.g. Ehin 2008; Weatherford 1992), or associated, at least 
in the form of generalised regime trust, with strengthening citizens’ legitimacy beliefs (Norris 
2011b). 
112 Some might argue that support for EU membership is essentially also a measure of system 
support on the legitimacy dimension. While this might partially be the case, I argue that it is 
primarily a measure of preferences towards integration. However, conducting the same analy-
sis as below with support for membership leads to exactly the same conclusion that there is 
little relationship to citizen representation. 
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and Eurozone crises) against averages for the years from 2009 onwards (during 
the crises). In the case of trust, the figure shows the percentage of respondents 
who ‘tend to trust’ the EU. In the case of satisfaction with how democracy 
works, it shows the percentage of respondents who are ‘fairly satisfied’ or ‘very 
satisfied’. Countries with strong representation on the domestic route have a 
filled marker, countries with medium representation an empty marker, and 
countries with weak representation no marker. As expected, the results show 
that satisfaction with how democracy works, a more diffuse form of system 
support, has been more stable during the crisis than trust, a more specific form 
of system support (Norris 2011b). While both forms of support have decreased 
rather than increased, the losses in trust are greater than in satisfaction with 
democracy and the average change between the two time periods is 11 percent-
age points for trust but only 7 for satisfaction. 
 
FIGURE 6.1: TRUST IN THE EU AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION 
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FIGURE 6.2: SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY IN THE EU AND QUA-
LITY OF REPRESENTATION 
 
Notes: AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; BU: Bulgaria; CY: Cyprus; CZ: The Czech Republic; DK: Denmark; EE: 
Estonia; FI: Finland; FR: France; DE: Germany; EL: Greece; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IT: Italy; LV: Latvia; 
LT: Lithuania; LU: Luxembourg; MT: Malta; NL: The Netherlands; PL: Poland; PT: Portugal; RO: Romania; 
SI: Slovenia; SK: Slovakia; ES: Spain; SE: Sweden; UK: The United Kingdom. 
 
Most importantly, both figures show that there is little obvious relationship 
between the quality of representation on the domestic route and popular legit-
imacy. In both cases, countries with strong representation are scattered from 
low levels to high levels of system support, and in both cases, the change in 
support also appears unrelated to the quality of representation. Countries with 
weak representation are similarly scattered across the entire range of support. 
Clearly, these patterns do not rule out the possibility that the quality of repre-
sentation has an effect on system support, as this might be veiled by various 
confounding factors. However, it clearly suggests that if such an effect exists, it 
is not very strong compared to other factors which determine system support. 
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Hence, we can tentatively conclude that – so far – we have little empirical evi-
dence that strengthening citizen representation, at least on the domestic route, 
should noticeably strengthen the EU’s popular legitimacy. Of course, this nei-
ther suggests that representation should not be a democratic aim in itself, nor 
that strengthening representation on the European route (e.g. institutional 
change of the EP, Commission) instead of the domestic route would not in-
crease popular legitimacy (see also Beetham and Lord 1998; Hix 2008). But it 
cautions us not to simply assume that more politicisation of the EU and the dif-
fusion of domestic institutions for managing EU affairs will end the EU’s legit-
imacy crisis. 
 
FURTHER CONTRIBUTIONS 
Besides its contributions to the democratic deficit debate and questions re-
garding the EU’s popular legitimacy, the thesis also makes some broader theo-
retical and empirical contributions to the fields of representation and coalition 
politics research. 
First, with regard to representation research, the thesis develops new theoret-
ical concepts of responsiveness that could be applied in other contexts in the 
future: the distinction between systematic and sporadic responsiveness (Paper 1) 
highlights the idea that rational political actors will only plan their responsive-
ness efforts systematically if an issue dimension is reliably salient in elections. If 
electoral salience is fluctuating, sporadic responsiveness in response to salience 
shocks is probably sufficient. This distinction may be relevant to many studies 
that investigate responsiveness on issue dimensions with differing variability in 
electoral salience. Moreover, by coining the term signal responsiveness (Paper 2) 
the thesis aims to clarify a relevant distinction between responsive legislative 
behaviour that is effective in changing policies and behaviour that is mainly an 
expressive signalling tool. It thereby essentially adds a middle category to 
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Hobolt and Klemmensen's (2008) popular taxonomy of rhetorical (statements, 
speeches) vs. effective (policy) responsiveness, as signal responsiveness goes 
‘beyond words’ to legislative behaviour, but falls short of policy consequences. 
In light of its fit with this taxonomy, the term could be used in the future to 
characterise responsive but outcome-inconsequential roll-call or voting behav-
iour, for instance, in the US Congress.  
Second, to my knowledge the thesis provides the first integrated theoretical 
and empirical treatment of how territorial representation influences the opin-
ion-policy linkage (Paper 4). While research in the areas of federalism (e.g. 
Rodden 2006) and political theory (e.g. Rehfeld 2005) has provided impressive 
accounts of territorial representation, its consequences for policy representation 
have only superficially been considered but not fully theorised or empirically 
demonstrated. This contribution of the thesis should therefore support future 
investigations of the effects of territorial representation in other polities. In par-
ticular, the thesis provides a novel dataset on policy representation that meth-
odologically matches existing datasets, especially for the US (e.g. Gilens 2012), 
and potentially enables future comparisons across polities. 
Third, the thesis also contributes to the broader study of coalition politics 
(Paper 3), in particular on the question of how government support coalitions 
solve conflicts over policy direction. With regard to theory, it transcends exist-
ing models that have pointed either to ministerial discretion or to policy com-
promises as the mode of coalition policy-making. Instead, these options emerge 
as different equilibriums in the synthesis model presented, depending on legis-
lative and executive institutions, and indeed ideological divisiveness. Empiri-
cally, to my knowledge the paper offers the first study of coalition policy-
making that directly observes policies’ location in an ideological space, instead 
of making inferences about ideological location through correlates (such as 
amendment activity). It also draws on an unprecedented country sample of 22 
EU member states. It therefore makes a significant contribution to the field, 
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challenging and refining some of the central findings in the seminal works of 
Martin and Vanberg (2011, 2014). In particular, it questions the decisive role of 
legislative institutions in coalition policy-making. 
 
AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
While the studies presented here investigate key links on the chain of policy 
representation in the EU, they are by no means exhaustive. First, with regard to 
pathways to representation, the studies here focus on the domestic route of repre-
sentation. Future work should also address representation on the European 
route, and investigate to what extent the EP and the Commission are influenced 
by citizens’ preferences in their legislative activity and what factors strengthen 
representation on this route. Relevant work on this is emerging but is still ra-
ther limited (e.g. Arnold and Sapir 2013; Hartlapp, Metz, and Rauh 2014; Lo 
2013).  
Second, policy representation is arguably not only about whether citizens’ 
substantive preferences are reflected at the stages of policy negotiation and 
adoption, but also whether legislative activity in the first place is concentrated 
in areas of citizens’ political priorities. In fact, substantive congruence and respon-
siveness may be of less value if the EU acts in areas in which people do not 
want it to act, and stays out of areas in which people would like to see it active. 
This is particularly pertinent in the EU’s multilevel system, since recent re-
search shows that citizens’ issue priorities for EU politics differ in non-trivial 
ways from their priorities for the national level (Bevan, Jennings, and Wlezien 
2016). Future research could therefore address the question of the extent to 
which citizens’ priorities are represented by the political and legislative agen-
das of the EU institutions. Explorative work on the ‘agenda responsiveness’ of 
the Council to public priorities was recently conducted by Alexandrova, 
Rasmussen, and Toshkov (2016). 
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Third, future work on the EU’s chain of policy representation could speak to 
the issue of social inequality in representation, which is extensively discussed in 
the current US literature (e.g. Bartels 2009; Gilens and Page 2014; Gilens 2005, 
2012). Are affluent citizens better represented by EU policy-making than the 
less educated and the poor? Are there gender or age gaps in representation in 
the EU? On a basic level, these questions can be answered with the dataset pro-
vided in Paper 4. It will therefore soon be possible to investigate the question of 
social inequality in EU representation. 
Fourth and probably most pressingly, future studies should address the is-
sue of causal identification. As I have discussed in the introduction, causal identi-
fication is a central challenge in the literature on policy representation. The 
studies in this thesis do provide important evidence for bottom-up dynamics, 
but they fall short of employing popular methods of causal inference such as 
vector autoregression models, or difference-in-differences and synthetic control. 
All these methods that would allow us to identify causality more convincingly 
would have to rely on time-series data of public preferences and policy-making. 
Creating time-series measures of policy-making (e.g. governmental policy posi-
tions, policy output) is therefore a primary task for future work. One other al-
ternative for causal identification might be field experiments, but these are dif-
ficult – if not impossible – to implement with top-level politicians and officials 
as experimental subjects. 
Fifth, for the field of political theory, the thesis poses the question of whether 
the traditional assessment criteria of representation are adequate in the case of the 
EU, and to what extent they might have to be amended. While the thesis 
demonstrates that they can in principle be applied to the case, it also highlights 
unresolved questions. For instance: is it normatively justifiable (or even prefer-
able) that EU policies reflect the preferences of the salient national median voter 
(those national publics that care about an issue) rather than of an EU-wide me-
dian voter? If yes, then a revised criterion of congruence as the match between 
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EU-level policies and ‘salient opinion’ is adequate. If not, other criteria might be 
preferred. 
Looking beyond the chain of representation, this conclusion has also high-
lighted that we only have a very limited empirical understanding of whether 
and under what conditions citizen representation enhances popular legitimacy. 
The widespread conjecture that representation leads to public support is proba-
bly more routed in a déformation professionnelle of political scientists who believe 
in the power of democracy than in the available, weak empirical evidence. Irre-
spective of the answer, crucial evidence as to whether EU-level representation 
improves the union’s legitimacy or not would move various debates in the field 
into new directions. 
		 	 211	
 
 
This page was intentionally left blank 
 
		 	 212	
 
 
APPENDIX 1 
 
 
 
This appendix provides supporting information on Paper 1.  
 
Suitability of the DEU dataset 
The DEU dataset is ideally suited to this application, in particular, as the 
weaknesses of DEU are not relevant to the analyses presented here. DEU has 
primarily been used to test competing bargaining models and this particular 
usage has been criticised. At the heart of the critique is the sensitivity of such 
tests to measurement error (Slapin 2013) as well as problems with post-diction – 
the idea that interviewees who knew the outcome of negotiations could recon-
struct actors’ initial positions so as to fit them to the known outcome (Bueno de 
Mesquita 2004). However, even critics remark that these weaknesses are limited 
to certain usages of the dataset (Slapin 2013: 13).  
First, post-diction is no problem in the context of this analysis as it actually 
makes the data less likely to have a public opinion bias. As interviews with 
DEU experts were conducted months and years after the legislative negotia-
tions, it is unlikely that interviewees would be capable of using public opinion 
at the time preceding the negotiations as a cue to reconstruct governments’ po-
sitions. This would demand at least two implausible assumptions to hold: 1) 
Experts would have to have a better cross-national and cross-time recollection 
of fluctuations in public opinion than of governments’ positions in the negotia-
tions. 2) Experts would have to have an intuitive understanding that what mat-
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ters is opinion (six months) prior to the issuing of the proposal and not opinion 
during the actual negotiations. 
Second, in order to ameliorate any potential biases from post-diction, I ex-
clude from the analysis all DEU issues for which the experts interviewed were 
not able to report at least one third of national governments’ positions. Such 
large gaps indicate that experts found it difficult to reconstruct positions and 
may have used cues instead of actual knowledge of positions in their assess-
ments. In some cases, it might also indicate that the identification of the legisla-
tive issue as a ‘key controversy’ was inappropriate in the first place. Important-
ly, these issues only represent 2.5% of the observations on the left-right and 
1.7% of the observations on the pro-anti integration dimension. 
Third, concerns about homoscedastic measurement error are not particularly 
pressing for this application as such errors affect all government positions 
equally, which are measured as single point estimates. In contrast, it is prob-
lematic in applications comparing bargaining models in which actors’ positions 
are measured with varying accuracy (e.g. weighted average of government po-
sitions for Council but single point estimates for Commission and EP). 
 
Category scheme 
The category scheme for classifying DEU issues on the two dimensions was 
developed to closely reflect citizens’ understanding of the substantive content 
of the left-right and the pro-anti integration dimension. This promises a close 
substantive correspondence between the available opinion measures and the 
substance of the DEU issues.  
The existing literature on the substantive meaning of the left-right self-
placement and the membership question was the guiding principle in con-
structing the scheme (Boomgaarden et al. 2011; Cohrs et al. 2005, 2007; Huber 
1989; Knutsen 1997; Kvaloy, Finseraas, and Listhaug 2012; Neumayer 2004; 
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Skrentny 1993; Thalmann 2004; de Vries, Hakhverdian, and Lancee 2013). This 
inductive-empirical approach might sometimes diverge from a political scien-
tist’s understanding of the dimensions. For instance, according to the category 
scheme the protection of civil rights is assumed to be ‘left’ as research shows 
that citizens placing themselves left are more likely to support such values 
(Cohrs et al. 2005, 2007). However, more deductive approaches might view 
support for civil rights as ‘right’. 
Table A1.1 provides an overview of the categories and the share of issues 
coded into each (if issues were coded into more than one category, they are dis-
played in the more prevalent category here). The full scheme with coding in-
structions will be made available after peer-reviewed publication of Paper 1 or 
Paper 3 of this thesis.  
 
TABLE A1.1: OVERVIEW OF DEU CATEGORY SCHEME 
Category Description Number 
of DEU 
issues 
1: Consumer Protec-
tion vs. Freedom of 
Businesses (left-right) 
Defining new or redefining existing rights and obliga-
tions between consumer and producer of goods or ser-
vices (e.g. warranty, repairs); Prohibiting or legalising 
the sale of potentially harmful products or the use of 
potentially harmful substances and components … 
45 
(13.6%) 
2: Environmental Pro-
tection vs. Freedom of 
Businesses (left-right) 
Increasing or decreasing product or processing stand-
ards that are intended to protect the environment (e.g. 
water use, air pollution, climate, waste management); 
Defining or redefining rules that impact on the protec-
tion of wild animals or breeding animals … 
57 
(17.2%) 
3: Economic Regula-
tion vs. Freedom of 
Businesses (left-right) 
Regulating or intervening in markets by discouraging or 
prohibiting certain activities (e.g. in order to make busi-
nesses work better, restructure competition, fight mo-
nopoly/cartel power) or deviating from free market 
principles (e.g. price competition, freedom of mergers & 
acquisitions) … 
19 
(5.74%) 
4: Employees’ Rights 
vs. Other Interests 
(left-right) 
Defining or redefining standards for the organisation of 
work (e.g. wage, hours, safety); Entitling or disentitling 
employees of rights or benefits (e.g. unionisation, social 
security rights) … 
9 (2.72%) 
5: Protectionism vs. 
Free Trade (left-right) 
Opening up or closing markets to European or interna-
tional competitors … 
13 
(3.93%) 
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6: Equality vs. Ac-
ceptance of Inequality 
(left-right) 
Affirming or undermining equal rights for all individu-
als irrespective of social class, gender, race, ethnicity, 
religion, ability, or sexual orientation; Increasing or 
decreasing spending to reduce inequalities (e.g. spend-
ing on education, social welfare of the weak) … 
10 
(3.02%) 
7: Immigration vs. 
Fortress Europe (left-
right) 
Changing the status of foreign nationals from outside 
the EU; Relaxing or tightening visa requirements and 
procedures for foreign nationals from outside the EU 
(e.g. visa requirement, information collection about visa 
applicants, …) … 
10 
(3.02%) 
8: Civil and Human 
Rights vs. Fight 
against Crime (left-
right) 
Defining and redefining rules concerning the collection, 
storage, and use of privacy data of individuals (e.g. 
private communications data, personal information); 
Defining and redefining rules concerning public access 
to government documents and information … 
17 
(5.14%) 
9: Harmonisation vs. 
National Standards 
(pro-anti integration) 
Harmonising or retaining national standards and rules; 
Defining or not defining EU-wide minimum standards 
or targets; Allowing or prohibiting devia-
tions/derogations from EU rules and benchmarks … 
29 
(8.76%) 
10: Wide vs. Narrow 
Scope (pro-anti inte-
gration) 
Including previously unaffected areas (e.g. substance 
area not covered so far), objects (e.g. particular goods 
not covered) or subjects (e.g. previously unaffected 
group of businesses, people, …) in the application of EU 
legislation, rules, or practices …  
18 
(5.44%) 
11: EU vs. Member 
State Authority (pro-
anti integration) 
Extending or restricting the rights (e.g. decision-making, 
monitoring, sanctioning) of the European Commission 
vis-à-vis the member states (incl. the European Council); 
Increasing or decreasing the visibility of the EU and its 
institutions …  
25 
(7.55%) 
12: Speeding Up vs. 
Blocking of EU Legis-
lation (pro-anti inte-
gration) 
Speeding up, subjecting to conditions (e.g. awaiting 
other outcomes), or postponing legislation’s entry into 
force or its implementation in an area where the EU has 
not been active (e.g. new proposal) …  
6 (1.81%) 
UNCLASSIFIED Relates to none of the other categories (e.g. relates to 
geographical cleavages, inter-institutional issues, entire-
ly technical issues, conflicts of interest between busi-
nesses) 
73 
(22.05%) 
TOTAL  331 
(100%) 
 
 
If an issue was coded into any category between 1 and 8, it was included for 
the analysis of left-right issues. In turn, if it was coded in any category between 
9 and 12 it was included in the analysis of pro-anti integration issues. The inter-
coder reliability for the binary variable indicating whether an issue related to 
any left-right or any pro-anti integration category was assessed on the basis of 
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Krippendorff’s alpha. This reveals satisfactory levels of reliability with ! = 0.88 
for the left-right dimension and ! = 0.73 for the pro-anti integration dimension. 
 
Descriptive statistics and variable definitions 
Table A1.2 displays all descriptive statistics of all variables used in the main 
analyses (Table 2.1 + Table 2.2 + Table 2.3 in the paper). The statistics were cal-
culated by pooling observations on both dimensions (left-right and pro-anti 
integration). The last column indicates the data source used as well as trans-
formations and interpolations applied. 
 
TABLE A1.2: OVERVIEW OF DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND VARIABLE 
DEFINITIONS 
Variable Mean SD Max Min Source / Definition 
Left-right 
position 
51.11 44.98 0.00 100.00 DEU113, linearly transformed 
Integration 
position 
53.34 45.80 0.00 100.00 DEU, linearly transformed 
Left-right 
opinion 
5.30 0.35 4.35 6.46 
Eurobarometer (left-right self-placement), 
average by country applying sampling 
weights, linearly interpolated on the day 
level, six-month lag from proposal date 
Pro-anti inte-
gration opin-
ion 
0.43 0.21 -0.16 0.84 
Eurobarometer (support for EU member-
ship), average by country applying sam-
pling weights, linearly interpolated on the 
day level, six-month lag from proposal 
date 
Government 
left-right 
position 
-2.34 12.32 -23.22 32.71 CMP
114 (RILE), seat-weighted average of 
cabinet parties at last election 
																													
113 Thomson et al. (2006, 2012). 
114 Lehmann et al. (2015). Government parties were identified with the help of the ParlGov da-
tabase (see Döring and Manow 2012). 
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Government 
pro-anti inte-
gration posi-
tion 
2.59 2.11 -0.19 9.91 
CMP (per108-per110), seat-weighted aver-
age of cabinet parties at last election 
Days to elec-
tions 
8.20 4.57 -0.04 18.21 
ParlGov115 (100 day units to next scheduled 
legislative election assuming four or five 
year terms), corrected 
District mag-
nitude (ln) 
2.57 1.24 0.00 5.01 Author’s own assignment
116, natural log 
transformation 
Party empha-
sis (EU) 
-0.29 1.65 -4.54 4.35 
CMP117 (per108+per110), simple average of 
opposition parties accounting for changes 
in government composition, linearly inter-
polated, difference between proposal date 
and four years before 
EU event 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Author’s own assignment, six months be-
fore and after national referendums on 
integration, final ratification of EU treaties, 
accession to the EU, introduction of the 
euro currency, elections to the EP; during 
the six-month period of Council presidency 
as well as three months before and after 
Council presidency 
Net receipts 
from EU 
budget 
0.34 1.05 -0.85 3.59 
www.money-go-round.eu, net receipts 
from EU budget (receipts – payments) in % 
of GDP 
Unemploy-
ment 
7.80 3.51 2.30 22.50 
World Bank (ILO definition), yearly rate in 
% 
Inflation 2.40 1.49 -0.14 12.35 
World Bank (change in consumer prices), 
yearly rate in % 
Economic 
freedom 
7.14 0.73 4.93 8.60 
Fraser Institute (Economic Freedom of the 
World, area ‘Regulation’)118, yearly and 
linearly interpolated where necessary  
Party empha-
sis (LR) 
1.03 7.05 -29.78 23.39 
CMP (RILE), simple average of opposition 
parties accounting for changes in govern-
ment composition, linearly interpolated, 																													
115 Döring and Manow (2012). 
116 Based on concept by Johnson and Wallack (2005). Details of coding are available upon re-
quest. 
117 Opposition parties were identified with the help of ParlGov. 
118 Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall (2013). 
		 	218	
difference between proposal date and four 
years before 
Public sali-
ence (LR) 
2.16 0.79 0.90 5.21 
Relative frequency of words from Laver-
Garry dictionary (sum of categories 
‘+State+’, ‘=State=’, and ‘-State-’) in country 
reports of the most salient political issues 
in The Political Data Yearbook, yearly 
Public sali-
ence (EU) 
 
0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Author’s own assignment, based on coun-
try reports of the most salient political is-
sues in The Political Data Yearbook, yearly 
 
 
Left-right position and integration position 
The measure of government’s initial negotiation positions on a legislative 
proposal is taken from the DEU dataset directly (March 2012 version). Wherev-
er necessary the policy scales of 0-100 were linearly transformed so as to ensure 
that the most ‘right’ and the most ‘integrationist’ option advocated by any gov-
ernment in the estimation sample were represented by 100. 
 
Left-right and pro-anti integration opinion 
I base my measures of left-right and pro-anti integration opinion on ques-
tions in the biannual Standard Eurobarometer survey series of the European 
Commission. For left-right opinion I use the respondent’s ideological self-
placement item. The exact wording of the question is: 
‘In political matters people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right’. How would you place 
your views on this scale?’ 
I assign the following codes to the response options: 
Left = 1 
2 
3 
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4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Right = 10 
DK / Refused / etc. = . 
 
For pro-anti integration I use the question on support for EU membership. 
The exact wording is: 
Once a country is an EU member: 
‘Generally speaking, do you think that (YOUR COUNTRY’S) membership of the 
European Union (European Community) is … ?’ 
Before a country is an EU member: 
‘Generally speaking, do you think that (YOUR COUNTRY’S) membership of the 
European Union will (would) be … ?’ 
I assign the following codes to the response options: 
‘A good thing’ = 1 
‘A bad thing’ = -1 
‘Neither good nor bad’ = 0 
DK / Refused / etc. = . 
In each case, the measure of opinion is the average of all valid responses by 
country using sampling weights. I assign this measure to the day on which 
fieldwork for the survey started, and linearly interpolate values between sur-
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veys. To represent the causal relationship, in which opinion influences national 
delegations’ positioning, I use opinion six months prior to the date on which the 
proposal was submitted to the Council. 
 
Government left-right and pro-anti integration position 
I measure the governments’ ideological position on left-right and pro-anti in-
tegration from the CMP’s119 coding of election manifestos by seat-weighting the 
government parties’ positions on each dimension. As the measure for left-right 
I use the CMP’s RILE concept as the difference between the percentages of 
‘rightist’ and ‘leftist’ quasi-sentences: !"#$%&'$&( !"#$ − !"#ℎ! !"#$%$"&
=  !"#104! +⋯+ !"#606! − !"#103! +⋯+ !"#701!!!!! ∗  !!!! 
Analogously, I measure the governments’ pro-anti integration position as the 
difference between the percentages of positive and negative quasi-sentences on 
EU integration120: 
!"#$%&'$&( !"#$%&'#!(" !"#$%$"& =  !"#108! − !"#110!!!!! ∗  !!!! 
Where i denotes the respective government party, N is the number of gov-
ernment parties, !! is the number of seats of party i, and !! the total number of 
governmental seats. The measures are based on the party manifesto issued at 
the last election preceding the legislative proposal. 
																													
119 See Lehmann et al. (2015). All CMP-based measures are derived using the ‘2015a’ version of 
the database. 
120 per108: ‘European Community/Union: Positive’; per110: ‘European Community/Union: 
Negative’ 
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Days to elections 
I operationalise the distance to the next scheduled legislative election in 100 
day units. After elections in countries with four-year terms, I count down from 
1460 days, and from 1825 days for countries with five-year terms. Five-year 
terms were applied in Cyprus, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, and 
the United Kingdom during the period of investigation. 
 
District magnitude 
To characterise electoral systems on a majoritarian versus a proportional con-
tinuum, I use a measure of district magnitude from the perspective of the aver-
age legislator (see Johnson and Wallack 2005). In order to account for outliers, I 
use the natural log of district magnitude. This measure runs from 0 for the UK 
and France to about 5 for the Netherlands and Slovakia. The source data can be 
obtained from the author upon request. 
 
Party emphasis 
The operationalisation of change in party emphasis is based on the CMP and 
follows Hagemann, Hobolt, and Wratil (2016). For pro-anti integration I take 
the simple average percentage of quasi-sentences which opposition parties de-
vote to European integration121: 
																													
121 One problem with using manifesto data for measuring emphasis on European integration is 
that on some occasions European elections occurred together with national elections, which 
normally yields an artificially increased level of attention paid to EU integration. I have esti-
mated this effect on a sample from 1989 to 2014 and deducted it from the measure. However, 
not applying this correction yields the same results in Paper 1 (Model B2 in Table 2.2) and Paper 
2 (Model 3 in Table 3.2). 
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!"#$% !"#ℎ!"#" (!") =  !"#108! + !"#110!!!!!!  
Analogously, for left-right I use the simple average of the percentage of qua-
si-sentences which opposition parties devote to the CMP’s RILE coding catego-
ries: !"#$% !"!ℎ!s!" (!")
=  !"#104! +⋯+ !"#606! + !"#103! +⋯+ !"#701!!!!!!  
Where i denotes the respective party and N is the number of opposition par-
ties. I linearly interpolate this measure between elections and government 
changes, and use the difference between party emphasis on the proposal date 
and four years before as the measure of change in party emphasis.  
As described in the paper, I use change in emphasis rather than emphasis it-
self, as I expect governments to increase their responsiveness when parties mo-
bilise the issue (‘sporadic mode’). This idea is less reflected in the level than in 
the change in emphasis.  
 
EU events 
The measure of EU-related events is a dummy variable that is ‘1’ six months 
before and after national referendums on integration, final ratification of EU 
treaties (ratification date of last national parliament), accession to the EU, intro-
duction of the euro currency, elections to the EP. It is also ‘1’ during the six-
month period in which a country holds the Council presidency as well as three 
months before and after the presidency. 
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Public salience 
The alternative measures of public salience of left-right and pro-anti integra-
tion are based on content-analysing country reports on the most important po-
litical issues on a country’s agenda from The Political Data Yearbook, published 
annually by the European Journal of Political Research. For left-right I apply 
automated content analysis using the Laver-Garry dictionary for policy posi-
tions. The measure of public salience of left-right issues is the relative frequency 
of words from the following dictionary categories: ‘+State+’, ‘=State=‘, and ‘-
State-’. While this is arguably a crude measure of the public salience of left-right 
conflicts, it has good face validity. For instance, one among the 10 highest val-
ues observed on this measure occurs in Sweden in 2007, the year in which the 
new Reinfeldt cabinet delivered key components of its right-wing reform pro-
gramme including property tax reform and cuts to sickness and unemployment 
benefits. 
For pro-anti integration, I searched each report for the words ‘EU’ or ‘Eu-
rope*’ and determined whether the country expert reported any aspect of EU 
integration that was a salient political issue in the respective year. Wherever at 
least one aspect of EU integration was reported as salient, the dummy variable 
is ‘1’ for the entire year. The coding revealed that EU-related events (in particu-
lar, referendums, discussions about adopting the euro, and Council presiden-
cies) are key triggers of public salience. However, in some cases events such as 
European elections or the introduction of the euro currency were mentioned, 
but experts stressed that they passed without receiving any public attention (‘0’ 
was assigned). This illustrates the point that EU-related events themselves are 
often a good proxy for public salience of integration but not in all cases. Yet, the 
measure of public salience based on expert reports is arguably less exogenous 
to governments’ behaviour than EU-related events. Therefore, it is important to 
stress that all measures show the same interaction effect with public opinion. 
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Missing data 
The CMP measures are the only source of missing values in the main anal-
yses.122 I use the ParlGov database to ascertain which parties entered parliament 
and government (defined as representation in the cabinet). While the ParlGov 
database provides direct links to the CMP, these links often result in a high de-
gree of missing values on the CMP, e.g. when parties do not issue individual 
manifestos, or when parties change parliamentary fractions, split, or unite dur-
ing the legislative term. In order to recover the policy positions in such instanc-
es, I employ a number of strategies. In the case of party splits, I assigned the 
new party/fraction the CMP measures of its ‘mother’ as long as no new mani-
festo was available. In the case of electoral alliances issuing a common manifes-
to, all parties were assigned the related CMP measures. In case of party/fraction 
mergers, I assigned the CMP measures of the largest party to all parties from 
the recording date of mergers in the ParlGov database. In the case of marginal 
parties, I researched whether they sat together with a larger party or supported 
this party throughout their history. If this was the case, I assigned the CMP 
measure of the larger party. I also added several links between ParlGov and 
CMP that were missed by the ParlGov team (e.g. when a manifesto was coded 
by CMP but the CMP code was missing in the ParlGov database).  
With regard to government position measures (on left-right and pro-anti in-
tegration), I am able to recover complete CMP measures covering all govern-
ment parties for about 95% of the observations on each dimension. In about 2% 
of the cases, single or few cabinet parties were not covered by the CMP, but the-
se parties consistently represented a negligible proportion of less than 10% of 
																													
122 This applies to the main models in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 in the paper. In addition, there are 
also some missing values for the measures of public salience from The Political Data Yearbook 
reports. 
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the government’s seats. Hence, I simply assigned the CMP measures of the re-
maining government parties. Ultimately, I was left with only 2.6 – 3.1% missing 
values on the government positions from Malta and Latvia. Malta is not includ-
ed in the CMP so far, whilst the 2006 elections are missing for Latvia. 
In terms of the change in opposition parties’ emphasis on both issue dimen-
sions, I recover the positions of parties representing more than 95% of all oppo-
sition seats for about 87% of the observations on both dimensions at the date 
the proposal was transferred to the Council as well as four years prior to that 
data. Moreover, wherever an election was coded, the available CMP measures 
cover parties representing more than 70% of the opposition seats. Hence, I de-
cided to ignore missing values on single opposition parties.123 In total, this 
leaves 3 – 3.5% of missing values on the measures of change in party emphasis 
from elections not yet coded by the CMP. 
 
Additional robustness checks 
In addition to the robustness checks included in the paper (see Table 2.3 in 
the paper), I address two kinds of further concerns here. All results are reported 
in Tables A1.3 + A1.4 for the left-right and pro-anti integration dimension re-
spectively. 
																													
123 In particular, I checked that in the cases with the most missing values (e.g. more than 25% of 
opposition seats) the opposition parties not coded were not anti-EU parties and did not have 
any other outlier status. In the case of caretaker governments that had no clear opposition (e.g. 
Dini in Italy), I interpolated the measure between the last identifiable set of opposition parties 
before the caretaker and the next set of parties after the caretaker government. Excluding care-
taker governments leaves the results on the interaction term between party emphasis and pro-
anti integration opinion unchanged. 
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First, I address concerns regarding the lag length of the public opinion 
measures. These are twofold. On the one hand, the claim that governments re-
spond to public opinion may be problematic if different lags of public opinion 
are so highly correlated that the same results can be obtained with virtually any 
lag length of opinion (e.g. two years). Then, one could not speak of a timely ‘re-
sponse’ anymore. On the other hand, if my results hinge on the six-month lag 
and entirely break down at other, similar lag lengths, this might potentially in-
dicate a chance finding instead of actual responsiveness. Models A1 to A3 and 
B1 to B3 re-estimate the main models from the paper using current opinion, a 
one-year lag, and an 18-month lag. They provide evidence that the first concern 
is unfounded. On each dimension, all results break down with an unreasonably 
long 18-month lag, which is evidence that the ‘true’ lag in government respon-
siveness may be between zero and 12 months. However, while results partially 
hold for pro-anti integration with current opinion and the one-year lag, on left-
right issues the central interaction terms are not statistically significant with any 
other lag length than six months. At least, the coefficients always point in the 
expected direction and some effects are close to significance.124 In addition, the 
direct effect of opinion is strongest for current opinion and weakest for the 18-
month lag, which is in line with expectations. Taken together with the results 
from different lag lengths on pro-anti integration, neither concern seems press-
ing. 
 
																													
124 Unreported models also show that when using the binary version of the dependent variable, 
the interaction between public opinion and the days to the next election is weakly significant (at 
the 10% significance level) using current opinion as well as a one-year lag, but is insignificant 
using the 18-month lag. 
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TABLE A1.3: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON RESPONSIVENESS ANALYSIS ON LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION 
 Model A1 Model A2 Model A3 Model A4 Model A5 Model A6 
Left-right opinion 35.542 30.504 6.113 46.245 16.420 12.890 
 (16.542)** (18.337) (19.092) (15.041)*** (8.440)* (4.834)*** 
Days to election 3.627 6.167 3.608 4.724 5.574 6.130 
 (2.089)* (3.698) (3.165) (2.692)* (2.436)** (2.667)** 
Left-right opinion x Days to election -0.654 -1.138 -0.661 -0.850 -1.024 -1.125 
 (0.383) (0.688) (0.587) (0.495)* (0.450)** (0.496)** 
District magnitude (ln) 31.218 0.599 5.934 44.723   
 (28.687) (33.549) (33.719) (18.776)**   
Left-right opinion x District magnitude (ln) -6.664 -0.815 -2.150 -9.178   
 (5.433) (6.407) (6.584) (3.581)**   
Lijphart threshold     -5.459  
     (2.069)**  
Left-right opinion x Lijphart threshold     1.122  
     (0.397)***  
Majoritarian      -47.540 
      (28.576)* 
Left-right opinion x Majoritarian      9.733 
      (5.798)* 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Policy 
issues, 
countries 
Policy 
issues, 
countries 
Policy 
issues, 
countries 
Policy 
issues, 
countries 
Policy 
issues, 
countries 
Policy 
issues 
Random effects      Countries 
Number of policy issues 172 172 172 172 172 172 
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Number of countries 26 26 26 26 26 26 
N 2,965 2,906 2,859 2,965 2,965 2,965 
Robustness check Current 
opinion 
One-year 
lag of 
opinion 
18-month 
lag of 
opinion 
Days to 
elections 
that really 
occurred 
Lijphart’s 
effective 
electoral 
threshold 
Majoritari-
an / Mixed 
/ PR sys-
tem 
Notes: All are fixed effects regressions; No observations for Malta due to missing CMP measures;  
Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
TABLE A1.4: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON RESPONSIVENESS ANALYSIS ON PRO-ANTI INTEGRATION DIMENSION 
 Model B1 Model B2 Model B3 Model B4 Model B5 Model B6 Model B7 
Pro-anti integration opinion 10.761 -20.873 -1.165 9.976 6.312 9.419 19.677 
 (15.430) (22.848) (19.340) (21.669) (21.457) (21.639) (19.820) 
Party emphasis (EU) -1.684 -2.676 -1.523 -3.104 -3.449 -1.761 -3.077 
 (1.969) (1.443)* (1.536) (1.592)* (1.725)* (1.070) (1.280)** 
Pro-anti integration opinion x Party emphasis (EU) 6.110 7.907 5.101 11.185 10.591 6.373 9.405 
 (4.303) (3.874)* (3.744) (4.326)** (3.469)*** (2.922)** (3.247)*** 
EU event -18.243 -16.292 -14.272 -16.078 -16.339 -16.670  
 (6.896)** (7.623)** (7.993)* (7.027)** (6.959)** (7.244)**  
Pro-anti integration opinion x EU event 30.284 27.330 23.065 26.856 27.757 27.555  
 (12.784)** (13.859)* (14.468) (13.009)** (12.444)** (13.312)**  
Council presidency        -15.627 
       (8.835)* 
Pro-anti integration opinion x Council presidency       32.561 
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       (18.724)* 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Policy 
issues, 
countries 
Policy 
issues, 
countries 
Policy 
issues, 
countries 
Policy 
issues, 
countries 
Policy 
issues, 
countries 
Policy 
issues, 
countries 
Policy 
issues, 
countries 
Number of policy issues 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 
Number of countries 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 
N 1,448 1,448 1,442 1,448 1,442 1,448 1,448 
Robustness check Current 
opinion 
One-year 
lag of 
opinion 
18-month 
lag of 
opinion 
Three-
year 
change in 
party 
emphasis 
Five-year 
change in 
party 
emphasis 
Seat-
weighting 
for party 
emphasis 
Council 
presiden-
cy event 
Notes: All are fixed effects regressions; No observations for Malta due to missing CMP measures;  
Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Second, I test the sensitivity of the results with regard to alternative meas-
urements/operationalisations for the four moderators of responsiveness. In 
Model A4 I re-assess hypothesis LR-H1 on electoral cycle effects by operational-
ising the days to the next election that really occurred instead of the days to the 
next scheduled election. This addresses the concern that after early elections are 
announced, governments will not care about the end of the regular legislative 
term but about the dates of the early election. However, this operationalisation 
is necessarily less adequate for the time before early elections are announced, 
when governments may not anticipate that the regular term will not be com-
pleted. Importantly, the results are similar with both operationalisations. With 
regard to hypothesis LR-H2 I test two alternative measures of electoral systems. 
Model A5 uses Arend Lijphart’s measure of the effective electoral threshold and 
Model A6 uses a variable that is ‘2’ for pure SMD systems (France, UK), ‘1’ for 
mixed systems without correction (Lithuania), and ‘0’ for PR.125 Both measures 
yield qualitatively the same results. 
With regard to hypothesis EU-H1, the decision to operationalise the change 
in opposition emphasis on integration over four years may appear arbitrary. 
Hence, in Models B4 + B5 I use the change over three and five years respectively 
to assess the sensitivity of the choice of four years. In Model B6 I also use the 
change over four years but calculate it as the seat-weighted average across all 
parliamentary opposition parties instead of simple averaging. All three models 
entirely confirm the results from the paper and demonstrate that they are not 
sensitive to such choices. Last, regarding hypothesis EU-H2, my coding of ma-
																													
125 Lijphart’s threshold calculates as !"". !ℎ!"#ℎ!"# = !"%!!!, where ! is the average district mag-
nitude (in my case from the perspective of the average legislator). This measure has been used 
in some key works to characterise the majoritarian vs. proportional continuum (see e.g. Boix 
1999). In Model A6, I use a random effect for countries instead of fixed effects as the variable for 
electoral systems is time-invariant within countries. 
		 	231	
jor events related to integration may capture other factors than increased public 
salience of EU integration. This is best illustrated with regard to European elec-
tions, which turn the dummy variable ‘1’ for all countries for an entire year. 
Clearly, this event could easily be confounded with other year-level factors, 
such as economic growth in Europe or certain kinds of proposals the European 
Commission might put forward in such years. Therefore, I re-estimate the re-
sults in Model B7 with a simple dummy for whether a country held the presi-
dency of the Council. The advantage of the presidency event is that it only oc-
curs in one country at a time and in an arbitrary order that is very unlikely to be 
related to any unobservable factors across the data. Even with this single type 
of event, the interaction is positive and significant at the 10% level. 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
 
 
This appendix provides supporting information on Paper 2.  
 
Summary statistics 
The following tables display summary statistics. Table A2.1 illustrates what 
fraction of the voting data is excluded due to our selection of policy areas. It 
shows votes per policy area from 1999 to October 2011. 
 
TABLE A2.1: VOTES PER POLICY AREA (1999-2011) 
Policy area Votes % Cum % 
Agriculture and fisheries 12,492 27.82 27.82 
Budget 1,014 2.26 30.08 
Civil liberties, justice and home affairs 6,098 13.58 43.66 
Constitutional affairs and administration 677 1.51 45.17 
Development and international trade 981 2.19 47.36 
Economic and financial affairs 7,302 16.26 63.62 
Employment, education, culture and social affairs 2,745 6.11 69.74 
Environment and energy 4,751 10.58 80.32 
Foreign and security policy 409 0.91 81.23 
Internal market and consumer affairs 4,719 10.51 91.74 
Transport and telecommunications 3,709 8.26 100.00 
Total number of votes 44,897 100  
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Table A2.2 displays summary statistics for all variables included in the mixed 
effects logistic regression models based on the estimation sample for Models 1-3 
in Table 3.2 in the paper. 
 
TABLE A2.2: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF ESTIMATION SAMPLE 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Opposition vote  0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 
Public opinion 0.44 0.19 -0.05 0.85 
Party emphasis (EU) -0.39 1.52 -4.71 5.65 
Government pro-anti integration position 2.23 1.72 -0.19 9.91 
Government left-right position -2.51 11.73 -23.22 32.71 
Net receipts from EU budget 0.35 1.11 -0.95 5.34 
Unemployment 7.59 3.30 1.80 21.80 
Inflation 2.62 1.93 -4.48 12.35 
Co-decision 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Post-enlargement 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Rotating presidency 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
N 17,176    
 
 
Variable definitions and sources 
Table A2.3 provides an overview of all variables used in the main model in 
Table 3.2 of the paper, their definition, and source as well as the extent of miss-
ing values. 
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TABLE A2.3: OVERVIEW OF VARIABLE SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS 
 
Variable Source / Definition Missing 
values 
Opposition vote ‘1’ for ‘No’ or ‘Abstain’, ‘0’ for ‘Yes’ 0 
Public opinion Eurobarometer (support for EU membership), average by 
country applying sampling weights, linearly interpolated 
on the day level, six-month lag from vote date 
0 
Party emphasis (EU) CMP126 (per108+per110), simple average of opposition 
parties accounting for changes in government composi-
tion, linearly interpolated, difference between vote date 
and four years before 
1,596 
Government pro-anti 
integration position 
CMP127 (RILE), seat-weighted average of cabinet parties at 
last election 
983 
Government left-right 
position 
CMP (per108-per110), seat-weighted average of cabinet 
parties at last election 
983 
Net receipts from EU 
budget 
www.money-go-round.eu, net receipts from EU budget 
(receipts – payments) in % of GDP 
0 
Unemployment World Bank (ILO definition), yearly rate in % 0 
Inflation World Bank (change in consumer prices), yearly rate in % 0 
Co-decision ‘1’ for co-decision procedure, ‘0’ otherwise 0 
Post-enlargement ‘1’ from 1st of May 2004, ‘0’ otherwise 0 
Rotating presidency ‘1’ for presidency country at vote date, ‘0’ otherwise 0 
 
 
Opposition vote 
The EU Council voting data analysed in this paper is part of an original da-
taset collected over a number of years and continuously updated as information 
becomes available from the Council’s public records. As the Council records 
																													
126 Lehmann et al. (2015). Opposition parties were identified with the help of the ParlGov data-
base (see Döring and Manow 2012). 
127 Government parties were identified with the help of ParlGov. 
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vary in format and presentation of information, the dataset has been manually 
collected. The data is used for academic research purposes while also forming 
the basis for the reporting on legislative activities in the Council by VoteWatch 
Europe (www.votewatch.eu), a transparency organisation based in Brussels. 
The information covered by the dataset is publicly available (see 
www.votewatch.eu) and is collected from three different sources: the Council of 
the European Union’s register (www.consilium.europa.eu), EURLEX 
(www.eur-lex.europa.eu) and from the EP’s Legislative Observatory (OEIL) 
(www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil). The latter has been used for additional infor-
mation if details were omitted from the Council documents.  
 
FIGURE A2.1: PERCENTAGE OF OPPOSITION VOTES BY COUNTRY (1999-
2013) 
 
Notes: at: Austria; be: Belgium; cy: Cyprus; cz: The Czech Republic; dk: Denmark; ee: Estonia; fi: Finland; 
fr: France; de: Germany; el: Greece; hu: Hungary; ie: Ireland; it: Italy; lv: Latvia; lt: Lithuania; lu: Luxem-
bourg; mt: Malta; nl: The Netherlands; pl: Poland; pt: Portugal; si: Slovenia; sk: Slovakia; es: Spain; se: 
Sweden; uk: The United Kingdom 
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Our dependent variable on voting behaviour in the Council is based on the 
dataset described, covering the period January 1999 to December 2013. The 
votes are coded ‘1’ for ‘No’ and ‘Abstain’, and ‘0’ for ‘Yes’ votes. To illustrate 
the distribution of opposition votes across countries, we plot the percentage of 
opposition votes across the time period for each country separately in Figure 
A2.1.  
For further details on all other variables, consult Appendix 1. Variables are 
linked on the proposal date. Operationalisations and data sources of variables 
with the same name are identical across papers. 
 
Missing data 
For general information on linking ParlGov and CMP, see Appendix 1. Spe-
cific information on missing values in Paper 2 follows. 
In terms of government positions on left-right and EU integration, we are 
able to recover the positions of all government parties for 92.7% of our observa-
tions in the target sample for the logistic regression models reported in Table 
3.2 in the paper. In another 2.5% of the cases, CMP measures for parties repre-
senting less than 10% of the governmental seats are missing. We ignored this 
negligible fraction and simply assigned the CMP measure of the remaining par-
ties. Our only missing values on government positions stem from Malta (not 
included in the CMP so far) as well as from elections in Latvia after 2002 (which 
have not yet been coded). They represent about 4.8% of the target sample and 
we delete these observations list-wise from our estimations reported in Table 
3.2 in the paper. 
In terms of the change in opposition parties’ emphasis on integration, we re-
cover the positions of parties representing more than 95% of all opposition seats 
for about 82% of the observations at the vote date as well as 86% four years pri-
or to that data. Moreover, wherever an election was coded, the available CMP 
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measures cover parties representing more than 70% of the opposition seats. 
Hence, we decided to ignore missing values on single opposition parties. In to-
tal, we are left with 7.8% of missing values on the measure of change in party 
emphasis. In the robustness checks (see below), we demonstrate that our results 
are robust to using multiple imputations for the CMP measures. 
 
Policy areas 
We code the policy area of the act from the legislative proposal that we 
download from www.consilium.europa.eu, or www.eurlex.eu. The proposal 
usually indicates a policy area, alongside any additional areas when relevant, as 
well as the Council working group from which the act originates. The initial 
working group and the policy area correspond in most, if not all, cases. When 
no indication of a policy area was included in the Council act itself, we looked 
up the act in EURLEX and OEIL to find the correct classification of the pro-
posal. 
As policy categories have changed considerably over time, we merge the 
long list of policy categories referenced in the official documents into the 11 ar-
eas listed below. The only editorial decisions that have been made in this pro-
cess are as follows: 
 
1. Policy areas referenced as ‘General Affairs’ since 2004 have been re-allocated 
to their ‘original’ areas such as ‘Economic and Financial Affairs’, ‘Foreign 
Affairs’ etc. based on the working group they originated from (included in 
the Council act’s list of references). Any acts which do not fall into a policy 
category, but which rather relate to constitutional matters (e.g. accession is-
sues with new member states; the EU flag) and administrative matters (e.g. 
pensions to EU officials) have been grouped into a new category of ‘Consti-
tutional Affairs and Administration’. 
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2. Where a previous policy category consisted of two areas which have in later 
years been reconfigured in the Council’s own references, the policy area has 
been re-coded to the appropriate new area. For instance, in the first years of 
the period covered by the data, ‘Transport’ was referenced as ‘Transport, 
Telecommunication and Energy’. Later, ‘Energy’ was paired with ‘Environ-
ment’ and hence, all acts which were previously in the first reference but re-
lated to ‘Energy’ have been reallocated to the newer category of ‘Environ-
ment and Energy’.  
 
Please see Table A2.4 below for details.   
 
TABLE A2.4: ALLOCATION OF ACTS INTO POLICY AREAS 
 
Policy area Council reference categories 
Agriculture and fisher-
ies 
Agriculture; Agriculture and Fisheries; Agriculture & Fisheries; 
Fisheries 
Budget Budget 
Civil liberties, justice 
and home affairs 
Civil Liberties, Justice & Home Affairs; Civil liberties, justice and 
home affairs; Justice and Home Affairs; Legal affairs; 
Constitutional affairs 
and administration 
Constitutional Affairs & inter-institutional relations; General Affairs 
(Constit. Affairs & Admin) 
Development and in-
ternational trade 
Development & International Trade; Development; International 
trade; Trade; 
Economic and financial 
affairs 
Economic & Financial Affairs; Economic & monetary affairs; Budg-
etary control; Financial Affairs; 
Employment, educa-
tion, culture and social 
affairs 
Employment, Education, Culture & Social Affairs; Culture & educa-
tion; Education; Education, Youth & Culture; Employment; Em-
ployment & Social Policy; Employment and social affairs; Employ-
ment, Social Policy and Consumer Affairs; Employment, Social Poli-
cy, Health & Consumer Affairs; Gender Equality; Consumer Affairs 
& Tourism (Culture); Labour and Social Affairs; Social Affairs; 
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Environment and ener-
gy 
Environment & Energy; Energy; Environment; Environment & Pub-
lic health; Transport, Telecommunication and Energy (Energy); 
Foreign and security 
policy 
Foreign & Security Policy; Enlargement; External Relations; General 
Affairs & External Relations (Foreign & Security Policy); General Af-
fairs (Foreign & Security Policy); 
Internal market and 
consumer affairs 
Internal Market & Consumer Affairs; Competitiveness; Consumer 
Affairs; Health; Industry; Industry, research & energy (Internal Mar-
ket); Internal Market, Consumer Affairs & Tourism (Internal Market 
& Consumer Affairs); Internal Market, Industry and Research; Inter-
nal Market & consumer protection; Regional development; Research; 
Transport and tele-
communications 
Transport & Telecommunications; Aviation; Communications; Tele-
communications; Transport; Transport & tourism (Transport); 
Transport, Telecommunication and Energy (Transport & Telecom-
munications); Transport, Telecommunications and Energy 
(Transport & Telecommunications); 
 
 
Quantitative text models 
We employ two different quantitative text models on the legislative summar-
ies of the acts we collected from the OEIL website. Details on each model are 
provided below. Descriptive statistics on the text length of the OEIL summaries 
are provided in Table A2.5. 
 
TABLE A2.5: WORD LENGTH OF OEIL SUMMARIES 
 
Min 25th Percentile Median Mean 75th Percentile Max 
29 257 409 522 684.2 3306 
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Wordscores 
We use Wordscores (Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003) to determine whether 
acts operate within areas of established EU competencies or (partly) aim at ex-
tending the scope or level of EU authority. In order to obtain reference texts for 
this contrast, we first created a codebook defining each end of our dimension of 
interest to human coders. This codebook is included at the end of this appendix. 
We then selected ‘candidate summaries’ by running a correspondence analysis 
on a set of keywords from the acts’ titles that we expected to be associated with 
the dimension of interest (e.g. ‘harmonisation’, ‘establish’, ‘amend’, ‘extend’). 
We then read about 250 summaries with extreme title scores. Of those, we 
pooled 55 into one reference document, to which we assigned the value of ‘-1’ 
for acts operating within areas of established competences, and 45 into a second 
reference document, to which we assigned the value of ‘+1’ for acts extending 
the level or scope of EU authority. Reference texts were balanced across time 
and policy areas. The coding of the selected reference summaries as either ‘+1’ 
or ‘-1’ shows high levels of inter-coder reliability with Krippendorff’s alpha 
standing at 0.92. 
We use the JFREQ software to obtain the word-frequency matrix (using 
stemming and removal of punctuation and numbers) and implement 
Wordscores with the austin package in R. We first score each individual sum-
mary and then calculate the average rescaled score for our 11 policy areas as 
displayed in Table 3.1 in the paper. We score individual summaries instead of 
the entire corpus of summaries from one policy area, since summaries have 
tended to become longer over time. This ensures that equal weight is placed on 
each act.  
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TABLE A2.6: EXTREME WORDS OCCURRING IN BOTH REFERENCE 
TEXTS 
Word Score  Word Score 
asylum 0.94  codifi -0.96 
monitor 0.92  eec -0.95 
polit 0.90  compani -0.95 
intergovernment 0.89  modif -0.92 
situat 0.84  observatori -0.92 
role 0.84  border -0.91 
independ 0.84  regim -0.91 
emiss 0.84  visa -0.91 
strengthen 0.84  codif -0.90 
fundament 0.83  supersed -0.90 
cours 0.82  percentag -0.89 
project 0.82  newli -0.89 
major 0.81  exercis -0.87 
promot 0.80  cohes -0.87 
especi 0.80  substanc -0.86 
creation 0.80  henc -0.83 
agenc 0.79  modifi -0.83 
peopl 0.79  notifi -0.83 
label 0.79  registr -0.83 
greater 0.79  summari -0.83 
cooper 0.78  updat -0.83 
Notes: Bold words are particularly indicative of the model’s face validity. 
 
Table A2.6 shows the 40 word stems with the most extreme scores that occur 
at least once in each of the reference documents.128 The selection is evidence of 
																													
128 Words that only occur in one of the two reference documents automatically obtain a score of 
1 or -1 (with the naïve Bayes probability that we are reading the relevant reference text being 1). 
They are often uninformative, as they may be very specific to a particular reference summary 
(e.g. ‘wine’ or ‘postgradu’). 
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the model’s face validity as stems like ‘codifi’ or ‘modif’ as well as ‘updat’ occur 
much more often in the summaries of acts operating within established compe-
tences, whereas ‘strengthen’, ‘fundament’, ‘major’ or ‘creation’ are used to de-
scribe acts extending authority. Additionally, to enable face validation we in-
clude the two summaries with the most extreme scores (positive/negative) ac-
cording to the Wordscores model at the end of this appendix. 
 
Latent Dirichlet Allocation 
We use a latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) model (Blei, Ng, and Jordan 2003) 
on the legislative summaries to investigate on what kind of ‘topics’ or ‘themes’ 
governments increase their opposition when opinion is more Eurosceptic. In 
pre-processing, we use the JFREQ software to obtain the word-frequency matrix 
(using stemming and removal of stop words, punctuation, and numbers) and 
remove very frequent (>90% of summaries) and very infrequent stems (<0.5% of 
summaries). We implement the LDA with the topicmodels package in R and use 
the variational expectation maximization algorithm (VEM) for fitting the model. 
We estimate various models, adjusting the number of topics k between 20 
and 50. While models with 20 to 30 topics often pool rather unrelated issues 
(e.g. ‘police’ and ‘research’), the face validity of the model clearly increases from 
30+ topics onwards. The model of 45 topics we present provides a good delinea-
tion of substantive themes. As we are not interested in determining the most 
appropriate number of topics dealt with in legislation, but rather want to pro-
vide a good indication of the kind of themes governments use to signal respon-
siveness, we acknowledge that a model of e.g. 43 or 47 topics may also repre-
sent the data well. Moreover, as the VEM algorithm may only find local modes, 
starting values have some influence on model results. Hence, topics may look 
slightly different even with constant k. Importantly, a variety of model estima-
tions confirm that opposition votes are related to Euroscepticism on topics such 
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as environment and transportation, data exchange and statistical harmonisa-
tion, establishing new agencies (particularly on border control, security, and 
migration) as well as (with less consistency) immigration, financial contribu-
tions, and disaster management. 
Table A2.7 provides an overview of all 45 topics and the 20 most frequent 
stems129 in each. 
 
TABLE A2.7: OVERVIEW OF LDA TOPIC MODEL 
 
Description Stems 
1 Budgetary surveillance of member states 
econ, regul, member, state, correct, council, 
budgetari, european, commiss, island, surveil, 
canari, excess, stabil, imbal, deficit, union, in-
sur, euro, measur 
2 
Passenger rights and EU funding for disas-
ters  
transport, damag, passeng, disast, road, eur, 
fund, flood, solidar, regul, major, waterway, 
affect, direct, total, million, infrastuctur, liabil 
3 Regulation on food products 
food, regul, label, feed, consum, addit, prodct, 
market, list, ec, commun, commiss, rule, provis, 
authoris, inform, legisl, include, safeti, direct 
4 Communications and research 
programm, european, action, commun, activ, 
support, object, implement, commiss, inform, 
promot, develop, decis, field, project, financi, 
organis, cooper, specif, area 
5 Crime and justice 
state, member, decis, crimin, person, frame-
work, inform, offenc, nation, judici, author, 
european, council, measur, crime, law, purpose, 
execut, order, ensur 
6 Maritime  
convent, state, agreement, ship, member, com-
mun, intern, law, regul, commiss, rule, countri, 
parti, recognit, organis, maritim, mainten, relat, 
document, oblig 
7 
Instruments and programs to financially 
support non-EU countries 
countri, regul, instrument, develop, financi, 
assist, support, cooper, measur, commun, fi-
nanc,  implement, programm, region, action, 																													
129 This contrasts with Table 3.3 in the paper, which provides keywords (or ‘semantically im-
portant’ stems). 
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oper, provid, object 
8 Agriculture 
product, regul, measur, agricultur, market, 
commun, specif, system, local, organ, region, 
council, oper, trade, produc, illeg, scheme, ap-
plica, suppli, forest 
9 Companies and financial industry 
direct, compani, payment, requir, market, in-
form, account, financi, state, member, report, 
transfer, busi, eu, european, regist, money 
10 Energy and environment 
energi, effici, state, emiss, eu, commiss, mem-
ber, gas, european, measure, greenhouse, re-
new, framework, direct, fuel, consumption, 
council, target, develop, save 
11 Environment and transport 
vehicl, emiss, limit, requir, system, air, road, 
engine, reduc, direct, car, instal, pollut, stage, 
motor, measur. Reduct, nois, fuel 
12 Environment  
substanc, direct, environment, wast, environ, 
require, pollut, equip, recycl, state, water, haz-
ard, member, legisl, annex 
13 Common market in food products 
market, aid, price, regul, year, sugar, product, 
sector, eur, quota, common, scheme, tonn, re-
form, purpos, commiss, restructur, council 
14 Health, risk management, culture 
health, european, eu, culture, action, member, 
state, protect, threat, emerg, qualiti, respons, 
commiss, diseas, level, ensur, public, risk, 
measur, year 
15 EU Financial assistance 
assist, guarantee, million, loan, eur, financi, 
fund, amount, eu, financ, commiss, oper, decis, 
econom, support, grant, european, eib, com-
mun 
16 Employment and social policy 
employ, social, educ, european, labour, state, 
member, train, polici, guidelin, year, promot, 
work, develop, activ, eu, worker, peopl, learn, 
stratgi 
17 Transportation and public works contracts 
public, oper, contract, air, state, servic, member, 
commun, inform, carrier, airport, requir, secur, 
rule, procedur, commiss, audit, aircraft, 
transport, provid 
18 
Accession of new member states and asylum 
matters 
decis, procedur, european, council, commiss, 
asylum, state, applic, committee, member, ac-
cess, establish, consult, parliament, set, order, 
regul, purpos, ensur, draft 
19 Regulation on external trade relations 
regul, ec, council, european, union,  amend, act, 
impact, commiss, treati, assess, legal, parlia-
ment, eu, trade, adopt, function, basi, applic 
20 Consumer protection and legal enforcement right, protect, victim, court, proceed, consum, 
law, member, state, person, option, european, 
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case, ensur, justic, eu, rule, legal, provid 
21 Taxation and internal market 
vat, state, member, sevic, direct, rate, tax, good, 
suppli, reduc, appli, commiss, fraud, applic, 
charg, person, derog, rule, purpos, system 
22 
Common Agricultural Policy and rural de-
velopment 
regul, develop, agricultur, rural, polici, pay-
ment, support, fund, common, cap, region, eur, 
pillar, measure, framework, direct, council, 
billion, object 
23 Internal market in energy 
market, oper, suppli, network, gas, commiss, 
transmiss, system, regul, cooper, secur, electr, 
level, effect, european, regulatori, nation, eu, 
energ, independ 
24 EU budget 
eur, million, budget, appropri, payment, com-
mit, head, expenditur, amount, increas, year, 
draft, financi, commiss, total, european, level, 
resourc, eu, administrat 
25 Animal welfare and disease 
anim, commun, measur, control, member, state, 
health, purpos, rule,  plant, diseas, veterinari, 
product, import, countri, year, commiss, decis, 
inspect, protect 
26 Customs union  
custom, duti, import, tax, rate, product, meas-
ure, tariff, excise, appli, commiss, countri, taxat, 
agreement, increas, period, safeguard, tobacco, 
state, union 
27 
Establishment of agencies and networks, 
relating to border control, security and mi-
gration 
agenc, member, state, inform, european, com-
miss, task, network, establishment, nation, se-
curity, exchang, system, border 
28 Common Agricultural Policy  
milk, payment, wine, commiss, product, mem-
ber, state, farmer, quota, market, scheme, sup-
port, increas, direct, develop, singl, sector, crop, 
measur, potato  
29 Medicine, chemicals and research 
product, medicin, authoris, substanc, safeti, 
market, nuclear, risk, chemic, commun, mem-
ber, state, requir, activ, assess, procedur, hu-
man, protect, report, system 
30 Single Market 
direct, eec, amend, provis, ec, requir, commiss, 
council, limit, annex, order, technic, relat, 
standard, refer, legisl, introduc, protect, articl, 
safety 
31 Implementation 
procedur, implement, instrument, ec, commiss, 
amend, decis, council, adopt, regulatori, ele-
ment, measur, confer, introduc, act 
32 Codification  
act, direct, eec, council, codif, codifi, amend, 
purpos, incorpor, formal, preserv, requir, euro-
pean, superse, exercis, full, legisl, regul, under-
tak, law 
		 	246	
33 Fisheries 
fish, fisheri, measur, regul, vessel, stock, com-
mun, conserv, council, sea, manag, commiss, 
area, plan, adopt, technic, year, establish, catch, 
resourc 
34 Single currency 
eur, regul, state, member, coun, council, ec, 
derog, counterfeit, refer, date, amend, adopt, 
purpos, period, nation, currenc, circul, extend, 
appli 
35 Research and technology 
research, joint, commun, technolog, pro-
gramme, project, european, framework, con-
tribut, financ, cost, develop, establish, undertak, 
specif, instrument, financi, rule, tax 
36 
Financial contributions to member state 
expenditure and to EU funds 
financi, fund, state, member, programm, peri-
od, commiss, european, implement, manag, 
support, assist, annual, amount, commun, 
decis, provid, project, contribut, mechan 
37 Import and export of goods 
regul, control, export, product, requir, option, 
rule, market, legisl, eu, european, provis, pro-
cedur, assess, technic, standard, articl, author, 
general, import 
38 Financial institutions 
credit, rate, risk, capit, institut, requir, financi, 
market, invest, manag, bank, rule, regul, firm, 
provis, instrument, direct, hous, ensur, asset 
39 Communications 
servic, staff, commun, eea, oper, commiss, 
phase, regul, european, mobil, systm, provis, 
satellit, offici, spectrum, work, member, order, 
provid, price 
40 
EU financing in innovation and infrastruc-
ture 
option, union, polici, fund, europen, impact, eu, 
innov, invest, object, develop, financi, imple-
ment, assess, europ, support, sector, commiss, 
eur, infrastruc 
41 Financial supervision 
author, supervisori, european, financi, nation, 
supervis, system, bank, respons, ensur, com-
mun, establish, board, esa, recommend, mem-
ber, compet, commiss 
42 Statistical surveys and data sharing  
data, statist, european, collect, regul, state, 
member, commun, patent, inform, council, 
commiss, system, qualit, framework, account, 
nation, report, product, establish 
43 Transport safety and communications 
safeti, service, direct, european, railway, estab-
lish, system, rail, network, market, develop, 
commun, regulatori, interoper, common, certif, 
state, freight, framework, member 
44 Schengen and border control 
visa, state, member, border, sis, schengen, reg-
ul, ii, issu, decis, system, document, countri, 
applic, council, inform, provis, migrat, travel 
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45 Social security and employment 
state, member, protect, nation, person, resid, 
provis, direct, secur, principl, right, social, 
provid, citizen, appl, condit, applic, profession, 
commun, legisl 
 
 
Analysis of newspaper coverage 
In the paper, we analyse whether opposition votes are related to higher me-
dia coverage of an act. For this purpose, we merge our data of voting records 
with Reh et al. (2013), who collected the average number of newspaper stories 
(in the British, French, German, and Italian quality press in seven countries) 
referring to a legislative procedure for all co-decision acts in the fifth and sixth 
EPs. Their data can be matched with ours for 565 legislative acts on which the 
Council voted. As the Reh et al. data was collected on the act level, we collapse 
our data by summing all opposition votes by act (at any vote occasion) given by 
the seven member states covered in the media data. Descriptively, 1.88 news-
paper stories per country are devoted to an act on average, with the median 
being 0, and some acts being extreme outliers of up to 464.5 media stories per 
country for the ‘Bolkestein’ or ‘services in the internal market’ directive. 
We create two different measures of newspaper coverage. First, we use the 
logged average number of newspaper stories per country to ameliorate prob-
lems with outliers. Second, we create a simple binary indicator for whether an 
act was covered at all by any newspaper story. 212 of the 564 acts were covered 
at least by one story. We regress both measures on the number of opposition 
votes using OLS for the first measure and a logistic regression for the second 
measure. In both models, we control for variation in newspaper coverage relat-
		 	248	
ed to the 45 topics we identified with the LDA.130 This comes as fixed effects in 
the OLS model and as a random effect in the logistic regression for the most 
likely topic of the act.131 The results of these models are reported in Table A2.8 
and Figure 3.2 in the paper is based on the OLS results. As we argue in the pa-
per, the number of newspaper stories on an act increases with the number of 
opposition votes. Similarly, we also have clear evidence (at the 5% level) from 
the logistic regression that opposition votes increase the likelihood that an act 
gets on the media agenda in the first place. 
 
TABLE A2.8: MODELS OF NEWSPAPER COVERAGE 
 
 OLS Logistic 
Opposition votes 0.180 0.452 
 (0.064)*** (0.208)** 
Constant 0.553 -0.518 
 (0.370) (0.431) 
Fixed effects Topics  
Random effects  Topics 
R2 0.19 - 
N 563 563 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
																													
130 As we lack legislative summaries and consequently topics from the LDA for two of the 565 
acts, our number of observations is 563. 
131 We use a random effect rather than fixed effects in the logistic regression to avoid complete 
separation with regard to topics for which none of the acts received any media coverage. When 
using topic fixed effects, the significance of the coefficient on opposition votes drops to the 10% 
level following the loss of observations due to separation. 
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Robustness checks 
We perform several robustness checks on our main results; these are report-
ed in Tables A2.9a and A2.9b. All these checks concern the mixed effects logistic 
regression models from Table 3.2 in the paper and essentially represent varia-
tions of Model 3. 
A first set of checks concerns the fixed and random effects structures. Model 
1 addresses concerns of heterogeneity in voting across policy areas. As we have 
argued throughout, the substance of legislative acts differs between areas and 
hence they represent an important clustering factor that may or may not be ac-
counted for with our random effect for legislative acts. Therefore, we check the 
robustness of our results with regard to including fixed effects for the eight pol-
icy areas in the sample. The results we obtain are virtually identical. The same 
conclusions also follow from Model 2, which includes a random effect parame-
ter for the votes instead of the acts. This different specification of the random 
component does not change our results. 
Another set of robustness concerns questions the adequacy of our operation-
alisations. Importantly, it could be argued that pooling ‘no’ and ‘abstain’ votes 
in our dependent variable is inappropriate for testing signal responsiveness, 
since an abstention will be a weaker signal in the eyes of the public than voting 
‘no’. Model 3 addresses this concern by excluding abstentions from the depend-
ent variable. The coefficients on public opinion as well as on the interaction 
with party salience remain highly statistically significant.  
A second operationalisation concern relates to the change in party emphasis. 
Here, our choice of a change over four years might be criticised as arbitrary as 
well as our decision to weight opposition parties equally. Models 4, 5, and 6 
demonstrate the robustness of our findings with regard to alternative choices 
on these matters. Model 4 operationalises a three-year change, Model 5 a five-
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year change, and Model 6 the seat-weighted change over four years. In all three 
cases, we obtain the exact same results. 
A third operationalisation choice that could potentially drive our results is 
our use of a six-month lag of public opinion (see also Appendix 1). Hence, we 
present estimates with current opinion on the vote date, a one-year, and an 18-
month lag in Models 7 to 9. Importantly, the public opinion effect is very simi-
lar for the one-year lag but the main effects of current opinion as well as the 18-
month lag are not significant. Hence, while we do not know the best lag repre-
sentation, it is clear that our results would be the same if we used different rea-
sonable lag lengths between six and 12 months but would not be obtained with 
unreasonably long or short lengths like zero or 18 months. This provides fur-
ther confidence in our results. 
Another source of potential concern is the Wordscores estimates measuring 
authority extension vs. established competence areas. Since we restrict our 
sample based on these estimates, a natural question is whether the inclusion or 
exclusion of borderline areas makes a difference for our results. Hence, we have 
compared our Wordscores estimates with classical measures of policy area in-
tegration based on expert judgements in order to identify areas with ambiguous 
classification (Börzel 2005; Hix and Høyland 2011). This exercise shows that 
‘Development and international trade’ as well as ‘Environment and energy’ are 
sometimes classified as established areas and ‘Internal market and consumer 
affairs’ contains particular sub-areas, in which authority is still extended. In 
Model 10, we show that excluding trade, development, environment, and ener-
gy policies from our sample does not affect the results – if anything, it strength-
ens them. In turn, Model 11 also shows that including internal market and con-
sumer policies only marginally changes our estimates and leaves significance 
levels unchanged. 
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TABLE A2.9A: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON MODELS EXPLAINING OPPOSITION VOTES 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Public opinion -3.002 -3.022 -3.897 -2.905 -3.253 -2.770 -1.754 
 (1.002)*** (1.003)*** (1.595)** (1.012)*** (1.011)*** (1.001)*** (1.092) 
Party emphasis (EU) 0.554 0.525 0.474 0.580 0.472 0.380 0.431 
 (0.141)*** (0.141)*** (0.212)** (0.152)*** (0.141)*** (0.126)*** (0.160)*** 
Public opinion x Party emphasis (EU) -1.625 -1.573 -1.969 -1.890 -1.438 -1.216 -1.243 
 (0.351)*** (0.352)*** (0.524)*** (0.393)*** (0.350)*** (0.316)*** (0.388)*** 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Countries, 
policy are-
as 
Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries 
Random effects Legislative 
acts 
Vote occa-
sion 
Legislative 
acts 
Legislative 
acts 
Legislative 
acts 
Legislative 
acts 
Legislative 
acts 
Number of acts 915 915 915 915 915 915 887 
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
N 18,687 18,687 18,687 18,687 18,687 18,687 18,006 
Robustness check FEs for 
policy are-
as 
RE for vote 
occasions 
DV: ‘No’ 
votes only 
Three-year 
change in 
party em-
phasis 
Five-year 
change in 
party em-
phasis 
Seat-
weighting 
for party 
emphasis 
Current 
opinion 
Notes: All are mixed effects regressions; No observations for Malta due to missing CMP measures, no observations for Latvia due to no opposition votes cast; 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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TABLE A2.9B: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON MODELS EXPLAINING OPPOSITION VOTES 
 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Public opinion -2.433 -0.986 -5.185 -2.517 1.220 -3.274 -2.013 
 (0.960)** (0.940) (1.308)*** (0.847)*** (0.700)* (1.104)*** (0.912)** 
Party emphasis (EU) 0.588 0.658 0.552 0.480 0.063 0.441 0.532 
 (0.139)*** (0.150)*** (0.175)*** (0.124)*** (0.127) (0.179)** (0.141)*** 
Public opinion x Party emphasis (EU) -1.680 -1.770 -1.924 -1.324 -0.349 -1.409 -1.567 
 (0.340)*** (0.356)*** (0.447)*** (0.301)*** (0.287) (0.419)*** (0.353)*** 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries 
Random effects Legislative 
acts 
Legislative 
acts 
Vote occa-
sion 
Legislative 
acts 
Legislative 
acts 
 Legislative 
acts 
Number of acts 915 915 654 1126 1143 915 915 
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 26 25 26 
N 18,687 18,687 13,430 23,019 23,038 18,687 20,384 
Robustness check One-year 
lag of opin-
ion 
18-month 
lag of opin-
ion 
Exclusion 
of policy 
areas 
Inclusion 
of policy 
area 
Established 
policy are-
as 
Jackknife 
test (coun-
tries) 
Multiple 
imputa-
tions  
Notes: All are mixed effects regressions, except for ‘Model 14’, which is fixed only; No observations for Malta due to missing CMP measures, 
 no observations for Latvia due to no opposition votes cast, except for ‘Model 12’ and ‘Model 14’ with additional observations;  
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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A related issue concerns our argument that we will only find the public opin-
ion effect as hypothesised in policy areas that are not well-established but in 
which the boundaries of competences are still pushed in daily legislative activi-
ty. To show that this argument is valid and that we do not find the same opin-
ion dynamics in established policy areas, we estimate our model on ‘Agricul-
ture and fisheries’, ‘Economic and financial affairs’, and ‘Internal market and 
consumer affairs’ only. The results are reported as Model 12. The positive but 
only weakly significant effect on public opinion clearly indicates that our hy-
pothesis does not hold for these areas and that other dynamics seem to be at 
play.132 
Model 13 addresses the concern that our results may be due to a few ‘outlier’ 
countries, in which governments strongly engage in signal responsiveness, 
while governments in other countries may not at all do so. In this case, our gen-
eralised claims about signal responsiveness may be misplaced. In order to test 
this concern, we employ a jackknife resampling at the country level, omitting 
one country after another from the estimation and obtaining standard errors 
from the variation in the coefficients across estimations. Our results are entirely 
unaffected by the resampling exercise.133 
																													
132 Additional analyses show that the significant positive coefficient on public opinion is driven 
mainly by ‘Agriculture and fisheries’, the most integrated of all policy areas according to our 
Wordscores measure as well as according to the expert judgments. In fact, it is conceivable that 
most changes in this policy area are not extending the authority of the EU but may even restrict 
it. Hence, an opposition vote in this area could serve to signal support for rather than opposi-
tion to full EU integration. 
133 Please note that due to technical restrictions in the jackknife resampling, this is the only case 
in which we implement country fixed effects by demeaning (using the within-transformation) 
instead of using dummy variables and we also exclude the random effect for legislative acts. 
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Lastly, we address the issue of missing values on the CMP measures that re-
sulted in an exclusion of 7.8% of all observations in the models reported so far. 
To rule out the potential of any bias due to list-wise deletion, we set up a multi-
ple imputation model using regression imputation with chained equations for 
the missing values (and the interaction between public opinion and party em-
phasis, treating it as ‘just another variable’). We use 10 multiple imputed da-
tasets with all remaining covariates, country and policy area dummies as well 
as the dependent variable as predictors. Model 14 shows that we obtain the 
same results when imputing the missing values. 
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Summaries Codebook (Wordscores) 
 
Please code each summary individually. For classification use only the information pro-
vided in the legislative summary. 
 
 
V1 Extension of EU authority 
 
Does the legislative act aim at extending the scope, level, or inclusiveness of EU au-
thority or does it provide for changes within areas of already established competency?  
 
 
Extending EU authority Changes within areas of competency 
 
• Establishing legislation in areas with 
no existing EU level legislation 
• Setting up novel programmes / 
schemes / frameworks / actions in 
areas with no (or only informal) 
previous EU activity  
• Upgrading of existing programmes / 
schemes / frameworks / actions or 
legislation (e.g. include new policy 
instruments, measures, activities, 
areas, countries) 
• Establishing new EU level agencies / 
authorities / networks / organisations / 
offices or upgrading of their powers 
(e.g. in terms of mandate, objectives, 
rights, decisional authority, and 
funding) 
• Harmonising / establishing new 
common (minimum) standards, rules, 
guidelines, and procedures (incl. 
implementation) across the EU 
member states 
• Phasing out derogations and enforcing 
common rules / standards / legislation 
 
 
• Changing existing legislation, 
programmes, rules in a substantive 
sense without altering the EU's 
authority (e.g. altering already 
established rules, standards, quotas, 
targets that relate to the substance 
matter) 
• 'Updating' existing regulation in view 
of new developments (e.g. adapting to 
technical change or experience from 
implementation, incorporating 
international obligations of the EU) 
• Codifying, clarifying, simplifying, or 
re-packaging of existing legislation 
(e.g. changes are of entirely 'technical' 
nature not affecting substance) 
• Applying regular (e.g. yearly, 
monthly) changes to existing 
legislation 
• Applying changes of otherwise 'minor' 
nature to existing legislation, 
programmes, rules (e.g. temporary, 
one-off / extraordinary measures) 
• Discontinuing or suspending existing 
provisions  
CODE: +1 CODE: -1 
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Example summary A (rescaled score: +4.28) 
 
PURPOSE: to establish a programme for the enhancement of quality in higher educa-
tion and the promotion of intercultural understanding through co-operation with third 
countries (Erasmus World) (2004-2008). CONTENT : the Erasmus World programme 
offers high-profile assistance in the form of 250 European masters courses and thou-
sands of study grants and fellowships for nationals of third countries and for Europeans. 
Like the Fulbright Programme for the United States (please refer to summary 
CNS/2000/0263), it will help to strengthen intercultural dialogue and communicate Eu-
ropean cultures and values more effectively to the rest of the world. Covering the period 
2004-2008, Erasmus World will have a budget of EUR 200 million. The Erasmus 
World Programme has the following objective is: 1) Creation of 250 inter-university 
masters courses with the seal and support of the European Union Erasmus World aims 
to create or develop a European higher education product providing both European stu-
dents as well as students and invited scholars from third countries with added value. 
Host European postgraduate courses which already exist or are to be set up will be se-
lected for a five-year period. They will receive funding from the Community and an 
‘EU’ seal. These ‘EU Masters Courses’ will be an ideal structure for receiving students 
from third countries under the Erasmus World programme, alongside European stu-
dents. At the end of the programme in 2008, around 250 ‘EU Masters Courses’ should 
have been established. To qualify for the ‘EU’ seal, these courses should involve at least 
three universities from three different Member States and entail recognised periods of 
study in at least two of the three universities. These courses will lead to diplomas that 
are officially recognised in the European countries taking part. They will reserve places 
for third-country students receiving Erasmus World scholarships. The courses will cov-
er various fields and there will be no conditions regarding the language in which teach-
ing takes place. 2) ‘Erasmus World’ scholarships for 4 200 students and 1 000 visiting 
scholars to Europe from third countries Either directly or under partnerships between 
their university of origin and the universities taking part in an ‘EU Masters Course’, 
postgraduate students from third countries will be able to study in Europe for up to two 
academic years. During their studies, they will follow courses in several Member States, 
like all the students enrolled in an ‘EU Masters Course’. The scholarships, amounting 
on average to EUR 1 600 per month, will enable the students to come to Europe and 
cover their living expenses while they are there. When it comes up to speed, Erasmus 
World should enable over 2 000 third-country students to receive a scholarship of this 
kind, with around 4 200 scholarships being awarded over the life of the programme. 
When implementing the programme, special attention will be given to ways of avoiding 
a ‘brain drain’ from the developing countries whose students are to take part in the pro-
gramme. 3) the ‘EU Masters Courses’ will receive visiting scholars from universities 
around the world for teaching and research assignments lasting an average of three 
months. Between now and 2008, Erasmus World will provide support for over 1 000 
visiting scholars to Europe from third countries, who will receive an average grant of 
EUR 13 000. 4) Partnerships between the ‘EU Masters Courses’ and universities in oth-
er continents to facilitate the mobility of 4 000 European students and 800 European 
scholars Erasmus World will encourage the universities taking part in an ‘EU Masters 
Course’ to establish a structured cooperation with top-class universities in third coun-
tries through joint projects covering a three-year period. This cooperation on an equal 
footing will provide a means for the exchange of students and scholars going to third 
countries with Erasmus World scholarships. Between now and 2008, almost 4 000 Eu-
ropean postgraduate students and 800 European visiting scholars should receive support 
under the Erasmus World Programme. This cooperation will relate to areas given high 
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priority for higher education in Europe. 5) International cooperation : Erasmus World 
will provide financial support for the international promotion of European higher educa-
tion (publicity material, presence at international education fairs) and for the establish-
ment of services facilitating access of third country students to European universities 
(tools for language training, living conditions for third country students, etc). It should 
be noted that this programme does not replace, but complements in an innovative way, 
existing regional programmes such as TEMPUS (mainly with countries from the former 
USSR, the Western Balkans and the Mediterranean Basin), agreements with the United 
States and Canada, ALFA and ALBAN (for Latin America), Asia-Link, pilot projects 
with Australia, etc. Compared with these programmes and with national initiatives on 
cooperation with third countries, Erasmus World will offer third-country students and 
teachers a greater opportunity for mobility and an enhanced European added value. 
 
 
 
 
Example summary B (rescaled score: -5.22) 
 
PURPOSE : to amend for the twenty-ninth time Council Directive 76/769/EEC on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member 
States relating to restrictions on the marketing and use of certain dangerous substances 
and preparations (substances classified as carcinogen, mutagen or toxic to reproduction 
- c/m/r) PROPOSED ACT : Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
CONTENT : European Parliament and Council Directive 94/60/EC amending for the 
fourteenth time Directive 76/769/EEC of 27 July 1976 on the approximation of the 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to re-
strictions on the marketing and use of certain dangerous substances and preparations 
introduced a list of substances classified as category 1 or 2 carcinogen, mutagen or toxic 
to reproduction (c/m/r) in the Appendix of Annex I to Directive 76/769/EEC. It stipu-
lates in points 29, 30 and 31 of Annex I of Directive 76/769/EEC that these substances 
may not be used in substances or preparations placed on the market for sale to the gen-
eral public. These are substances which have previously been listed as carcinogen, mu-
tagen or toxic to reproduction (c/m/r) in Annex I of Council Directive 67/548/EEC of 
27 June 1967 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provi-
sions relating to the classification, packaging and labelling of dangerous substances. 
Annex I of Directive 67/548/EEC is regularly updated by way of adaptations to tech-
nical progress. Directive 94/60/EC also provides that the Commission will submit to the 
European Parliament and Council, no later than six months after publication of an adap-
tation to technical progress of Annex I to Council Directive 67/548/EEC, a proposal for 
a Directive governing the substances newly classified as carcinogenic, mutagenic and 
toxic to reproduction in categories 1 and 2, so as to update the Appendix of Annex I to 
Directive 76/769/EEC. Commission Directive 2004/73/EC of 29 April 2004 adapting to 
technical progress for the twenty-ninth time Council Directive 67/548/EEC, and more 
particularly Annex I thereto, inserted 146 entries containing substances newly classified 
as carcinogenic category 1, 21 entries containing substances newly classified as car-
cinogenic category 2, 152 entries containing substances newly classified as mutagenic 
category 2, and 24 entries containing substances newly classified as toxic to reproduc-
tion category 2 in Annex I of Directive 67/548/EEC. It is proposed to update the Ap-
pendix of Annex I to Directive 76/769/EEC in order to govern these substances newly 
classified in the framework of Directive 67/548/EEC. This twenty-ninth amendment 
will insert 346 entries containing substances newly classified or re-classified under 
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Commission Directive 2004/73/EC in the Appendix of Annex I to Directive 
76/769/EEC. However, among these 346 entries, 304 contain substances which were 
already subject to a restriction for sale to the general public due to an earlier classifica-
tion as c/m/r substance of category 1 or 2. Therefore, only 42 of these entries relate to 
substances that will be subject for the first time to the restriction for sale to the general 
public provided in points 29, 30 and 31 of Annex I of Directive 76/769/EEC. Among 
the 146 entries containing substances newly classified as carcinogenic category 1, 145 
cover substances which were previously classified as carcinogenic category 2. There-
fore, the list relating to carcinogens category 2 needs to be amended accordingly. In 
addition, a number of entries in the Appendix of Annex I to Directive 76/769/EEC need 
to be amended to update the content of the column entitled ‘Notes’. This update con-
cerns four entries related to substances classified as carcinogenic category 1, 36 entries 
related to substances classified as carcinogen category 2, six entries related to substanc-
es classified as mutagen category 2, two entries related to substances classified as toxic 
to reproduction category 1 and three entries related to substances classified as toxic to 
reproduction category 2. 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
 
 
This appendix provides supporting information on Paper 3.  
 
Summary statistics 
Table A3.1 provides summary statistics of all variables on the basis of our es-
timation sample. 
 
TABLE A3.1: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF ESTIMATION SAMPLE 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Economic left-right position 51.25 45.62 0 100 
Compromise position -2.46 11.30 -20.53 29.12 
Ideological divisiveness 21.61 12.76 2.71 67.63 
Executive coordination 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Parliamentary oversight 1.02 0.42 0.29 1.75 
Minority government 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Left-right public opinion 5.35 0.34 4.53 6.46 
Net receipts from EU budget 0.70 0.87 -0.95 3.86 
Unemployment rate 7.18 3.02 2.30 18.10 
Inflation rate 2.42 1.61 0.19 12.35 
Economic freedom 7.26 0.62 5.15 8.60 
Population 19.00 25.82 0.49 82.00 
N 1,694    
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Table A3.2 displays the split of observations in our estimation sample by 
country. 
 
TABLE A3.2: OBSERVATIONS BY COUNTRY 
 Observations % Cum.% 
Netherlands 142 8.38 8.38 
Germany 140 8.26 16.65 
Denmark 137 8.09 24.73 
Belgium 135 7.97 32.70 
Finland 130 7.67 40.38 
France 130 7.67 48.05 
Ireland 129 7.62 55.67 
Austria 121 7.14 62.81 
Luxembourg 110 6.49 69.30 
Lithuania 60 3.54 72.85 
Estonia 56 3.31 76.15 
Slovakia 54 3.19 79.34 
Slovenia 53 3.13 82.47 
Czech Republic 51 3.01 85.48 
Hungary 49 2.89 88.37 
Cyprus 48 2.83 91.20 
Latvia 39 2.30 93.51 
Italy 36 2.13 95.63 
Poland 28 1.65 97.28 
Sweden 25 1.48 98.76 
Bulgaria 13 0.77 99.53 
Portugal 8 0.47 100 
TOTAL 1,694 100  
 
 
Table A3.3 reports sample mean values for the key independent variables of 
interest by country.  
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TABLE A3.3: COUNTRY MEANS OF KEY INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 Ideological divi-
siveness 
Executive coor-
dination 
Parliamentary 
oversight 
Minority gov-
ernment 
Austria 19.78 0 0.99 0.29 
Belgium 27.18 0 0.50 0.07 
Bulgaria 21.10 0 1 0 
Cyprus 29.67 0 0.29 0 
Czech Republic 22.85 1 1.36 0.29 
Germany 23.04 0 1.25 0 
Denmark 24.43 1 1.42 1 
Estonia 6.61 0 1.25 0 
Finland 31.57 1 1.75 0 
France 17.75 1 0.91 0 
Hungary 9.84 0 1.11 0 
Ireland 13.03 1 0.59 0.43 
Italy 58.76 0 0.62 0.92 
Lithuania 24.28 1 1.75 0.38 
Luxembourg 6.74 1 0.43 0 
Latvia 13.09 1 1.36 0.44 
Netherlands 24.70 0 0.78 0.13 
Poland 11.03 1 1.11 0 
Portugal 15.04 1 0.48 0 
Sweden 19.00 1 0.96 0 
Slovenia 20.73 0 1.11 0 
Slovakia 33.81 0 1.36 0.04 
TOTAL 21.61 0.5 1.02 0.20 
 
 
Variable definitions and sources 
Table A3.4 provides an overview of all main variables used in the paper, their 
definition, and source as well as the extent of missing values.  
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TABLE A3.4: OVERVIEW OF VARIABLE SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS 
Variable Source / Definition Missing 
values 
Economic left-right 
position DEU
134, linearly transformed 
0 
Compromise posi-
tion 
CMP135 (RILE), simple average of the seat-weighted RILE 
average of the coalition parties and the seat-weighted RILE 
average of the supporting parties (where applicable) 
70 
Ideological divi-
siveness 
CMP (RILE), absolute RILE distance between most ‘left’ and 
most ‘right’ party in the support coalition 
133 
Executive coordi-
nation 
Kassim (2013), ‘1’ for coordinated executive, ‘0’ for uncoor-
dinated executive 
0 
Parliamentary 
oversight 
Winzen (2013), composite measure of indicators of parlia-
mentary control in EU affairs (information, processing, en-
forcement), yearly 
14 
Minority govern-
ment 
‘1’ if cabinet parties hold <= 50% of parliamentary seats, ‘0’ if 
cabinet parties hold > 50% of seats 
0 
Left-right opinion 
Eurobarometer (left-right self-placement), average by coun-
try applying sampling weights, linearly interpolated on the 
day level, six-month lag from proposal date 
0 
Net receipts from 
EU budget 
www.money-go-round.eu, net receipts from EU budget 
(receipts – payments) in % of GDP 
0 
Unemployment World Bank (ILO definition), yearly rate in % 0 
Inflation World Bank (change in consumer prices), yearly rate in % 0 
Economic freedom 
Fraser Institute (Economic Freedom of the World, area ‘Reg-
ulation’)136, yearly and linearly interpolated where necessary 
0 
Population Eurostat, population in million as of 1st of January 2009 0 
 
 
 
 
																													
134 Thomson et al. (2006, 2012). 
135 Lehmann et al. (2015). Parties in the support coalition were identified with the help of the 
ParlGov database (see Döring and Manow 2012) as well as The Political Data Yearbook reports. 
136 Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall (2013). 
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Economic left-right position 
The measure of government’s policy positions on economic left-right issues 
is taken from the DEU dataset directly (March 2012 version). An original coding 
scheme was developed in order to classify all DEU issues with regard to major 
substantive dimensions of political competition in domestic and EU politics. See 
Appendix 1, Table A1.1, for an overview of the 13 categories of the coding 
scheme.  
If an issue was coded into any category between 1 and 6, it was in principle 
included in our analyses (170 issues).137 Inter-coder reliability of the binary deci-
sion as to whether an issue related to any economic left-right category or not 
was assessed with the help of Krippendorff’s alpha that is 0.91. However, we 
excluded any policy issues for which the experts interviewed were not able to 
report at least one third of national governments’ policy positions (see Paper 1, 
footnote 27, for a justification). Importantly, only 16 issues were excluded be-
cause too many positions were missing. Wherever necessary we linearly re-
scaled the pre-defined DEU policy scales of 0-100 so as to ensure that 0 repre-
sented the most ‘left’ option and 100 the most ‘right’ option adopted by any 
government in our sample. Rescaling removes nine further issues on which all 
coalition governments in our sample adopted exactly the same position, and 
variation in positions stemmed from single party governments or the European 
institutions (Commission, EP), which adopted diverging positions but were not 
part of our sample.138 This leaves us with observations on 145 economic left-
right issues. 
																													
137 Categories 7 and 8 do not relate to economic but rather to left-libertarian vs. right-
authoritarian conflicts and were therefore excluded. 
138 The value of the common position of governments on such issues (say, 50) has no meaning-
ful interpretation in these cases, as it is referenced against actors outside the model. 
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Compromise position 
We measure the ideological compromise position of the government’s sup-
porting parties from the CMP’s139 coding of election manifestos (Lehmann et al. 
2015). As we note in the paper, using the CMP instead of expert survey 
measures has several advantages in our particular application. In addition to 
the points mentioned, we would also like to stress that the construct validity of 
scales constructed from the CMP can be more accurately assessed. While CMP 
scales are transformations of category counts with a substantive meaning de-
scribed in the codebook, we usually do not know on what particular conception 
of ‘left-right’ experts base their judgment when answering party surveys 
(Budge 2000). For our analysis specifically, this issue is pertinent to guarantee a 
good substantive matching between the left-right party positions and our cate-
gorised and re-scaled DEU issue positions.  
Our measure of the compromise position is the simple average between the 
seat-weighted RILE of the government parties and the seat-weighted RILE of 
the supporting party (or all opposition parties, in cases of unclear or varying 
support): !"#$%"#&'( !"#$%$"&!"#$%&'( !"#$%&'$&(=  [[(!"#104! +⋯+ !"#606!) − (!!"103! +⋯+ !"#701!)] ∗  !!!!] !!!!! 	!"#$%"#&'( !"#$%$"&!"#$%"&' !"#$%&'$&(=  12 [[(!"#104! +⋯+ !"#606!) − (!"#103! +⋯+ !"#701!)] ∗  !!!!]  !!!!!+ 12 [[(!"#104! +⋯+ !"#606!) − (!"#103! +⋯+ !"#701!)] ∗  !!!!] !!!!! 	
	
																													
139 All CMP-based measures are derived using the ‘2015a’ version of the database. 
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Where i denotes the respective government party, j the respective (support-
ing) opposition party, !! is the number of government parties, !! the number of 
(supporting) opposition parties, !!,! is the number of seats of party i / j, and !!,! 
the total number of government and supporting opposition seats. The measure 
is based on the party manifesto issued at the last elections preceding the date on 
which the proposal was submitted to the Council. 
 
Executive coordination 
We operationalise the distinction between coordinated and uncoordinated 
executives by relying on the classification of Kassim (2013) and use a dummy 
variable that is ‘1’ in case of coordination and ‘0’ in case of no coordination. We 
do not consider the extent of coordination (comprehensive vs. selective) as most 
countries with coordination also display comprehensive coordination. In addi-
tion, selective (policy-specific) coordination may just be sufficient to bring na-
tional ministers in line with the coalition’s compromise where they have an in-
centive to deviate from it. 
 
Parliamentary oversight 
We take the composite measure of parliamentary oversight in EU affairs 
from Winzen (2013). This is the most recent version of the data. Values for Ro-
mania in 2007 and 2008 are missing, which is why the country is not included in 
our main models in the paper. However, in the section on robustness checks 
(see below), we show that re-estimating our main model with multiple imputa-
tions of these values leads to exactly the same results as on the restricted sample 
in the paper. 
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Minority government 
We identify minority governments by using the ParlGov database (Döring 
and Manow 2012) on government composition. However, we corrected the in-
formation from this database in several cases after cross-checking it with infor-
mation from The Political Data Yearbook. In particular, we discovered some gov-
ernments that lost their majority late in their legislative term and acted as mi-
nority quasi-caretakers up to their replacement.  
 
For further details on all other variables, consult Appendix 1. Variables are 
linked on the proposal date. Operationalisations and data sources of variables 
with the same name are identical across papers. 
 
Missing data 
For general information on linking ParlGov and CMP, see Appendix 1. Spe-
cific information on missing values in Paper 3 follows. 
For majority governments, we are able to recover the positions of all cabinet 
parties for 91% of the observations in our sample. The remaining 9% are split as 
follows: first, for 3.6% of these cases (some observations from France and Italy) 
we lack the CMP measures of at least one cabinet party and we exclude these 
observations from the main analyses in the paper, as any measurement of the 
coalition’s ideological divisiveness (and to a much lesser extent, the compro-
mise position) would be unreliable. Second, for three majority governments of 
Italy (Berlusconi II + III, Prodi I), representing 4.3% of the observations, we face 
the problem that the government parties issued a common manifesto. Hence, 
while this manifesto is arguably an adequate measurement of the compromise 
position of these parties, we again lack information on the ideological range of 
the coalition and exclude these cases. Moreover, we also lack CMP measures 
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from the Latvian elections 2006, which leads to the exclusion of the remaining 
1.2% of observations from majority governments.  
For minority governments which rely on stable support of a single party, we 
always have full CMP measures for all parties. For minority governments rely-
ing on changing support, we use the seat-weighted average opposition party as 
a proxy.140 While some opposition parties and factions are not covered by the 
CMP, the dataset always provides measures for more than 90% of non-
governmental seats. Hence, we assume that the average opposition party’s posi-
tion is sufficiently precisely measured by the CMP and do not exclude any ob-
servations from minority governments. 
In total, we have 133 missing values on ideological divisiveness (7.2%) and 
70 on the compromise position (3.8%). Importantly, in the robustness checks 
(see below) we demonstrate that our results are robust to using multiple impu-
tations for these missing CMP measures. 
 
Robustness checks 
We perform various robustness checks to provide more confidence in our 
main results by re-estimating variations of our baseline model from Table 4.1 in 
the paper. The results of these robustness checks are reported in Table A3.5. 
First, we address four different measurement concerns. As our results may 
partly hinge on the operationalisation of the compromise position, Models 1 
and 2 re-estimate our baseline model with alternative measures. In Model 1, we 
ascertain the influence of seat-weighting and calculate the compromise as the 
																													
140 For the alternative calculation of the compromise in ‘Model 2’ in the next section (see Table 
A3.4), we use the opposition parties closest to the PM. For this calculation we do likewise not 
consider parties with missing CMP values. 
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simple average of all supporting parties (irrespective of cabinet representation). 
In Model 2, we challenge the assumption that opposition support under minori-
ty governments with no fixed supporting parties is best characterised by the 
average opposition party, and instead select the opposition parties ideologically 
closest to the PM’s party. This reflects the idea that the PM is the effective for-
mateur, or alternatively, that this role is played by the responsible minister, 
who, in most cases, will be from the PM’s party. We seat-weight among cabinet 
and opposition parties identified according to this criterion. In both cases, the 
results are substantively identical to those from our main specification, with 
one notable variation in the significance level: in Model 1, the interaction be-
tween ideological divisiveness and the compromise drops below the 5% signifi-
cance level with a p-value of 0.072. 
Regarding ideological divisiveness, we test two alternatives to the range. 
Importantly, the range may overstate divisiveness in support coalitions with ! > 2 parties, if the largest party (holding most ministerial posts) is centrally 
located. In such cases, the distance between the largest party as the predomi-
nant proposer and the party located furthest from it in the coalition may be a 
better measure of divisiveness. We test this measure in Model 3 and largely 
confirm our results with the interaction on minority governments dropping to a 
p-value of 0.071. Moreover, the range is not sensitive to the number of parties in 
the coalition. If each coalition partner can call and enforce compromise negotia-
tions and does so with a certain probability that increases with ideological dis-
tance, it is not only the ideological range that matters for the joint probability of 
compromise negotiations but also the sheer number of parties in the coalition. 
In fact, the more parties are located further from the central proposer, the more 
likely compromises should become. We therefore construct a measure of the 
summed ideological distance of all parties in the coalition to the largest party as 
predominant proposer. The results in Model 4 mostly confirm our findings. The 
divisiveness effect appears even more significant compared to our baseline re-
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sults (1% level), while the interaction on minority governments is a borderline 
case for significance at the 5% level with a p-value of 0.05. 
One further measurement concern pertains to the cross-national comparabil-
ity of left-right ideology. While we argue that the CMP is the best approach to 
measure a universal left-right concept, research has shown that parties that are 
left or right according to the CMP (and, indeed, popular perception) sometimes 
implement diametric policies in post-communist and Western Europe (Tavits 
and Letki 2009). In addition, some research indicates that for parties in post-
communist countries some ‘left’ RILE categories correlate more strongly with 
‘right’ RILE categories than within the set of ‘left’ categories – and vice versa 
(Mölder 2013). From our perspective, this may suggest that the RILE concept of 
economic left-right is not a major structuring factor in party competition in 
Eastern Europe. But this actually does not demonstrate that the RILE index 
lacks any construct validity when used for Eastern European parties. Instead, it 
may simply indicate that many parties in post-communist societies have am-
biguous stances on this dimension, which result in rather centrist and less dis-
persed positions. This is exactly what we see in our sample, where dispersion of 
the compromise position is much larger in Western than in Eastern Europe. In 
order to address remaining doubts, Model 5 re-estimates our main model ex-
cluding post-communist countries.141 Our findings substantively hold in this 
restricted sample, with the interaction on ideological divisiveness dropping in 
significance to a p-value of 0.07.  
																													
141 As our sample is reduced to 13 countries, we do not report country cluster-robust standard 
errors, as they are asymptotic in the number of clusters and we are estimating 19 parameters. 
Instead, we report hetereoscedasticity-robust standard errors assuming that our set of control 
variables sufficiently minimises concerns about clustering in this restricted sample of countries. 
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TABLE A3.5: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON MODEL OF COALITION POLICY-MAKING 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Compromise position -0.312 -0.121 -0.244 -0.050 -0.555 -0.019 0.091 
 (0.325) (0.325) (0.340) (0.274) (0.423) (0.019) (0.314) 
Ideological divisiveness -0.020 -0.044 0.042 -0.029 0.023 -0.008 -0.109 
 (0.122) (0.120) (0.158) (0.090) (0.114) (0.007) (0.109) 
Ideological divisiveness x Compromise position 0.030 0.032 0.040 0.022 0.031 0.002 0.038 
 (0.016)* (0.013)** (0.018)** (0.006)*** (0.017)* (0.001)** (0.016)** 
Executive coordination -4.871 -6.588 -6.017 -7.692 -2.485 -0.224 -5.504 
 (3.255) (3.732)* (3.739) (3.545)** (3.957) (0.232) (3.703) 
Executive coordination x Compromise position 0.526 0.447 0.567 0.500 0.841 0.044 0.507 
 (0.225)** (0.211)** (0.247)** (0.217)** (0.309)*** (0.016)*** (0.236)** 
Minority govt -3.200 -5.069 -11.768 -11.485 3.036 -0.351 -10.543 
 (11.915) (12.342) (10.121) (9.631) (9.268) (0.524) (9.166) 
Parl. oversight 0.513 -0.849 -1.182 -2.446 5.693 0.002 -4.813 
 (4.232) (4.008) (4.386) (4.008) (7.532) (0.258) (4.045) 
Minority govt x Parl. oversight -4.390 3.503 1.907 2.857 -16.400 -0.101 3.352 
 (11.573) (11.101) (9.249) (8.840) (8.345)* (0.505) (8.754) 
Minority govt x Compromise position -3.304 -3.725 -3.523 -3.587 -3.972 -0.248 -4.240 
 (1.151)*** (0.930)*** (1.855)* (1.729)* (1.515)*** (0.097)** (1.655)** 
Parl. oversight x Compromise position -0.259 -0.548 -0.613 -0.601 -0.311 -0.030 -0.866 
 (0.288) (0.287)* (0.365) (0.267)** (0.433) (0.024) (0.382)** 
Minority govt x Parl. oversight x Compromise position 2.491 2.656 3.028 3.058 3.320 0.203 3.504 
 (1.048)** (0.758)*** (1.298)** (1.192)** (1.159)*** (0.070)*** (1.260)** 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Policy Policy Policy Policy Policy Policy Policy 
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issues issues issues issues issues issues issues 
Number of policy issues 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 
Number of countries 22 22 22 22 13 22 23 
N 1,694 1,694 1,694 1,694 1,291 1,694 1,841 
Robustness check No seat-
weighting 
Opposi-
tion party 
close to 
PM 
Max dis-
tance to 
largest 
party 
Sum dis-
tance to 
largest 
party 
Western 
Europe 
only 
Binary DV Multiple 
imputa-
tions 
Notes: All are fixed effects regressions, except for ‘Model 6’, which is a fixed effects logistic regression; No observations for countries without coalition governments;  
Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses, except for ‘Model 5’ with errors clustered by policy issue; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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A last concern about measurement is that we treat the CMP estimates as if 
they had no uncertainty. Benoit, Laver, and Mikhaylov (2009) have argued that 
positions expressed in a 100-page manifesto are arguably measured with much 
more precision by the CMP than those expressed in a 10-page manifesto. We 
follow the authors’ proposed remedy and obtain standard errors of the RILE 
scores of all parties by bootstrapping from the coded quasi-sentences.142 We 
then use the SIMEX (simulation and extrapolation) algorithm to see how our 
results would change at different levels of measurement error. For our four 
main interaction coefficients this exercise is displayed in Figure A3.1-a + b + c + d. 
They clearly show that as ! – the extent of measurement error we add to our 
data – increases, our results become weaker. Hence, any presence of measure-
ment error in the CMP does not drive our results. Quite the opposite: if we 
faced no measurement error (! = -1), we would have even stronger results than 
those reported.143  
																													
142 We obtain standard errors of a support coalition’s compromise position and its ideological 
range by analytical derivation from the bootstrapped standard error estimates for each individ-
ual party: 
!"#$%"#&'( !"!"#$%&'( !"# = !""#$#%&''() !"! ∗  !!!! !!!!!   !"#$%"#&'( !"!"#$%"&' !"# =
!""#$#%&''() !"! ∗  !!!! !!!!! ∗  !! ! +  !""#$#%&''() !"! ∗  !!!! !!!!! ∗  !! !  
!"#$% !"!"#$%&'(/!"#$%"&' = !""#$#%&''() !"!"#$% !"#$ !!"#$! ! + !""#$#%&''() !"!"#$%!"#$ !!"#!!! !!!!!   
Where ! denotes cabinet parties, ! supporting parties, !!,! is the number of seats of party i / j, and !!,! the total number of government and supporting opposition seats. 
143 For technical reasons we have to implement the SIMEX analysis using issue dummies for the 
fixed effects and without any adjustment of standard errors for country-level clustering. But 
this does not influence the directional impact of the measurement error. We conducted the same 
SIMEX analysis for hypothesis H5 (see Table 4.2 in the paper), the relationship between institu-
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Next, we address one concern regarding model specification: the fact that a 
significant fraction of the DEU policy scales are binary, i.e. the legislative con-
flict only offered two options. This renders the distribution of our dependent 
variable rather skewed at both tails.  
 
FIGURE A3.1: SIMEX COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES OF INTERACTION 
TERMS 
	
A3.1-A: EXECUTIVE COORDINATION * COMPROMISE POSITION 
	
	
A3.1-B: IDEOLOGICAL DIVISIVENESS * COMPROMISE POSITION 
	
	
																																																																																																																																																																		
tional strength, ideological divisiveness, and the compromise position. Again, measurement 
error weakens our results instead of causing them. 
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A3.1-C: MINORITY GOVT * PARL. OVERSIGHT * COMPROMISE POSITION 
	
 
A3.1-D: MINORITY GOVT * COMPROMISE POSITION 
	
Notes: SIMEX estimates with 500 iterations per !. Detailed results are available from the authors upon 
request. 
	
While we use linear regression in the paper to preserve maximum variation 
in the data, we now create a second, dichotomised version of the dependent 
variable in order to see whether our non-normal dependent variable drives any 
results. If governments took more leftist positions between 0 and 49, we code 
this as ‘0’ and more rightist positions between 50 and 100 as ‘1’ (see also Paper 
1). Model 6 re-estimates our final model with this dependent variable using lo-
gistic regression with fixed effects for policy issues and cluster-robust standard 
errors at the country level. Again, this different specification yields qualitatively 
identical results, indicating that the compromise position is a stronger predictor 
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of whether governments adopt leftist or rightist positions in the Council under 
the factors we hypothesised.  
Last, we address the problem of missing data from the CMP and the Winzen 
(2013) dataset on parliamentary oversight (for Romania). In all baseline estima-
tions we had to list-wise delete a total of 8% of the observations due to these 
sources (see above). In order to ascertain whether this causes any potential bias 
of our results, we build a multiple imputation (MI) model using regression im-
putation with chained equations for the missing values (and their interactions 
with other variables treating interactions as ‘just another variable’). We use 10 
multiple imputed datasets with all remaining covariates, policy issue dummies, 
and the dependent variable as predictors. Additionally, we also include a vari-
able indicating the number of party families represented in the support coali-
tion, which should be beneficial for imputing the ideological divisiveness of the 
coalition. The MI results from Model 7 show that all our results firmly hold, 
now with Romania included, even across 23 EU countries.144 
 
Testing the alternatives 
Our data from the Council allowed us to test the extent to which the coalition 
compromise underpins governments’ adopted policy positions. Regrettably, 
our test with EU policy-making does not enable us to test directly whether min-
isterial government prevails when the conditions for the compromise model are 
not given. This is due to the fact that it is often impossible to ascertain which 
																													
144 Using multiple imputations (as well as in ‘Model 4’ with the alternative measure of ideologi-
cal divisiveness) we even find evidence that the effect of parliamentary oversight on the com-
promise is negative under majority governments (the opposite of Martin and Vanberg's (2011) 
argument). Importantly, unreported analyses confirm that the marginal effect of oversight on 
the compromise under minority governments is still significantly positive. 
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national minister is responsible for dealing with an EU legislative proposal. In-
formation on this is not generally reported and strategies to collect this infor-
mation are not reliable.145 However, what we are able to do here is test the pre-
dictive power of the compromise position against two other prominent alterna-
tives that do not feature in our model: the median legislative party (see Baron 
1991; Morelli 1999; Schofield and Laver 1990) and the PM party (e.g. Dewan and 
Hortala-Vallve 2011). If our model provides a sufficient description of coalition 
policy-making as a game between compromises and ministerial discretion, the 
positions of the median and the PM parties should have little positive relation-
ship with policy positions.  
One complication in testing this claim is that the median legislative party’s 
position in particular, but also the PM party’s position, is often highly correlat-
ed with the compromise position as well as with the average minister’s position 
(e.g. if the PM party also fills most portfolios). This may cause spurious correla-
tions between policy positions and these party positions. Controlling for the 
compromise position can ameliorate this problem, but potentially introduces 
concerns about multicollinearity. We address this problem by estimating a se-
ries of models, gradually increasing a minimum absolute distance between the 
median or PM party’s position and the compromise position. The first model 
includes all observations in our sample, the second model only those where the 
distance between compromise and median or PM position is more than 1 RILE 
																													
145	Participant lists of ministerial Council meetings could, in principle, serve as an indication of 
responsibility. Yet, in the 1990s, member states’ Permanent Representatives to the EU attended 
a substantial amount of these meetings instead of the ministers and delivered pre-planned ne-
gotiation lines on their behalf. In addition, the accuracy of the	participant lists is not very high. 
Speakers in official meetings and reported participants do not generally match. Moreover, as 
many pieces of legislation cover several portfolios they cannot be allocated to certain ministries 
in a straightforward manner.  
		 	277	
scale points, the third model sets 2 scale points as the minimum difference, the 
third 3 scale points etc. We increase the minimum distance until our number of 
observations falls below 20% of the original sample. For the comparison with 
the median party we fall under 20% of the observations at a difference of 9 RILE 
scale points, whereas the same figure is 12 for the PM party. We include the 
median or PM party’s position and the compromise position as well as all con-
trol variables from the last section in all estimations.  
Figure A3.2 shows the results for the coefficients on the compromise and the 
median or PM party’s position for five models each. In parentheses we also re-
port the correlation between the compromise position and the median or PM 
party’s position. In general, the results demonstrate that neither the median nor 
the PM party’s position is a significant positive predictor of adopted policy po-
sitions in any of the models when controlling for the compromise position. 
Moreover, the compromise position has a positive coefficient in most of the 
models; this is enough to be statistically significant in 6 out of 10 models. This is 
especially the case when comparing to the PM party in samples where the two 
positions do not correlate highly, i.e. at 9 or 12 scale points difference on the 
RILE.146 
In total, these results suggest that our model of coalition policy-making is 
capturing the major dynamics between parties and we find no evidence that 
either the median or the PM party has to be considered in modelling the pro-
cess of policy formulation. 
 
 
																													
146 While the correlations between the compromise and the PM party shrink significantly with 
distance between the two measures, the median party’s position and the compromise are highly 
correlated in virtually any sample. 
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FIGURE A3.2: COMPARISON OF COMPROMISE POSITION TO MEDIAN 
AND PM PARTY 
 
Notes: 95% confidence intervals as horizontal lines. Detailed results are available from the authors upon 
request. 
 
Results on Martin and Vanberg (2011) sample 
An important feature of our main results is that we find no evidence that 
parliamentary oversight strengthens the relevance of the coalition compromise 
under majority rule, as argued in the work of Martin and Vanberg (2004, 2011). 
In fact, if anything, the results in Table 4.1 in the paper suggest that parliamen-
tary institutions have a negative influence on the compromise under majority 
rule (negative coefficient on interaction between parliamentary oversight and 
the compromise position). However, this effect is not statistically significant 
and from a theoretical perspective – it seems to us – there is little reason to ex-
pect any negative impact of parliamentary institutions.  
For some readers, the differences in our findings compared to that of Martin 
and Vanberg may instead raise concerns about our measure of parliamentary 
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institutions (taken from Winzen 2013). We want to alleviate these doubts by re-
estimating our baseline model and allowing the effect of parliamentary institu-
tions to vary between the countries included in Martin and Vanberg's (2011) 
seminal book (M&V) and those countries not included in their analysis. For this 
purpose, we construct a simple dummy that is ‘1’ for the countries included in 
M&V (these are Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, France, and Ireland) and 
‘0’ otherwise. In order to avoid four-way interactions and following M&V’s ar-
gument about the general benefit of legislative institutions, we do not consider 
the differential effect of parliamentary oversight under minority vs. majority 
rule here. Instead, we simply use a three-way interaction between the M&V 
sample dummy, parliamentary oversight, and the compromise position. Except 
for this difference we re-estimate our baseline model from Table 4.1 in the pa-
per.  
The results are reported as Model MV1 in Table A3.6. The expectations on the 
ideological range and executive coordination hold as expected. Interestingly 
however, the coefficient on the interaction term between parliamentary over-
sight and the compromise position is negative and statistically insignificant, but 
the three-way interaction indicating the additional effect for the countries in the 
M&V sample is strongly positive and highly significant. To investigate this fur-
ther, we plot marginal effects of the compromise position depending on par-
liamentary oversight and separately for the M&V sample as well as for all other 
countries in Figure A3.3. 
This illustrates nicely that we are able to replicate the finding by M&V – that 
strong parliaments help to police the compromise and make it more predictive 
of policy positions – for their sample of countries, but that the opposite, a nega-
tive relationship, emerges for the 17 countries we can add with our empirical 
approach. A few readers may still be concerned, as out of the countries we add, 
nine are post-communist and their parliamentary institutions may not be fully 
comparable to those in Western Europe and might be deficiently represented by 
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the Winzen composite measure. Therefore, Model MV2 performs the compari-
son between countries included in M&V and those not analysed in the book but 
excluding post-communist countries. The results are substantively the same. 
 
TABLE A3.6: ANALYSIS WITH M&V DUMMY 
 Model MV1 Model MV2 
Compromise position -0.214 -0.157 
 (0.223) (0.466) 
Ideological divisiveness -0.089 -0.038 
 (0.102) (0.100) 
Ideological divisiveness x Compromise position 0.042 0.041 
 (0.017)** (0.016)** 
Executive coordination -6.432 -3.534 
 (3.582)* (3.649) 
Executive coordination x Compromise position 0.720 0.844 
 (0.211)*** (0.257)*** 
Sample M&V 8.496 10.756 
 (6.323) (9.046) 
Parliamentary oversight 2.178 -1.554 
 (3.601) (7.341) 
Sample M&V x Parliamentary oversight -18.321 -20.528 
 (5.543)*** (8.088)** 
Sample M&V x Compromise position -3.723 -4.001 
 (0.748)*** (0.914)*** 
Parliamentary oversight x Compromise position -0.637 -0.742 
 (0.377) (0.491) 
Sample M&V x Parliamentary oversight x Compromise position 3.339 3.595 
 (0.665)*** (0.837)*** 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Policy issues Policy issues 
Number of policy issues 145 145 
Number of countries 22 13 
N 1,694 1,291 
R2 (within) 0.30 0.28 
Notes: Both are fixed effects regressions; No observations for countries without coalition governments; 
Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses, except for ‘Model MV2’ with errors clustered by 
policy issue; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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From our perspective, this makes it unlikely that the measure of parliamen-
tary oversight we employ is simply inadequate. While we cannot ultimately 
rule out this claim, we think that our results rather point to the possibility that 
the very limited country sample in M&V might bias the effect of parliamentary 
institutions under majority rule. Regrettably, we have no answer as to why the 
effects of parliamentary institutions differ in the two samples of countries. This 
might be due to an unobserved confounder or to various idiosyncrasies of the 
five countries included in M&V.  
 
FIGURE A3.3: COMPROMISE POSITION, PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT, 
AND M&V SAMPLE 
 
Notes: 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines; Histogram of observations as shaded areas. 
 
Formal model extensions 
In the following, we discuss whether our results from the formal model of 
coalition policy-making in parliamentary systems hold in cases of coalitions 
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with more than two parties and a centrist proposing party. We also discuss the 
implications of nesting the game within the Council of the European Union. 
 
Majority government coalitions of more than two parties 
Consider a majority government composed of three parties A, B, and C. The 
initial proposal comes from party A and the other two parties can simultane-
ously propose an amendment. Table A3.7 below summarises the payoffs for par-
ties B and C. 
	
TABLE A3.7: PAYOFFS FOR PARTIES B AND C 
 
Party B 
Do not amend Amend 
Party C 
 
Do not 
amend 
 
−!!! − !!3 ;  −!!! − !!3  
 
 
− !!2 ! − !!3 − !!;  −(!! −  !!2 )! − !!3  
 
Amend 
 
− !! − !!2  ! − !!3 ;  −(!!2 )! − !!3  − !! 
 
 
− !! −  !! + !!3 ! − !!3 − !!;  −(!! − !! + !!3 )! − !!3 − !! 
 
Notes: First payoff of party B, second payoff of party C. We disregard the case of !! =  !!. 
	
Consider first the case of a non-centrist proposer, that is !!  >  !! > !! = 0. 
We start with the situation where neither party amends – the upper left quad-
rant in Table A3.7. This is a Nash equilibrium if !! > !!!!! , since neither party 
has an incentive to change strategy unilaterally. If !! < !!!!! , party C amends. 
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Party B then amends, if and only if !! < (!! − !!!  )! −(!! −  !!!!!! )! ≡  !(!! , !!). 
Note also that, since !!!!! > !!!!! , party B will never amend first. Let !(!! , !!) ≡!! + !!!!   and !(!! , !! , !!) ≡ !! +  ( !!!!!!! )!. The best reply of party A is: if !! > !!!!! , propose !! = 0; if !(!! , !!) < !! < !!!!! , propose !! = !! −  !(!! , !!); 
otherwise, propose !! = !! + !! − !(!! , !! , !!). The outcome is ! = !! + !! −!(!! , !! , !!) if !!  <  !(!! , !!), ! = !! −  !(!! , !!) if  !(!! , !!) < !! < !!!!! , other-
wise ! = 0. Note that party B matters only with regard to which compromise 
position will be adopted, but it is irrelevant as to whether a compromise, that is ! ≠ 0, will be adopted. The circumstances under which party B amends are a 
subset of the circumstances under which party C does. The conclusion present-
ed in the main text holds: we should expect compromise positions in case of 
more heterogeneous coalition governments (as !! increases in this three party 
majority coalition), and when there are lower costs of challenging a proposal (as !! decreases). 
Consider now the case of a centrist proposer !!  >  !! = 0 > !!. Party A’s 
ideal policy is now located between those of the other two parties. It is in itself 
already more of a compromise than the positions of the other two parties. Nev-
ertheless, we analyse when the outcome differs from A’s position, representing 
therefore even more of a compromise. If !!!!! > !!!!! , party C again amends first 
and party B follows under that same circumstances analysed above. If !!!!! < !!!!! , 
the two parties simply switch roles. Results therefore hold and they can be easi-
ly extended to larger coalitions since the party that is located farthest away 
from the proposer drives the results. 
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A centrist agenda-setter in minority governments 
Consider now the same configuration, that is !! > !! = 0 > !!, but in the 
case of a minority government. In other words, the opposition party C is closer 
to the proposer party A than to the other government party B. Again, we can 
produce expectations about when the outcome differs from A’s position. 
The strategies of the three parties are the same as those described in the pa-
per. The only difference is that Party C’s ideal policy now takes negative values, !! < 0. Recall that !(!! , !!) ≡ (!! − !!! )!− (!!!!!!! )!. The outcome is (more of) a 
compromise position, that is ! ≠ 0, if 
● !! <  !!!!!   and !! > !"#[!(!! , !!); !!!!! ] 
● !! < !!! − ( !!!!!!! )! and !(!! , !!) > !! > !!!!!  
● !!!!! > !! > !(!! , !!) 
● !! < !"#[!(!! , !!); !!!!! ] 
We have to consider two cases. In the first case, !! < −3!! and !(!! , !!) <!!!!! . In this circumstance, the outcome differs from A’s ideal policy if 
● !! <  !!!!!   and  !! > !!!!!  
● !! < !!!!!  
There is no difference from the equilibriums analysed in the paper. We are 
however considering an opposition party C which is located quite far away 
from the two parties. Its distance from A is three times the government range. 
In the second case, !! > −3!! and !(!! , !!) > !!!!! . In this circumstance the 
outcome differs from A’s ideal policy if 
● !! <  !!!!!    and  !! > !(!! , !!) 
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● !! < !!! − ( !!!!!!! )!  and   !(!! , !!) > !! > !!!!!  
● !! < !!!!!  
In the first set of inequalities, in the case of an ideologically homogeneous 
support coalition (as !! approaches zero - !!) or weaker parliamentary over-
sight (as !! increases), we should expect a compromise position that differs 
from zero under the same conditions as those in majority government. The se-
cond set of inequalities represents a situation of intermediate levels of ideologi-
cal homogeneity and oversight. Nevertheless, as the parliamentary support coa-
lition becomes more homogeneous (as !! approaches zero –  !!) or parliamen-
tary oversight weaker (as !! increases), it approaches the same conditions as 
those under majority government. Otherwise, it approaches the first case of mi-
nority government. The third inequality is the same as in the first case of minor-
ity government. 
The conditions that lead to an amendment of party A’s proposal are unal-
tered, but because now A’s proposal is more centrist, the substantive impact of 
these factors is lower. In other words, any given compromise is naturally closer 
to A’s ideal policy if !! > !! > !! than if !! > !! > !!. So, say, the same in-
crease in the heterogeneity of the parliamentary support coalition should in-
crease the likelihood of having a compromise position in both cases, but the size 
of the effect would be smaller when the proposer is centrally located. 
 
Nesting the game within the Council of the European Union 
The empirical test of our model evaluates whether the degree to which the 
compromise position is reflected in the negotiation positions of the ministers of 
the Council varies with the ideological divisiveness in the government’s sup-
port coalition as well as executive and legislative institutions. This approach has 
several benefits. However, these positions are formulated on the basis of a bill 
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proposed by the Commission and, maybe, amended by the EP. We consider 
here whether this context has implications for our model. 
The DEU dataset records the governments’ negotiation positions at the earli-
est possible stage of the legislative process, when information about other gov-
ernments’ positions is most scarce. The key issue is whether governments have 
strong incentives to misrepresent their positions before the Council. According-
ly, we evaluate whether models of legislative bargaining with incomplete in-
formation have implications that must be taken into account in our analysis. 
Most of these models are centred on an uninformed proposer, which can be the 
Commission, making an offer to a receiver. For our discussion, it is useful to 
consider two types of receivers: conservatives who prefer a small policy change, 
and reformists who prefer a large change. The proposer belongs to the latter 
group.  
Consider the standard Nash bargaining solution where a proposer makes to 
a receiver a take-it-or-leave-it offer for dividing a pie. The receiver can either 
have a low disagreement value (a reformist) or a high disagreement value (a 
conservative). The proposer is more likely to make a conservative offer if the 
probability of a reformist type is low and the difference, in terms of proposer 
utility, between a conservative and a reformist offer is small (McCarty and 
Meirowitz 2007). This result indicates that a reformist could be better off if she 
can manipulate the proposer’s belief about her type. Whether this is possible is 
far from certain, however. 
In an important model on veto threats where the receiver sends a costless 
signal to the proposer (Matthews 1989; McCarty and Meirowitz 2007), the base-
line outcome is an uninformative babbling equilibrium where each type of re-
ceiver adopts the same mixed strategy over the set of possible signals. A sepa-
rating equilibrium, where each type sends a distinct signal, does not exist. The 
most informative equilibrium consists of only the most reformist receivers – 
those even more reformists than the proposer – signalling their support and 
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conservative receivers issuing a veto threat and gaining concessions. The impli-
cation of this model for our context is that only the governments which want a 
more radical reform than the Commission have incentives to distinguish them-
selves from the others. Additionally, a risk of negotiation failure makes a re-
formist receiver even more likely to compromise than a conservative (McCarty 
and Meirowitz 2007). On the other hand, McCarty (1997) shows how a reformist 
receiver may instead reject a first-period proposal to build a reputation as con-
servative and obtain a better outcome from a second-period proposal (the posi-
tions of the reformist receiver and the proposer must be sufficiently different 
for this dynamic to hold). 
In sum, these models do not offer obvious implications to take into account 
in our analysis. A reformist government may have an incentive to manipulate 
the proposer’s belief about her type when reputation is important. In other 
words, it may report a more conservative position. However, this pooling may 
not survive if there is a risk of failure (i.e. the bill is not adopted) or for strongly 
reformist governments. 
Moreover, these incentives are rooted in the take-it-or-leave-it nature of the 
proposer’s offer of these models. This setup confers a significant power to the 
proposer and, therefore, strong incentives for the receiver to manipulate him. In 
the Council, any government can propose amendments and decisions require 
supermajority, if not unanimous consent. The EP is another veto player in the 
ordinary legislative procedure. Open rule, supermajority, and parliamentary 
involvement make voting (veto) power more important than proposal power. 
Under these circumstances, a proposer has limited opportunities to shape out-
comes and a receiver has weak incentives to misrepresent her views. Accord-
ingly, a minister should have weak incentives to misrepresent her initial negoti-
ation position before the Council. 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
 
 
This appendix provides supporting information on Paper 4.  
 
Summary statistics 
In addition to Table 5.2 in the paper, Table A4.1 below depicts summary sta-
tistics of question-demeaned opinion and salience by country instead of policy 
area. 
 
TABLE A4.1: VARIATION IN QUESTION-DEMEANED OPINION AND SALI-
ENCE WITHIN COUNTRIES 
 Opinion Salience 
 Mean SD Max Min Mean SD Max Min 
AT -7.22 14.26 -43.46 31.79 2.25 3.66 -7.27 13.44 
BE -2.19 7.35 -18.79 16.43 6.00 4.96 -15.44 20.23 
BU 6.63 13.60 -24.76 35.88 -8.30 7.20 -32.54 2.88 
CY 3.76 10.54 -24.24 33.03 1.21 3.73 -13.04 14.24 
CZ -3.37 9.48 -40.04 26.79 2.23 4.31 -15.68 13.13 
DE -4.33 11.42 -30.30 25.54 3.80 3.65 -5.13 17.08 
DK -4.66 11.78 -44.13 36.96 3.82 3.59 -4.83 17.22 
EE 0.29 7.35 -21.72 18.79 -3.82 5.20 -24.63 9.14 
EL 1.93 9.25 -22.92 30.92 6.41 5.40 -16.69 23.16 
ES 2.59 8.71 -20.30 27.28 -4.35 6.51 -21.14 9.21 
FI -4.57 10.63 -38.86 18.01 4.87 3.70 -9.97 14.65 
FR -1.61 8.32 -29.31 25.40 2.61 2.98 -5.69 14.52 
HU 1.86 7.98 -40.78 26.96 -0.21 5.47 -28.32 15.49 
IE 2.77 8.23 -19.10 28.13 -4.75 8.04 -26.03 24.96 
IT 0.25 10.91 -23.22 30.73 -0.23 4.48 -23.58 20.15 
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LT 2.21 9.26 -29.23 29.07 -6.34 6.29 -35.74 4.55 
LU -4.10 10.35 -31.85 19.61 2.63 4.36 -9.16 18.32 
LV 0.01 7.60 -28.88 20.14 -2.68 5.07 -22.70 11.95 
MT 4.46 9.59 -27.32 34.31 -5.30 6.64 -32.27 11.55 
NL -4.89 10.74 -29.02 33.72 4.00 4.52 -28.54 16.43 
PL 2.95 9.14 -21.47 26.34 -1.70 3.86 -26.41 9.40 
PT 2.11 7.27 -19.26 23.57 -4.78 5.59 -22.53 13.65 
RO 7.57 13.64 -22.83 45.16 -7.86 5.87 -31.04 6.51 
SE -0.78 13.80 -33.60 29.63 2.64 4.34 -14.19 15.80 
SI 2.73 8.51 -25.49 23.51 3.61 4.65 -22.04 14.23 
SK 0.73 8.06 -32.22 21.95 1.83 4.53 -21.88 12.67 
UK -2.52 8.80 -27.44 20.41 -0.65 4.50 -13.93 18.72 
TOTAL 0.00 10.64 -44.13 45.16 0.00 6.53 -35.74 24.96 
Notes: AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; CY: Cyprus; CZ: The Czech Republic; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; FI: 
Finland; FR: France; DE: Germany; EL: Greece; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IT: Italy; LV: Latvia; LT: Lithua-
nia; LU: Luxembourg; MT: Malta; NL: The Netherlands; PL: Poland; PT: Portugal; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slo-
vakia; ES: Spain; SE: Sweden; UK: The United Kingdom. 
 
This demonstrates that the average differences in opinion and salience across 
countries are rather small, i.e. within 10 to 15 percentage points for both 
measures. Importantly, these differences do not seem to follow any obvious 
structure. In particular, EU policy-making is not consistently more salient in the 
old than in the new member states or in the big than in the small. While it is 
true that Bulgarians and Romanians regard EU policies as least salient, citizens 
in other new and small member states such as Slovenia or the Czech Republic 
care more about EU policies than Italians and as much as French or Germans.  
 
Variable definitions, sources, and data collection 
Table A4.2 provides an overview of the definitions and sources of all main 
variables used in the paper (in the models in Tables 5.4 + 5.5).  
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TABLE A4.2: OVERVIEW OF VARIABLES’ DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Policy change ‘1’ = Policy change occurred (implementation 
degree >= 80) 
‘0’ = No change occurred (implementation 
degree < 80) 
Author’s own data 
Congruence ‘1’ = Policy change occurred and opinion ma-
jority in favour of change, or no change oc-
curred and opinion majority against change 
‘0’ = Otherwise 
Author’s own data, Euroba-
rometer survey series 
Most salient 
opinion 
(five/ten) 
0-100, simple average of support for policy 
change (as percentage, excluding DK/refusal) 
in five/ten countries with highest salience on 
the question 
Eurobarometer survey series 
Least salient 
opinion 
(five/ten) 
0-100, simple average of support for policy 
change (as percentage, excluding DK/refusal) 
in five/ten countries with lowest salience on 
the question 
Eurobarometer survey series 
EU-wide opin-
ion 
0-100, EU-wide support for policy change (as 
percentage, excluding DK/refusal) 
Eurobarometer survey series 
Salience 100 minus share of DK/refusal responses as 
percentage of all responses 
Eurobarometer survey series 
Opinion majori-
ty size 
0-50, absolute value of support for policy 
change (as percentage, excluding DK/refusal) 
minus 50 
Eurobarometer survey series 
EU-wide opin-
ion majority 
size 
0-50, absolute value of EU-wide support for 
policy change (as percentage, excluding 
DK/refusal) minus 50 
 
EU competence 
level 
‘1’ = Mainly national competence 
‘2’ = Mixed competence 
‘3’ = Mainly EU competence 
Author’s own coding fol-
lowing Börzel (2005) and 
Hix and Høyland (2011) 
Decision rule ‘1’ = QMV 
‘2’ = Unclear decision rule 
‘3’ = Unanimity 
Author’s own coding 
 
 
		 	291	
Data collection 
Policy issues were selected by screening all ‘Standard’, ‘Special’, and ‘Flash’ 
Eurobarometers with a fieldwork start date between 1st of May 2004 and 31st of 
December 2010 for the following key terms: ‘oppose’, ‘agree’, ‘approve’, ‘fa-
vour’, ‘for it or against it’, ‘do you think’, ‘in your opinion’, ‘do you believe’, 
‘would you say’, ‘should’, and ‘would you like’. For each question item that 
contained these terms, I further ascertained whether it fulfilled the following 
four criteria: 
 
1) Opinion: The item asked respondents for their personal opinion on a pol-
icy issue, or policy change, rather than whether some policy is ‘useful’, 
‘important’, or ‘efficient’. 
2) No conditionality: The item surveyed straight opinion on the policy with-
out hypothetical or conditional twists (e.g. ‘given that X, would you op-
pose Y’). 
3) Specificity: The item wording was specific enough for human coders to be 
able to ascertain implementation. 
4) Competence: The implementation of the policy lay within the potential 
competences of the EU level, and given this competence, the EU had a 
realistic chance of unilaterally implementing the policy.147 This excluded 
any questions on areas with exclusive national competences, but it in-
																													
147 The second criterion led to the exclusion of questions on EU enlargement to Switzerland and 
Iceland, as these countries have proven considerably unwilling to join the EU and unilateral 
implementation from the EU side is not realistic. In turn, Turkey and countries in the Balkans 
and Eastern Europe are generally assumed to be willing to join the EU, and the EU has a realis-
tic chance of enabling their accession. 
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cluded areas of weak and potentially growing competence (e.g. public 
health, nuclear energy).148  
 
All questions that fulfilled these four criteria were included in the final da-
taset. In addition, 29 policy issues (relating to 31 implementation opportunities) 
were included that mildly violated one or two of these criteria.149 They were 
earmarked and in the section on robustness checks below I show that their ex-
clusion does not influence the results of the analyses. In total, 207 Eurobarome-
ter questions on 171 distinct policy issues were identified. But the responsive-
ness and congruence analyses in the paper and in the robustness check section 
below had to be performed on a slightly reduced dataset of 201 questions on 
167 policy issues. For three questions implementation could not be ascertained 
due to a lack of cooperation by the DG Agriculture and Rural Development. For 
two questions the EU was unable to implement policy within the maximum 
implementation time lag (see below) due to the timing of the next negotiations 
of the Multiannual Financial Framework, and for one question public opinion 
estimates were fully missing from the Eurobarometer data provided by GESIS. 
As various question formats were used across the 167 policy issues, for each 
format it was necessary to decide which response options relate to support for 
policy change and which to endorsement of the status quo. For instance, ‘totally 																													
148 As many policy areas are ‘shared competences’ between the EU and the national level, the 
EU has a chance to implement policies at any time, even though no EU legislation is in force so 
far. In addition, treaty change can provide the EU with more competences, but ‘candidate’ items 
rarely related to issues of exclusive national competence. 
149 The data also includes three policy issues regarding the euro currency. For these cases public 
opinion was only measured in the countries that had adopted the common currency. The gen-
eral logics of joint decision-making at the EU level should nevertheless apply and the questions 
were therefore included in the data.  
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in favour’ and ‘somewhat in favour’ were merged as both representing support 
for policy change, while ‘totally disagree’ and ‘tend to disagree’ were joined as 
support for the status quo. Allocating response options was mostly straightfor-
ward except in the following notable cases:  
 
1) Response indicating indifference: A very small number of questions offered 
a ‘neither … nor …’ or alternative option indicating that respondents 
were indifferent between policy change and the status quo. In these cas-
es, I counted half of the indifferent respondents to be supportive of poli-
cy change and the other half in favour of the status quo. 
2) Bi-directional policy change: Some questions relating to the EU budget of-
fered two directions of policy change, i.e. an increase or decrease in the 
budget, as well as a ‘no change’ or ‘maintain’ option. For some of these 
items, the question text clearly suggested that respondents should view 
either an increase or a decrease as change. Hence, either increase or de-
crease was coded as support for policy change and the other response 
option as well as the ‘no change’ option were coded as support for the 
status quo. If the question text provided no suggestion, an increase in the 
budget was assumed to represent change. 
 
For all questions, support for policy change (as a percentage) was calculated 
on the basis of opinion-revealing responses, i.e. DKs and refusals were exclud-
ed. In contrast, salience (as a percentage) was calculated as 100 minus the frac-
tion of DK and refusal responses on the basis of all responses. Post-stratification 
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weights provided by the Eurobarometer were used to obtain country and EU-
wide estimates of opinion and salience.150 
Human coders ascertained the implementation record for each policy issue, 
wherever possible on the basis of publicly available information by the EU in-
stitutions, and where necessary by written questions to the DGs of the Commis-
sion. Coders assessed the implementation degree, i.e. to what extent the policy 
change had occurred (scale from 0-100), and the implementation date, i.e. when 
the change was agreed. Thereby, they also checked whether the proposed poli-
cy change had already been implemented before the survey’s fieldwork, i.e. 
whether the question asked about support for the status quo rather than about 
policy change. This was the case for 26 issues (relating to 30 implementation 
opportunities). For these cases I swapped the public opinion estimates so that 
they represented support for change and coders checked whether change oc-
curred to the (newly established) status quo. In the section on robustness checks 
below I demonstrate that excluding these issues yields exactly the same results. 
Coders also provided URL internet addresses to all information used as well as 
a short written justification for their assessment of the implementation degree. 
The coding instructions used are attached at the end of this appendix. One cod-
er first collected the implementation records, before a second coder performed 
an independent search. A small number of disagreements between the coders 
were settled in discussion. 																													
150 In order to calculate EU-wide estimates of opinion and salience, I randomly sampled 2,000 
individuals from the data. If I instead used all 25,000-30,000 observations available in the data, 
random measurement error in the EU-wide estimate would be substantially smaller than in the 
country-level estimates of opinion (based on only about 1,000 observations for most countries), 
which could drive results. However, when using all observations for the EU-wide estimate, 
results (Models R5 and R6 in Table 5.4 and Model C2 in Table 5.5) are identical except for the 
coefficient on ‘most salient opinion’ in Model R6, which is not significant at the 10% level with a 
p-value of 0.14. 
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While coders were generally advised to ascertain the implementation degree 
as the ‘percentage of the proposed change that was implemented’, more specific 
guidelines were provided for two types of issues: 
 
1) EU enlargement: As question items on enlargement were asked three 
times within the period of Eurobarometers covered (10½ years), coders 
were instructed to consider a 6-year (instead of indefinite) implementa-
tion lag from the start date of survey fieldwork. They ascertained the 
number of stages (16 in total, from negotiations over an EU Association 
Agreement to the joining date) countries working towards EU accession 
had completed within this period. The implementation degree was de-
fined as the percentage (rounded to the nearest 5) of completed stages 
out of the total number of remaining stages at the start date of survey 
fieldwork.  
2) Differentiated integration: In some areas (justice and home affairs, open 
coordination) EU-level policies are agreed but not applied in all geogra-
phies (see e.g. Holzinger and Schimmelfennig 2012). In these cases of dif-
ferentiated integration, coders weighted the implementation degree by 
the number of countries that the change applied to, e.g. if the implemen-
tation was complete but only applied in 24 out of 27 countries, the im-
plementation degree was 90 (rounded to the nearest 5). 
 
For the implementation date coders were instructed to determine the ‘date 
on which the policy change is passed’. In the case of secondary law, this is the 
date all relevant EU institutions (e.g. EP, the Council) arrived at a political 
agreement on the relevant legislative act (as reported in EUR-Lex). In the case of 
primary law, it is the day the last national parliament ratified the relevant in-
ternational treaty.  
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The histogram in Figure A4.1 shows the distribution of the implementation 
lag (implementation date minus start date of survey fieldwork) across the data. 
This reveals two peaks in the data: questions on policy change are either fielded 
in the phase of policy preparation (i.e. 1000-2000 days before a political agree-
ment is reached) or shortly before policy implementation (i.e. less than 500 days 
before an agreement is reached). This supports the argument in the paper that 
the DGs use public opinion as a ‘bargaining chip’, either when negotiating 
amongst themselves during policy preparation, or when defending policy posi-
tions vis-à-vis the Council or the EP in the ‘end game’ of negotiations.  
 
FIGURE A4.1: HISTOGRAM OF IMPLEMENTATION LAG 
 
Notes: Based on cases with implementation degree greater than 0. 
 
Compared to studies of policy representation in the US (e.g. Gilens 2005, 
2012), in which 90% of policies that are implemented have a time lag between 
the survey’s fieldwork date and the implementation date of less than two years, 
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the median implementation lag in the EU data is four years (1427 days or 1315 
days – when excluding outliers, see below). On the one hand, this may be evi-
dence of the complex and lengthy policy process at the EU level. On the other 
hand, it may also be due to the fact that Eurobarometer questions are posed for 
the purpose of policy preparation (see above), whereas US survey companies 
presumably pose questions in times of public attention, e.g. shortly before votes 
in Congress. To the extent that this conjecture is accurate, the data here may 
suffer from less endogeneity bias than US data, as politicians who want to ma-
nipulate opinion should be less able to predict future implementation the more 
distant it is in time (also see robustness checks in the paper).  
However, the long implementation lags also pose problems, since opinion on 
policy issues may change over time and it seems problematic, at the very least, 
to speak of ‘responsiveness’, if citizens’ preferences are implemented after eight 
or 10 years. For this reason, I decided to correct the implementation degree to 0 
for any implemented change that happened after more than five and a half 
years (or 2008 days). This cut-off was chosen as the distribution of implementa-
tion lags starkly drops down after 2000 days (see Figure A4.1) and its long tail 
seems mainly to represent outliers, making up less than 10% of observations. In 
the section on robustness checks below, I also show that I obtain substantively 
the same results, with some variations in statistical significance, when using a 
cut-off of five years or when including all implementations, even after 10 years. 
The binary implementation variable used in the paper was constructed on 
the basis of the implementation degree and is ‘1’ if the implementation degree 
was 80 or more, and ‘0’ otherwise. This threshold of 80% implementation is in 
line with established practice in the field (see e.g. Gilens 2005: 782). Importantly, 
apart from policy issues on EU enlargement only five issues were assessed with 
an implementation degree greater than 0 but smaller than 80. In the section on 
robustness checks below I demonstrate that setting the threshold for implemen-
tation to 50 instead of 80 does not affect any results. 
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In the paper, I discuss the question of sponsor desirability bias in the Euroba-
rometer data. In particular, I argue that relative figures of support across coun-
tries are still a valid proxy of cross-country differences in opinion, as it is hard 
to influence these figures through question design and as it is unclear whether 
the Commission has any incentive to do so. In this respect, I would like to 
acknowledge that it might be possible to construct questions in such a way as to 
artificially obtain higher figures of support by – say – French or Italian re-
spondents, for instance, by presenting the policy in a certain frame. But this 
may at the same time have unintended consequences, lowering the support of 
the Germans or the Dutch. Control is limited. Moreover, while occasionally it 
may be strategically beneficial for the Commission to showcase high support in 
certain countries whose governments are blocking legislation, there is no reason 
to assume that this bias is systematic across policies. Lastly, one should consid-
er that many US studies rely on questions from survey companies that are con-
ducted for particular media outlets with a particular political slant. Absence of 
sponsor desirability bias is unlikely in such questions. In best case, biases of 
different companies cancel out on average.  
 
EU competence level 
The competence level of the EU with regard to implementing policy change 
was coded on the basis of assessments in Börzel (2005) and Hix and Høyland 
(2011).  
 
Decision rule 
The decision rule in the Council of the European Union that has to be used to 
agree policy change was assessed on the basis of the Lisbon Treaty rules. In 
some cases, the legal basis on which the change would be agreed was not clear. 
The decision rule for such issues was recorded as ‘Unclear decision rule’.  
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In contrast to theoretical expectations, my results in the responsiveness anal-
yses indicate that unanimity as decision rule makes policy change more likely 
instead of less likely. I suspect that this result could be due to some pre-
selection by the DGs, which perhaps only put policy questions with unanimity 
as decision rule on surveys when they expect strong and uniform support 
across countries and a real chance of implementation, while they may be less 
selective on QMV issues. Alternatively, there may also be complex interactions 
with the EU competence level, as the positive effect of unanimity turns insignif-
icant once I do not control for the competence level. 
 
Factor analyses of opinion and salience 
In the paper, I report the results of a factor analysis of question-demeaned 
support for policy change in order to map the EU’s public opinion space. Here, 
I provide a more substantive interpretation of the policy contrasts behind the 
first (old vs. new member states) and second factor (northern vs. southern 
member states) by investigating the factor scores of the question items. It turns 
out that factor one relates to the difference between prioritising environmental 
protection and phasing out the common agriculture policy (CAP) vs. support 
for enlargement of the union. While the publics in the old member states are 
relatively more supportive of ambitious changes in environmental protection as 
well as cutting the CAP’s budget, the citizens in the new member states priori-
tise the inclusion of more countries (without a specific focus). In turn, the se-
cond factor pits southern publics that prioritise support for federalist compe-
tence extension (especially in foreign affairs and symbolic politics) and some 
integration in financial affairs (transaction tax, consumer rights in financial ser-
vices) against northern publics that favour differentiated enlargement (esp. Bal-
kans, Ukraine) and cuts to the CAP. 
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These substantive differences in opinion are in line with the substantive dif-
ferences found in studies of governments’ initial policy positions in the Council 
(Thomson 2009, 2011a). For instance, these studies also find that old and new 
member states differ starkly in their preferences regarding the CAP and har-
monisation of policies. Similarly, they also find that the north-south divide re-
lates to questions of regulation vs. market-based solutions, which is in line with 
my finding that publics in the south are more in favour of regulatory projects in 
financial affairs (such as financial transaction tax or consumer rights in financial 
services). Taking into account that these studies could not cover policy posi-
tions on enlargement or federalist competence extension, which are covered in 
the data used here, the overlap in substantive meaning of the two divides (new 
vs. old, north vs. south) is quite striking. 
In addition, I here also report results of a factor analysis of question-
demeaned salience (Table A4.3). Using the Kaiser-Guttman criterion of an ei-
genvalue greater than 1, I retain five factors with the principal factor method. 
Importantly, the first two factors explain about 66% of all variation in question-
demeaned salience. Figure A4.2 plots the factor loadings for factors one and 
two. In contrast to the map of opinion, the country contrasts on the two factors 
have less straightforward interpretations. On factor one, the starkest contrast is 
between Finland on the one hand and Spain and Portugal on the other hand. 
But it is no straightforward north-south divide, as Greece is close to Finland 
and the Baltic states are close to Spain. On factor two, the opposing poles are 
Slovakia and Hungary vs. the UK and Ireland. While this configuration is close 
to a divide between new vs. old member states, Cyprus, Malta, and – to some 
extent – Poland and Slovenia are closer to the new member states. Hence, it 
could be characterised as a divide between post-communist vs. Western mem-
ber states (with the notable exceptions of Poland and Slovenia). 
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TABLE A4.3: FACTOR ANALYSIS OF COUNTRY DIFFERENCES IN SALI-
ENCE 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Uniqueness 
 Eigenvalue 
7.31 
Eigenvalue 
4.64 
Eigenvalue 
1.41 
Eigenvalue 
1.25 
Eigenvalue 
1.19 
 
at 0.405 0.107 -0.095 0.668 0.192 0.332 
be 0.721 -0.111 0.330 0.116 -0.325 0.240 
cy -0.112 0.288 -0.111 -0.181 0.017 0.859 
cz 0.544 -0.627 -0.005 -0.142 0.287 0.209 
de 0.613 0.255 0.019 0.284 -0.341 0.362 
dk 0.631 0.256 0.475 0.095 0.195 0.265 
ee -0.551 -0.473 0.328 0.039 0.260 0.296 
el 0.745 -0.144 -0.143 -0.095 -0.088 0.388 
es -0.657 0.268 0.046 0.189 -0.012 0.459 
fi 0.827 0.004 0.220 -0.244 -0.049 0.206 
fr 0.190 0.564 0.371 0.164 -0.245 0.421 
hu -0.103 -0.725 -0.139 0.224 -0.263 0.324 
ie -0.566 0.642 -0.086 0.091 0.262 0.183 
it 0.124 0.624 -0.361 -0.157 -0.041 0.438 
lt -0.549 -0.589 0.007 -0.090 -0.281 0.263 
lu 0.578 0.387 -0.144 0.233 -0.011 0.441 
lv -0.477 -0.642 0.285 0.043 0.031 0.276 
mt -0.525 0.315 0.069 -0.385 -0.006 0.472 
nl 0.704 0.219 -0.017 -0.304 -0.094 0.355 
pl -0.457 0.036 0.302 -0.139 -0.329 0.571 
pt -0.652 0.136 -0.245 0.194 0.098 0.450 
se 0.607 -0.028 0.194 -0.169 0.447 0.364 
si 0.576 -0.096 -0.322 -0.112 0.166 0.516 
sk 0.280 -0.745 0.015 0.167 0.216 0.293 
uk -0.373 0.641 0.430 0.050 0.221 0.213 
Notes: Principal factor method; five retained factors (eigenvalue > 1); factor loadings greater than ±0.45 in 
bold; at: Austria; be: Belgium; cy: Cyprus; cz: The Czech Republic; dk: Denmark; ee: Estonia; fi: Finland; fr: 
France; de: Germany; el: Greece; hu: Hungary; ie: Ireland; it: Italy; lv: Latvia; lt: Lithuania; lu: Luxem-
bourg; mt: Malta; nl: The Netherlands; pl: Poland; pt: Portugal; si: Slovenia; sk: Slovakia; es: Spain; se: 
Sweden; uk: The United Kingdom 
 
In substantive terms, the factor loadings reveal that factor one relates to the 
difference between those national publics for whom questions of animal protec-
tion, research, and space exploration are important (Spain, Portugal, …) vs. 
those that find questions of technology (such as stem cell research) and en-
largement more salient (Finland, Greece, …). Factor two is easier to interpret 
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with regard to its substantive meaning: it pits the difference between publics 
that care about the CAP, enlargement, and the EU budget (post-communist 
countries) against those that care more about financial services and constitu-
tional matters (Western European countries). In total, the analysis reveals some 
structure of salience across countries, but it is rather unrelated to well-known 
political cleavages from the literature.  
 
FIGURE A4.2: THE EU’S PUBLIC SALIENCE SPACE 
Notes: Factor loadings for factors one and two. at: Austria; be: Belgium; cy: Cyprus; cz: The Czech Repub-
lic; dk: Denmark; ee: Estonia; fi: Finland; fr: France; de: Germany; el: Greece; hu: Hungary; ie: Ireland; it: 
Italy; lv: Latvia; lt: Lithuania; lu: Luxembourg; mt: Malta; nl: The Netherlands; pl: Poland; pt: Portugal; si: 
Slovenia; sk: Slovakia; es: Spain; se: Sweden; uk: The United Kingdom 
 
Additional robustness checks 
In addition to the robustness checks presented in the paper, I perform several 
additional checks regarding the responsiveness and the congruence analyses in 
this section. Wherever possible, these checks are based on re-estimations of 
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Model R1 and Model C3 from the paper. All results are reported in Tables A4.4 
and A4.5. 
First, I address two concerns regarding the measurement of implementation. 
On the one hand, the binary measure of implementation is based on a continu-
ous measure (0-100) and successful implementation is recorded if at least 80% 
of the proposed policy change was implemented. This threshold established in 
the literature (Gilens 2005, 2012) may seem arbitrary and therefore Models R1 
and C1 re-estimate all key results on responsiveness and congruence with a 
threshold value for successful implementation of 50%. This does not affect the 
results at all. On the other hand, using a binary measure of implementation is 
necessary for the congruence analysis, but not the responsiveness analysis, 
where the binary measure removes variation from the data. To test whether this 
has any consequences, I re-estimate the main model from the responsiveness 
analysis with the continuous implementation degree as dependent variable and 
linear regression with a random effect on the level of policy issues in Model R2. 
Again, the substantive results remain unchanged. 
Second, I address two concerns regarding problematic policy issues in the 
dataset. As I have alluded to above, 29 policy issues were included in the data 
that mildly violate the four criteria that had, in principle, to be fulfilled for in-
clusion. To check whether these ‘borderline’ issues drive any results, I perform 
the main responsiveness and congruence analyses without these issues in Mod-
els R3 and C2. The results are exactly the same when excluding these issues. On 
the other hand, the coding of the implementation records revealed that the 
questions relating to 26 policy issues in the data surveyed support for a status 
quo rather than for policy change. In these cases, I swapped the public opinion 
estimates so as to reflect support for change. Given the paramount consequenc-
es of question design and wording on opinion estimates, asking for support of a 
change or disapproval of an existing status quo may not be comparable.  
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TABLE A4.4: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON RESPONSIVENESS ANALYSIS 
 Model R1 Model R2 Model R3 Model R4 Model R5 Model R6 Model R7 Model R8 
Most salient opinion  0.459 1.067 0.429 0.529 0.449 0.205 0.332 0.330 
 (0.140)*** (0.311)*** (0.153)*** (0.166)*** (0.139)*** (0.077)*** (0.103)*** (0.206) 
Least salient opinion  -0.158 -0.367 -0.149 -0.294 -0.137 -0.082 -0.115  
 (0.135) (0.327) (0.167) (0.139)** (0.133) (0.068) (0.104)  
Pro-anti integration issue       -10.755  
       (7.119)  
Pro-anti integration issue x Most salient opinion       0.078  
       (0.090)  
Vote-weighted most salient opinion        -0.026 
        (0.206) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Random effects Policy 
issues 
Policy 
issues 
Policy 
issues 
Policy 
issues 
Policy 
issues 
Policy 
issues 
Policy 
issues 
Policy 
issues 
Number of policy issues 167 167 139 143 167 167 167 167 
N 201 201 171 174 201 201 201 201 
Robustness check Imple-
mentation 
from 
>=50% 
Continu-
ous DV 
Exclude 
items 
violating 
inclusion 
criteria 
Exclude 
items on 
support 
for SQ 
Indefinite 
imple-
mentation 
lag 
Imple-
mentation 
lag of five 
years 
Interac-
tion pro-
anti inte-
gration 
issues 
Vote-
weighted 
most 
salient 
opinion 
Note: All are mixed effects logistic regressions (except for ‘Model R2’, which is a mixed effects linear regression); Variable ‘Most / least salient opinion’ is average opinion across the 
five countries whose citizens viewed the issue as most / least salient; Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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TABLE A4.5: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON CONGRUENCE ANALYSIS 
 Model C1 Model C2 Model C3 Model C4 Model C5 Model C6 
Opinion majority size -0.127 -0.118 -0.110 -0.088 -0.152 -0.244 
 (0.060)** (0.067)* (0.062)* (0.060) (0.061)** (0.083)*** 
Salience -0.019 -0.016 -0.014 -0.014 -0.020 -0.061 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.020)*** 
Opinion majority size x Salience 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003 
 (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)* (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Pro-anti integration issue      -7.942 
      (2.457)*** 
Pro-anti integration issue x Salience      0.083 
      (0.025)*** 
Pro-anti integration issue x Opinion majority size      0.232 
      (0.108)** 
Pro-anti integration issue x Opinion majority size x Salience      -0.002 
      (0.001)** 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Questions,  
Countries 
Questions,  
Countries 
Questions,  
Countries 
Questions,  
Countries 
Questions,  
Countries 
Countries 
Random effects      Policy 
issues 
Number of questions 96 78 90 96 96 201 
Number of countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 
N 2,554 2,082 2,394 2,554 2,554 5,319 
Robustness check Implemen-
tation from 
>=50% 
Exclude 
items vio-
lating in-
Exclude 
items on 
support for 
Indefinite 
implemen-
tation lag 
Implemen-
tation lag of 
five years 
Interaction 
pro-anti 
integration 
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clusion 
criteria 
status quo issues 
Notes: All are fixed effects logistic regressions, except for ‘Model C6’, which is a mixed effects logistic regression; Standard errors in parentheses; 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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But Models R4 and C3 show that all results hold when excluding these policy 
issues. 
Third, I test the results’ sensitivity with regard to the maximum implementa-
tion lag that still counts as successful implementation. While I use five and a 
half years as maximum implementation lag in the paper to exclude outliers and 
ensure a close link between the measurement of opinion and implementation, I 
here re-estimate the main analyses with a maximum lag of five years and an 
indefinite lag151. The results are reported as Models R5, R6, C4, and C5. The 
baseline findings from the paper largely hold across all models. A maximum 
implementation lag of five years yields substantively the same results. With the 
indefinite lag, the findings on congruence become marginally weaker in terms 
of statistical significance. Importantly, the interaction between the opinion ma-
jority size and salience is still a borderline case for statistical significance at the 
5% level with a p-value of 0.061.  
Fourth, I check an important implication from Paper 1 of this thesis: if gov-
ernments apply different modes of responsiveness to domestic public opinion 
on left-right and pro-anti integration issues, these modes may also be reflected 
in territorial representation. An implication of the ‘sporadic mode’ in Paper 1 is 
that public salience should be more strongly linked to policy representation on 
pro-anti integration issues compared to left-right issues. I test this implication 
with a dummy variable for policy issues in the data that relate to substantive 
pro-anti integration conflicts. In the responsiveness analysis, I interact this 
dummy variable with most salient opinion (Model R7). In the congruence anal-
ysis, I test a three-way interaction between the dummy for pro-anti integration 
																													
151 The indefinite lag is applied for all policy issues except enlargement, where a 6-year lag ap-
plies (see also above). 
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issues, the opinion majority size, and salience (Model C6).152 The interaction in 
the responsiveness analysis is positive, as expected, but statistically insignifi-
cant. In the congruence analysis, the two-way interaction between salience and 
the pro-anti integration dummy is positive and highly statistically significant, 
indicating that salience directly increases the probability of congruence on pro-
anti integration issues. Indeed, the marginal effect of salience is significant at a 
p-value of 0.031 for pro-anti integration issues, but insignificant for other issues. 
In contrast, the three-way interaction is negative and significant, indicating that 
the interaction of salience and the opinion majority size is more important for 
issues that are not conflicts over pro-anti integration (e.g. left-right conflicts). In 
fact, it turns out that the interaction effect is virtually zero for pro-anti integra-
tion issues.  
These results demonstrate that salience is more important for territorial rep-
resentation on pro-anti integration issues than other issues. Salience has an un-
conditional effect on congruence for pro-anti integration issues – irrespective of 
the opinion majority size. This confirms that territorial representatives (e.g. na-
tional governments) focus on salience when making policy on pro-anti integra-
tion. In turn, issues that do not relate to pro-anti integration drive the effect of 
the interaction between salience and the opinion majority size. Presumably, 
governments act more systematically on such issues and consider whether the 
crucial combination of salience and a sizeable opinion majority provides them 
with enough incentives to react to opinion. In sum, these findings provide some 
cross-validation of key results from Paper 1. 
Last, I return to the robustness check regarding a regressive distribution of 
bargaining power in the Council which was performed for the congruence 
																													
152 In this model, I have to use a random effect for policy issues instead of fixed effects for ques-
tions, as the pro-anti integration dummy is a question-level variable. 
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analysis in the paper (Model RC1 in Table 5.6 in the paper). Here, I test whether 
a vote-weighted version of most salient opinion outperforms most salient opin-
ion in the responsiveness analysis. For this purpose, I first rank the opinion of 
national publics by salience (as for ‘most salient opinion’) and then by the num-
ber of Council votes allotted to their country. I add the two ranks and define 
‘vote-weighted most salient opinion’ as the simple average opinion of those 
national publics with a summed rank <= 20.153 Model R8 pits vote-weighted 
most salient opinion against most salient opinion. As expected, the vote-
weighted version of opinion is not a statistically significant predictor of policy 
change. However, the coefficient on most salient opinion also turns statistically 
insignificant, with a p-value of 0.11. Hence, we have no evidence that it is nec-
essary to account for a non-equal distribution of power between member states 
in territorial representation in the EU. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																													
153 For instance, a national public opinion estimate would be included if opinion was the 4th by 
salience and the country was the 15th by votes. 
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Implementation	Check	Codebook	
	
When	checking	the	implementation	record	for	a	proposed	policy	change,	please	ad-
here	to	the	following	rules:	
	
1. Wherever	possible	use	official	information	from	EU	institutions	(e.g.	the	European	
Commission,	the	European	Parliament,	the	Council	of	the	EU,	EU	agencies).	The	web-
sites	of	the	European	Commission	as	well	as	EUR-Lex	are	particularly	helpful.		
	
2. Wherever	possible	point	to	legislative	activity	by	the	institutions	in	order	to	deter-
mine	whether	policy	change	occurred.	Most	policy	changes	occur	in	the	form	of	EU	
regulations	and	directives	and	their	specific	provisions.	However,	in	some	instances,	
informal	activity	by	the	institutions	represents	policy	change	(e.g.	coordination	effort,	
joint	planning),	or	policy	change	occurs	as	treaty	change.	
	
3. Wherever	official	information	on	legislative	activity	is	not	sufficient	to	evaluate	the	
implementation	record	use	information	from	objective	sources.	These	could	be,	in	
particular,	Wikipedia	and	news	agencies.	
	
4. If	the	implementation	record	can	neither	be	determined	from	official	information	nor	
from	objective	sources,	please	code	the	implementation	variables	as	missing	(blank	
cell)	and	add	an	explanation	in	the	‘Comment’	variable.	(NOTE:	Finding	no	evidence	for	
implementation	should	be	coded	as	‘no	implementation’	and	not	as	missing.	Mean-
while,	missing	should	be	coded	where	the	information	in	official	and	objective	sources	
is	ambiguous	or	does	not	allow	accurate	assessment	of	the	exact	policy	change	pro-
posed).	
	
	
	
Variables	
	
Implemented	before	survey?	
	
YES	=	The	proposed	measure	was	already	implemented	by	the	time	the	survey	was	
conducted	(‘political	agreement’	by	Council	/	EP	is	sufficient	in	the	case	of	legislation).	
	
NO	=	The	proposed	measure	was	not	already	implemented	by	the	time	the	survey	was	
conducted	(‘political	agreement’	by	Council	/	EP	is	sufficient	in	the	case	of	legislation).	
	
è IF	YES:	Check	whether	the	change	was	abolished	again	after	being	implemented.		
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Implementation	Degree	
	
0-100	=	Indicates	the	percentage	of	the	proposed	policy	change	that	was	implemented	
following	the	time	the	survey	was	conducted	(‘political	agreement’	by	Council	/	EP	is	
sufficient	in	the	case	of	legislation;	last	national	ratification	is	needed	for	international	
treaties).	For	instance,	if	the	proposed	change	is	that	Croatia	becomes	a	member	of	
the	EU,	the	number	of	negotiation	chapters	that	have	been	completed	compared	to	
the	total	number	of	chapters	that	have	to	be	completed	for	admission	indicates	the	
degree	of	implementation.	
	
	
Implementation	Time	
	
DD/MM/YYYY	=	The	date	on	which	the	policy	change	is	passed	(or	the	last	significant	
change	occurred	in	cases	of	partial	implementation).	In	the	case	of	legislation,	this	is	
the	date	on	which	the	‘political	agreement’	is	reached	in	all	institutions	that	have	to	
consent	(e.g.	Council	and	EP).	In	the	case	of	international	treaties,	this	is	the	date	
when	the	last	national	ratification	took	place.	In	the	case	of	non-legislative	change,	this	
is	the	date	when	the	proposed	policy	change	was	bindingly	agreed	upon	by	the	rele-
vant	decision-makers.	
	
	
Sources	
	
Web	links	to	the	relevant	information	sources	should	be	included	here.	
	
	
Comment	
	
An	informal	explanation	of	the	assessments	should	be	included	here	(e.g.	‘Data	Protec-
tion	Directive	was	passed	by	Council	after	EP	amendments	on	19/07/2010.	It	includes	
new	provisions	for	the	protection	of	minors	that	are	‘special’	in	the	sense	that	higher	
standards	of	protection	apply	compared	to	adults.	Hence,	policy	change	has	occurred	
and	to	a	degree	of	100.’)	
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APPENDIX 5 
 
 
 
This appendix provides supporting information on Figures 6.1 and 6.2 in the 
Conclusion. First, Table A5.1 displays the classification of EU countries as those 
with weak (column ‘Sum’ < 0), medium (‘Sum’ = 0), and strong (‘Sum’ > 0) rep-
resentation of their citizens on the domestic route according to the four criteria 
mentioned in the conclusion.  
With regard to the first criterion, the three countries with the smallest district 
magnitude (see Paper 1) were assigned ‘1’, the three countries with the biggest 
district magnitude ‘-1’, and all others ‘0’. For the second criterion, I calculated 
the average change in the opposition parties’ emphasis on EU integration (see 
Papers 1 and 2) for all CMP data available from 1990 onwards. Again, the top 
three countries were assigned ‘1’, the bottom three ‘-1’, and all others ‘0’. Re-
garding the public salience of the EU (see Paper 1), I assigned ‘1’ to Denmark, 
Ireland, and France as the countries that have held the most referendums on the 
EU and of which two (Ireland and France) are also members of the euro. In 
turn, I assigned ‘-1’ to Romania and Bulgaria, which have neither held any ref-
erendum on the EU nor joined the euro currency, events which created a lot of 
attention for EU issues during the crisis years. Lastly, with regard to institutions 
for managing EU affairs (see Paper 3) I assigned ‘1’ to the three countries in the 
group of countries with executive coordination that also had the highest par-
liamentary oversight. In turn, I assigned ‘-1’ to the three countries among those 
with no executive coordination that had the lowest parliamentary oversight, 
and ‘0’ to all others. 
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TABLE A5.1: QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION ON THE DOMESTIC 
ROUTE 
 Electoral sys-
tem 
Party competi-
tion on EU 
Public salience 
of EU 
EU affairs 
institutions 
Sum 
France 1 1 1 0 3 
Denmark 0 0 1 1 2 
Ireland 1 0 1 0 2 
Austria 0 1 0 0 1 
Latvia 0 0 0 1 1 
Czech Republic 0 0 0 1 1 
United Kingdom 1 0 0 0 1 
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 
Slovakia -1 1 0 0 0 
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 
Luxembourg 0 -1 0 0 -1 
Greece 0 0 0 -1 -1 
Belgium 0 0 0 -1 -1 
Bulgaria 0 0 -1 0 -1 
Netherlands -1 0 0 0 -1 
Romania 0 0 -1 0 -1 
Germany -1 0 0 0 -1 
Spain 0 -1 0 0 -1 
Cyprus 0 -1 0 -1 -2 
Criterion Majoritarian 
system 
Party empha-
sis on integra-
tion 
Events related 
to integration 
Executive co-
ordination, 
legislative 
oversight 
 
Data Author’s own 
data 
CMP Referendums, 
euro  
Kassim (2013); 
Winzen (2013) 
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Trust in the EU 
I measure institutional trust in the EU with the following item from the Eu-
robarometer series: 
‘I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institu-
tions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend 
not to trust it? The European Union’ 
With the following response options: 
‘Tend to trust’ 
‘Tend not to trust’ 
 ‘DK – Don’t know’ 
 
Satisfaction with democracy 
I measure satisfaction with how democracy works using the following item 
from the Eurobarometer series: 
‘On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all 
satisfied with the way democracy works in (your country)? Would you say you are...? 
How about the way democracy works in the European Union?’ 
With the following response options: 
‘Very satisfied’ 
‘Fairly satisfied’ 
‘Not very satisfied’ 
‘Not at all satisfied’ 
‘DK – Don’t know’ 
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